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Abstract
Air-to-surface weapons, and the platforms that deliver them, are becoming increasingly
automated and remote from operators. The benefits of remotely operated systems have
been widely agreed, yet the question of accountability remains an issue – both from a le-
gal standpoint and with regard to public opinion. The current focus of the military and
industry is to develop weapons with more autonomy and an increased range. This mo-
tivation is part of a wider aim for Network Enabled Capability across all military forces.
This thesis focuses on one aspect of Network Enabled Capability, the remote re-tasking
of air-to-surface weapons in flight, the aim being to explore the potential capabilities of
the human operator that may use such a system. Further, this thesis sets out to inves-
tigate the differences between using an automated system for re-tasking air-to-surface
missiles in flight as opposed to assigning the task to a human operator.
A simulation test-bed facility was established to investigate these research aims. The
development of this system first required a complete simulation of two air to surface
weapon systems, a generic guided bomb, and an extended range missile. These simu-
lation models were integrated into the test-bed facility to allow real-time targeting and
firing of the weapon systems in a 3D simulation environment.
Two participant trials were carried out to test firstly, the operator terminal designed
for re-tasking air-to-surface weapons in flight, and secondly, the operator capacity lim-
its when re-tasking multiple air-to-surface weapons against multiple defended targets.
These trials found that the system developed was suitable for the task, with interesting
results that prove counter to the expectation that operator capacity would severely
limit their capability to complete the task. Instead, operator capacity was found to be
sufficient to perform well in a demanding scenario in which 32 concurrent air-to-surface
missiles must be re-tasked amongst 8 targets. Their performance was comparable with
an ideal automatic system developed for the same role.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Significance and Motivation
The development of Network Enabled Capability (NEC) in military systems is allowing
greater connectivity between individual military personnel and the wider distributed
Command and Control (C2) structure. Such techniques have already been used widely
in civilian industry with positive effect. For example, Amazon’s internal data network,
used for live monitoring of stock and dispatching, allows for increased efficiency within
the company as well as improving the end user’s experience by providing them with use-
ful information that facilitates decision making. This network-driven revolution, made
possible by the internet, has changed the current state of affairs such that timeliness of
information and increased data transfer between platforms allows for new capabilities
to be generated where they were not possible before.
In the commercial sector the increase in applications for network driven products has
quickly surpassed the military in terms of use. In particular, multi-player gaming is
continuously adding new features, with the requirement for more network dependency.
Large numbers of players can simultaneously play in a single game world – requiring
significant overheads in terms of networking. Military systems have been slow on the
uptake of networked solutions to support the way in which wars are fought for several
reasons. One of the primary reasons is safety – any network used in the military must
be robust, as it will inherently involve information relating to military actions. Failures
of the network could result in potential loss of life. Networked gaming and other com-
mercial outlets for networking have far less risk to the users or others when the system
fails. Moreover, the commercial sector have far more opportunities to roll out patches
and updates to fix problems as and when they need to. This continuous development
is more difficult in military systems, where the product life cycle of any system may be
decades, and when platforms are required to be compatible with both legacy and future
systems. It is for these reasons that the military must have clear, long lasting, doctrine
outlining the intended use of networked systems and architecture. In the United King-
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dom this exists in the form of NEC Joint Service Doctrine 777 [1]. First published in
2005, Joint Service Publication 777 aimed to set out the British Armed Forces’ use of
networked systems.
Through collaborative efforts between the government, industry and academia, mil-
itary commanders are reaching the point of being able to use a wide range of NEC
features in battles. These range from enhanced air-to-surface weapon aiming – through
to stores management and logistics. Whilst some of the capabilities such as logistics
clearly benefit the military, other areas such as remotely piloted air systems or remote
re-tasking, re-targeting or refining of weapons in flight require in-depth knowledge of
the limits placed on such systems – not so much by the limitations in hardware or
software, but by the human operator.
One key element within NEC is the improved air-to-surface weapon aiming that can be
achieved through the ability to remotely update information on the weapon whilst it
is in flight. The main advantage of such a capability is the extended ‘stand-off’ range
of a platform. Stand-off range is the ability to attack targets/launch weapons against
targets from outside of the range of their defensive capabilities. However, extending
the stand-off range of a weapon system increases the time of flight of the weapon. This
increases the chance the target has to attempt to evade the incoming attack through
evasive manoeuvring or by moving into cover, and allows time for the situation on the
ground to change significantly. Furthermore, civilians or non-combatants may have
come within the effect of the weapon. These uncertainties require increased tactical
command of these weapons during their flight, so that appropriate target position up-
dates or abort commands can be transmitted to the weapon should the situation change.
The UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) Selective Precision Effects at Range (SPEAR) Ca-
pability 3 (Cap3) is a 100kg class air-launched precision-guided air-to-surface weapon
program [2,3]. A weapon developed by MBDA to meet this capability includes a two-
way data link that allows for in-flight updates, re-targeting and abort functions [4].
This NEC opens up the roles for which a SPEAR type weapon could be used. For
example, a SPEAR type weapon could be sent updated targeting information over a
network that can either re-task, re-target or refine targeting information, in a simi-
lar way to loitering munitions such as the Fire Shadow missile [5]. These actions are
related to three distinct levels of updating target information relating to the overall
objective, strategic benefits and updating the specific location of targets. Re-tasking
is the act of changing the main task, for example, switching from target A to target
B. Re-targeting is the act of changing the aim point of a weapon for specific effect –
for example, targeting the stern of a ship to disable rudder control. Refining is the
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act of providing refined target coordinates to ensure that the weapon hits the target as
intended – this is particularly relevant for moving targets.
Re-tasking an air-to-surface weapon remotely to different targets is not only a sig-
nificant technical challenge but also a human factors challenge. The way in which
specific information relating to a weapon’s capability to be re-tasked is displayed to a
remote operator to support their decision making is critically important. Further, an
understanding of the boundaries and limitations that exist within the domain of re-
mote operation of Network Enabled Weapon (NEW) are needed to allow commanders
to configure military engagements in a way that is not too demanding of operators.
This thesis describes an investigation into the way in which re-tasking information is
displayed to operators of remote weapon systems, and the limits that the operator has
when using these systems.
Firstly, a simulation test-bed facility was developed to represent air-to-surface engage-
ments in a safe, controlled research environment. This simulation test-bed facility exists
in a distributed network of aircraft simulators at the University of Liverpool, and has
been extended as part of this research to include two real-time air-to-surface weapon
simulations and a simulated remote operator terminal.
This test-bed facility enabled the human factors research to be conducted into the
best display methods of re-tasking information and the workload factors associated
with them. The first human factors trial sought to find the best way of visualising
the Re-task Availability Region (RAR) of an in-flight air-to-surface weapon. The RAR
is the area on the ground (for air-to-surface weapons) to which the weapon can be
safely re-tasked and is affected by the weapon’s proximity to the target and by the
physical limitations of the weapon such as its aerodynamic and propulsion properties.
Two methods of displaying the information were used. A RAR polygon overlaid on
a map display, and a numeric representation of the RAR capability adapted from the
RAR values made up the two different formats. A participant group was presented
with these two different display formats and tested for decision making accuracy and
reaction time for a set of scenarios.
Following the first human factors trial, a follow-up trial was conducted to evaluate
the workload related performance issued when operators used a more complex display
that was developed to allow for multiple weapons to be re-tasked amongst a number
of targets simultaneously. Again, a group of participants were presented a series of
scenarios to test their ability to perform the task. The scenarios presented were of dif-
ferent levels of difficulty rather than display type, so that findings of operator workload
capacity could be found.
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The results of these human factors trials and recommendations for practitioners when
developing future remote operator terminal displays are presented and discussed in
this thesis. The findings of this research aim to lay out a baseline standard for the
development and use of remote re-tasking systems for military applications.
1.2 Structure of Thesis
This thesis is divided into 6 further chapters:
• Chapter 2 is an overview of the relevant research in the fields of weapon simu-
lation, air-to-surface weapon developments, ecological and other methods of de-
signing graphical user interfaces, as well as the psychology disciplines of decision
making and cognition.
• Chapter 3 details the necessary computational steps needed for simulation of both
the weapon systems and the network protocol used to communicate information
between different ‘players’ in the simulation.
• Chapter 4 describes an overall picture of a battle-space where there are multiple
targets, target types and multiple delivery aircraft (platforms) each with different
sets of weapons. It goes on to offer several solutions to the task allocation problem,
where the platforms and their weapons need to be tasked to the targets in order
to achieve a stated military objective.
• Chapter 5 discusses the first of two participant studies carried out as part of this
research. The study involved participants, acting as a remote weapons operator,
re-tasking a single weapon to a emergent target of opportunity.
• Chapter 6 is the second of the two participant studies. This study involved
participants freely re-tasking multiple weapons amongst multiple targets given a
set of objectives in a Suppression of Enemy Air Defence scenario.
• Chapter 7 concludes the thesis, detailing specific contributions made and the
impact that these have in the field of air-to-surface weapon use. It also makes
recommendations for further investigations.
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1.3 Publications
1.3.1 Conference Papers
Davis, J. K., Griffith, E. J. and Ralph, J. F. Real-Time Task Allocation for Remote
Weapon Operators, In Proceedings, ISIF FUSION, Istanbul, 2013.
1.3.2 Conference Presentations
Davis, J. K., Power, N., Davies, J., Ralph, J. F., Alison, L. Simulation of Network
Enabled Weapons and SPEAR Strike Capabilities at “Hitting the Target?” How New
Capabilities are Shaping Contemporary International Intervention, Centre for Interna-
tional Intervention, University of Surrey, 2012.
Davis, J.K., Mehta, M., Ralph, J.F., Power, N., Alison, L. Remote Operator Terminal
Design for use in a Real-Time Distributed Simulation Environment at RAeS Simula-
tion and Mission Training Conference, RAeS, London, 2013.
Davis, J.K., Griffith, E.J., Mehta, M., Ralph, J.F. Distributed Simulation of Super-
vised UAV at RAeS Flight Simulation Seminar, University of Liverpool, 2014.
Davis, J.K., Ralph, J.F., Power, N., Alison, L. Suppression of Enemy Air Defence – A
New Targeting Capability at RAeS Delivering Weapon System Effects: The Contrast
Between Piloted and Remotely-Piloted Platforms, QinetiQ, Malvern, 2015.
1.4 Novel Contributions
This thesis covers the Systems Engineering and Human Factors of re-tasking NEW,
specifically focussing on the design and use of remote operator terminals for the first
time in open literature. Two main sets of novel findings are presented herein.
Firstly – the study of the difference between display types for initial re-tasking of a
remotely operated weapon system found that the graphical RAR (the native format of
the information) display effectively reduces the decision making time for operators by
approximately 0.5 seconds, compared to using a digital numeric display for the same
task. However, those using the numerical display format showed increased decision
accuracy compared to those using the graphical RAR. This research also found that
during borderline cases there is a large difference in accurate decision making between
groups – those using the graphical format of the RAR making a significant number of
mistakes, whereas those using the numerical display format maintaining 100% accuracy
in their decisions. These findings are important to those who might seek to develop
these capabilities in the near future.
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Secondly – investigations into the effects of simultaneous multiple re-tasking on op-
erator performance revealed that whilst there are real identifiable limits on the number
and frequency of simultaneous weapon engagements that can be handled by an opera-
tor, performance is sufficient to manage the task at a reasonable pace. An automated
re-tasking system was used to establish a baseline ideal performance across scenarios
where acknowledged communication and weapon system limitations were built into the
system. Performance of human operators was compared to the automated process with
some interesting comparable results. Human operators are able to maintain sufficient
performance until a point where the additional workload, caused by having a large num-
ber of weapons to re-task in a short period of time, causes a drop off in performance. It
is necessary to credit MBDA Systems for their input when designing a potential future
scenario of particular interest to both the military and industry.
This thesis provides an in depth analysis into the potential future of the use of NEC for
the purpose of re-tasking NEW and provides the outcomes of two studies for the mili-
tary, industry and academia to use as a basis for developing remote operator terminals
for future systems.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
This thesis encompasses several fields of academic and industrial research. These are
Aerospace, Systems & Networking (Engineering) and Human Factors, Ergonomics &
Human Computer Interfaces (Psychology). It is necessary to draw from these fields of
research in order to fully place and understand the research embodied herein. For the
purpose of this literature review several main areas will be discussed as related to their
fields, but firstly the relevant background behind the overall project will be discussed.
2.1 The History of Data and Communication Networks
Data communication networks are not something recent. Carrier pigeons were used
from 2900 Before Common Era (BCE) [6] and records from as early as 2000BCE indi-
cate the use of complex communication relay systems using messengers on horseback
and relay posts [6]. The Byzantine Navy had a well established method of communi-
cating command intent between ships in naval battles by raising different flags, dating
back to 800BCE [6]. For longer distance communication fire beacons as warnings sig-
nals were used and can be dated back to 650BCE [6]. Whilst they are fairly simple,
the beacon signal can be considered as one bit of binary data that travels as fast as
the speed of light. Ranged communications could now travel almost instantly between
relay points and no longer took days to travel by horseback or pigeon.
In 1793 a novel method of communicating more complex coded messages was developed
in France by Claude Chappe. Chappe’s Semaphore Telegraph was a mechanical sig-
nalling system made up of a central pivoting beam that had additional rotating beams
extending from each end of the main central beam. The whole system was built into
tower structures that contained the control systems within the buildings. In total 196
positions were available to be used to represent different characters for coded messages.
Chains of towers were placed roughly 15km apart and allowed messages to be sent
very quickly from one part of France to another. A set of codes and codebooks were
agreed upon which prevented ‘eavesdropping’ on the messages as they were sent down
7
the communication network. Only ’Superintendents’ at each end of a chain – or based
in strategically important locations – were able to decode the messages. A complex
set of control signals existed to communicate the priority of messages, handshakes and
potential breakdown issues of the network.
The invention of the Electrical Telegraph, and then the rapid development of com-
munication technologies from the mid 19th Century, provided the foundations for the
complex telecommunications networks of today. Many lessons have been learned about
the importance of such communications infrastructure in the military environment from
the strategic and tactical failures and successes during the First and Second World
Wars. The benefits of the rapid development of portable electronic equipment across a
very wide range of uses has shaped the outlook for future uses of such technology. Now,
in the 21st Century, technology such as digital radio communications has matured to
the level that it can and is being exploited by the more advanced militaries to increase
their capabilities beyond simple voice radio communications.
One such development is NEC, the use of electronic, radio and information technology
to create a network of networks to distribute command intent, share sensor data and
intelligence, as well as provide communication channels for units within the British
Armed Forces and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) Allies [1]. First an-
nounced in 2005, the United Kingdom (UK)’s NEC is more recent, compared to the
United States of America (US)’s Network-Centric Warfare (NCW) concept proposed in
1998 [7]. NEC integrates several programmes with an aim to synchronise all operations
from the tactical up to the strategic level and share relevant information between both
commanders and units in order to mount seamless joint service missions. In theory,
this will allow the military as a whole to use the correct force and tactics where needed.
For example, providing Close Air Support (CAS) to the front line, whilst keeping track
of ground force positions, or monitoring the remaining ammunition levels of forces de-
ployed across the globe. However, in practice the adoption of new technologies often
throws up more unforeseen challenges, particularly surrounding the utility of systems
that present information for an operator. How long these teething problems last can
be dramatically reduced through insightful research into these areas.
Although NEC was not announced as a coherent aim in the UK until 2005, some
development-related work was already under-way. In 2001, third party targeting in-
formation was successfully transmitted from ground units to an air platform [8]. In
this work, a NATO standard “9-Line Brief” CAS message was drafted using targeting
information gathered from range finding binoculars and a Global Positioning System
(GPS) receiver. The 9-Line Brief was then transmitted to, and received by, a Royal
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Air Force (RAF) Jaguar, whose pilot then digitally transferred the target information
to the aircraft’s weapon system. The work, named ‘Project Extendor’, ran from 2001
through to 2006 [9–11]. The modernisation of CAS and remote targeting has been in-
fluenced somewhat by the changing environment in which countries carry out military
campaigns; as coalition forces, rather than as individual nation states. In this instance,
Project Extendor was carried out to show the UK’s Time Sensitive Targeting (TST)
system for the NATO requirement on the coalition forces to produce TST systems [12].
Providing friendly force location allows the aircraft systems to check that no friendly
forces are at risk of fratricide from the weapon. The individual responsible for manag-
ing the weapon systems on-board the aircraft – be it the Pilot in a single seat aircraft
or a Weapons Officer (WO)/Navigator in a two or more seat aircraft – can also choose
a different weapon so as to minimise the risk of collateral damage [13].
2.2 Technology Context
The focus of this thesis surrounds the potential use of NEC for improving the capabil-
ities for air-to-surface weapon aiming and target assignment management. Although
there has already been some development work in the area of networking weapons
and extending the targeting capabilities of weapon systems, the impact this will have
in complex time-critical situations has not yet been investigated in open literature.
Whilst this technology advance will help to increase the utility of weapon systems after
the point of launch from the delivery aircraft, the risks of collateral damage will increase
as the flight ranges of modern weapons are extended. Presently there are limited num-
ber of weapons that have been demonstrated which include an Improved Data Modem
(IDM) for the purpose of allowing remote operation of the weapon [4, 14]. However,
the next generation of weapons will have this network capability [15]. It is therefore
imperative that research is carried out to establish some form of guidelines as to how
such weapons might be used and how best to present information to operators whom
are responsible for them.
2.2.1 Networked Close Air Support and Sensor To Shooter Capabil-
ities
As mentioned previously, NEC can be used to enhance CAS missions by enabling the
sensing equipment used for marking targets to be remote from the shooter of the weapon
itself. Take an example with a unit that has become pinned down by enemy fire, and
knows the location of the aggressor. Using radio systems, the ground unit’s Forward
Air Controller (FAC) would need to use a GPS device (or be very good at reading
a map), a set of range-finding binoculars, and a laser range-finder to fix the target’s
position [9]. Then, he or she would need to request CAS from a friendly aircraft. In
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order to transfer the target information the FAC needs to read out the ‘9-Line Brief’,
a standardised NATO briefing tool for CAS [16]. A typical example would be:
• Initial Point: Charlie 12345.
• Target Bearing: 100 True.
• Target Distance from IP: 10 Nautical Miles.
• Target Position: North 12.345678 Degrees, East 12.345678 Degrees.
• Target Elevation: 12345 Feet.
• Target Description: Infantry Unit in cover...
• Mandatory Attack Heading: 123 True.
• Friendly Distance: SW 10 Nautical Miles.
• Time on Target: 12Hrs 34Mins.
This message would need to be read over the secure radio network to the Pilot or
WO/Navigator (if the aircraft was a multi-seat aircraft), who would then need to
physically write it down [8]. If the target is being lased (the act of shining laser energy
onto the target with a laser designator) the FAC would also need to communicate the
laser designator’s code. Once the message has been received, the Pilot or WO would
then need to enter this data into the weapon targeting system for the specific weapon,
and read back the information to the FAC for confirmation, before being able to attack
the target. This process is clearly time consuming and has many opportunities for
errors to occur such as the misinterpretation of information.
2.2.2 Risks in Air-Strikes and Sources of Error
One of the biggest concerns with calling in an air-strike is the risk of fratricide. This
occurs when a weapon falls sufficiently close enough to friendly ground troops to cause
fatalities. Several case studies have been carried out on the causes of fratricide in both
the UK [17] and the US [18]. UK data shows that the majority of fratricide incidents
occur due to communications or information errors, 21% of cases. The joint second
highest causes are procedural and C2 at 13.5%. Critically, the data shows that the
equipment/technology itself was seldom a cause or contributory factor in fratricide
with a frequency score of only 2.5%. Very similar data is presented from the US source
with the equipment/technology causing fratricide with a slightly higher 3% of cases.
Figure 2.1 shows the information collected from the UK [17] and US [18] data.
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Figure 2.1: UK and US Causes of Fratricide
Whilst the above factors account for around 37% of errors, another error which can
occur is the obtaining of an incorrect range from laser ranging equipment by improper
use. This can happen when there is a slight misalignment between the sight and the
target, and the laser energy reflects off an object closer to or further away from the
FAC. A misalignment may not be apparent due to the fact that the laser spot on the
target is often not visible in the view finder or other imaging equipment due to the
difference between the waveband that the lasers operate in and the range of wavebands
that make up the visible spectrum that a human can see. This means that the laser
spot cannot always be visually verified to be in the correct place. If laser ranging is
carried out incorrectly, and the target range is very short, there is a possibility that the
target location could be so close to the FAC that he or she is in the Risk Estimated
Distance (RED) of the weapon to be launched [19]. There is a need for techniques
to remove risks from procedural, communication and information errors when using
any weapon system, and although there has been some success, achieved through the
digitisation of these elements, there is still more that can be done.
Within the scope of NEC is the need for a holistic approach to remote targeting and
CAS that gives commanders more options when controlling key assets within a theatre
of war. A Blue Force Tracker (BFT) is a system that uses GPS receivers and radio
transmitters as part of equipment provided to vehicles and personnel so that a real-time
situational picture can be seen by anyone with a receiving terminal. Friendly, neutral
and known enemy locations are plotted on a real-time map displayed on a ruggedised
laptop or console that is man portable or located within a larger platform. The term
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BFT is given as the colour blue is the standard colour for friendly troops (red being
hostile/enemy) in NATO countries [20]. The FBCB2 is one such a system developed
by the US between 1995-2004 to increase Situational Awareness (SA) and real-time
representation of the battlefield situation to commanders [21].
CAS missions and targeting are now at a stage where a FAC can fix the location
of a target using GPS-equipped binoculars and range finding equipment. This target
position can then be correlated with information on the network, for example the radar
track of an identified hostile vehicle. The FAC can then locate an available CAS aircraft
using a BFT system. The FAC can then contact the attack aircraft directly to request
CAS. Upon confirmation of a task, the FAC can send a data packet containing the
target and friendly force (own location) information directly to the aircraft’s weapon
computer – to be used by the Pilot or WO/Navigator – removing the risk for verbal
communication misinterpretations and decreasing the time it takes for the information
required to be transmitted.
One issue with this practice – and in general the overall practice of CAS missions
– is the way in which they tie in with the overall tactical air picture. Militaries may
provide CAS through a number of different aircraft types – each with their own levels
of anti-surface capability. For example, Apache Helicopters are equipped with guns,
rockets and Hellfire missiles for short range anti-personnel and anti-armour roles. When
operating in Afghanistan their role was to provide ‘top cover’ to ground troops during
missions [22]. Harrier (before their retirement) and Tornado attack aircraft were also
operational in the same airspace and predominantly used for pre-planned air-strikes.
However, Harriers and Tornados were both tasked to CAS missions at points in their
deployment [23, 24]. In a complex and often cluttered airspace above any land battle
there may be tens of operational aircraft from surveillance, re-fuelling, transport and
attack roles. When a FAC orders a CAS air strike on a position, it will be of great
importance that the assignment is appropriate and of measurable effects in accordance
with Rules of Engagement (RoE), and that the tasking does not impact adversely upon
other strategic requirements. The task allocation problem is still one that must be in-
vestigated so that a FAC or ground operator can optimise aircraft assignments, and
more importantly specific weapon assignments, quickly in this complex dynamic envi-
ronment.
In 2002, Northrop Grumman successfully engaged moving surface targets with the
JSOW and two JDAMs using Link-16 Data Links as part of the Air Force Research
Laboratory’s Affordable Moving Surface Target Engagement (AMSTE) contract spon-
sored by the Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). The weapons
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were sent targeting updates from an airborne BAC 1-11 test bed aircraft [25]. The
UK company QinetiQ then developed a capability to communicate with a weapon in-
flight under the Integrated Sensor to Effect (ISE/S2E) program. The initial proof of
concept was completed in December 2005 [26], with its first successful demonstration
in 2007 [27]. In this demonstration, an Enhanced Paveway II (ePWII) GPS guided
weapon was redirected in flight against a moving target. This demonstrated the ability
to use an IDM to transmit targeting updates to a weapon in-flight. The US Navy
demonstrated their first use of a NEW in use against a mobile maritime target [28]
in late 2011. During the US Navy’s test, the weapon (a JSOW C-1) was launched by
an F/A-18 E/F and was able to receive in-flight target position updates via a Link-
16 network from a third-party. In this case the third party was an on shore naval
ground station who’s data was relayed via aircraft. These weapon trials were proofs
of concept for the transfer of control authority of a weapon system after launch to
a remote location, and the foreseeable future of modern air launched weapons. The
development of this capability now raises the question of how well a weapon can be
controlled, or rather have its targeting information updated, by a remote operator and
how to display this information in order to make best use of the weapon’s full capability.
One method of visualising how a ‘third-party’ may control a NEW can be adapted
from the widely used Launch Acceptability Region (LAR). LARs define the area in
space from which a weapon may be released against a target [29–33]. These areas can
be small or large, depending on both the position and flight conditions of the carrying
aircraft as well as on the physical characteristics of the weapon, for example, whether it
is powered or unpowered. Research into improving the working environment and user
interfaces for WOs on-board B-1B bombers releasing the GPS guided Joint Direct At-
tack Munition (JDAM) was carried out by the US Air Force Engineering Directorate of
Aeronautical Systems Center [34,35]. This research incorporated the use of static LAR
overlaid onto a 2D map view of a set of targets. These static LARs were pre-calculated
based upon mission requirements and uploaded to the aircraft’s weapon computer be-
fore flight. The static LAR display was integrated into the weapon operator station as
a decision aid for the WO to assign and launch weapons against the target set efficiently
through being able to see and predict the scheduling of weapon launch events. It was
greeted with strong enthusiasm by the participating flight crews [35] (pg.32).
The algorithms and data used to generate the LAR display for the B-1B WO ter-
minal could be sent using NEC to a remote operator to process. This would allow the
WO to do their job from a base of operations rather than in the aircraft, and allow
the WO to be placed closer to the commander responsible for the mission he/she is
carrying out [36]. In addition to a pre-calculated LAR, a Reachable Set (RS) could
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be provided to the WO. A RS is the area on the surface that is within the weapon’s
capability at that point in time given the release aircraft’s current position and flight
conditions [37]. The RS can be utilised far more than the LAR in the sense that an
operator could use the information to assess whether a weapon can hit other targets
from its point of release, rather than retrospectively looking for the correct drop point
for a weapon to hit a single specific target. If the RS can be calculated in real-time
based upon the current position, velocity and attitude of the aircraft, then it should
be straightforward for a network enabled weapon to have its own RS, which could be
generated and updated continuously in real-time and presented to a remote operator
live.
Both LAR and RS are terms that are static and are concerned with the ability of
the weapon whilst still being carried by an aircraft. Once the weapon is launched, a
new term is needed to describe the ability of the weapon to hit alternative targets or
to abort if the situation changes whilst it is en-route to the intended target. The term
Re-task Acceptability Region will be used herein to define a RS that is calculated and
updated in real-time whilst a weapon is in flight. It defines the area on the surface
to which a NEW can be re-tasked to when in flight and still prosecute the target suc-
cessfully. The aim is for this to be both generated and presented in real-time, with
minimum latency.
A significant difference between the use of LARs by WOs on the B-1B compared to
the use of RARs by remote weapons operators is the way in which the information
presented changes dynamically over time. For the B-1B WOs the static LARs exist in
a fixed position in space, and the B-1B aircraft must pass through these areas to satisfy
release conditions for prosecuting particular targets. Dynamically the LARs remain the
same, and it is the aircraft icon that moves through the top down 2D map scene. By
contrast, the RAR changes dramatically over time, with several distinct phases. Gen-
erally these relate to the three phases of flight of air-to-surface guided weapons; Launch
(or fly-out), Mid-Course/Cruise, and Terminal Intercept [38]. The launch phase is used
to separate the weapon safely from the launch aircraft. In Mid-Course Guidance, the
weapon attempts to use the minimal control necessary to cruise/glide towards the tar-
get and to shape the trajectory to improve the likelihood of engaging the target or
improving the efficacy of the weapon. Finally, the Terminal Intercept phase is the final
phase of flight when the weapon fixes its target and flies an intercept path. Figure 2.2
shows the normal phases of flight for an air-to-surface bomb, whilst Figure 2.3 shows
the normal phases of flight for an air-to-surface missile that has been equipped with
range extending wings. In this case the glide and cruise (mid) phases of flight are in-
dependent. Both Figures have an example RAR superimposed onto the ground plane,
note that neither image is to scale.
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In Launch or fly out, the RAR remains fairly constant in size and shape, as typically
this phase of flight is only a matter of seconds. During the Mid-Course phase the RAR
begins to reduce in size slowly and at a constant rate. Then, as the weapon approaches
and enters the Terminal Phase of flight, the RAR starts to decrease significantly, col-
lapsing in as the weapon falls closer to the surface. Weapons would not normally be
re-tasked during their Terminal Phase because the weapon is locked on to the target
and has very limited alternatives during the short time immediately before target in-
tercept. Instead, it would be sensible to only consider re-tasking a weapon during the
Mid-Course phase of flight. However, this is a novel situation which needs research into
this cut-off point and sets of guidelines for system developers. These have not yet been
fully explored or been documented in the public domain.
For an operator, who is in control of the weapon via NEC, the collapse of the RAR
poses a problem. At what point does the weapon become committed to the target?
Although the RAR decreases in size, it may be necessary to be able to re-task a weapon
that has already been committed to a target in order to hit a more immediate-risk, a
high-value target, or even to abort the attack. Two such scenarios exist where the
RAR would be utilised to great effect. These are the re-tasking of weapons aimed at
non-time-sensitive targets to emergent threats or for CAS tasks, or the use of re-tasking
to manage the allocation of weapons aimed at targets in a scenario where weapons may
be lost in flight due to enemy fire.
2.2.3 Rules of Engagement Considerations
RoE are the guidelines set out at a national command level which are used by all forces,
to define when and in what manner force can be used justifiably against an enemy. The
RoE in modern conflicts are a great deal stricter than in previous ‘Total’ wars such as
World War II. The main differences arise from the role that the UK and Coalition forces
are playing in current operations and the threats to our forces and nationals. Under
the United Nations (UN) Charter and international law the use of force or threat of use
of force are prohibited except for self defence or when authorised by the UN Security
Council to maintain or restore international peace and security, such as the United Na-
tions Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I) 1992 [39,40], which allowed a US led United
Task Force (UNITAF) to operate in Somalia to enforce peace.
RoE during peacetime operations are based upon the principles and rights of self de-
fence against an act of violence or the threat of violence. However, they change if there
is “War” or “Armed Conflict”. In war, it is customary that enemy forces have been de-
clared to be hostile by national command. From this point on, the RoE are used to limit
the methods of warfare allowed by placing restrictions on the weapons that can be used
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against different enemy unit types, as well as limiting the risk of collateral damage and
risk to friendly forces. The RoE are used to ensure that the force applied is justified and
that the minimum force necessary is used to achieve the desired effect on the battlefield.
For RoE to be satisfied when prosecuting targets there is a need for someone in the
‘kill-chain’ to have ‘eyes on target’ – verified through visuals of Electro-Optical sensors,
and a calculation of the expected Battle Damage Estimates [41]. Given the capabilities
that NEC provides, an operator could be located remotely from the real world environ-
ment in which an engagement may be happening. This is made possible by the wealth
of information and high integrity communication channels available to assist them in
making a firm judgement on the appropriate method of prosecuting a target, which
will include the RoE in effect at that time for that particular operation.
Furthermore, there is a need for remote operators to have an up-to-date assessment
of the significance of a target and the value of attacking it [11]. If there is a choice
of methods, the commander should select those which minimise collateral damage and
civilian casualties. The commander is entitled to take into account other factors such as
stock levels, future demands, the timeliness of the attack and the risk to his own forces,
however, there may be RoE which require a commander to accept a higher level of risk
to his own forces in order to reduce or avoid collateral damage and civilian casualties.
2.2.4 Dynamic and High Fidelity Modelling of Network Enabled Ca-
pabilities
In order to successfully test the impact of NEC on the way in which air-to-surface
target engagements can be managed remotely, the system itself needs to be simulated.
This simulation needs to be real-time, realistic, and holistic in its approach so that the
breadth of both technical and psychological challenges can be tackled. A variety of
algorithms and simulations have been generated from within the Autonomous Systems
and Big Data research group at the University of Liverpool’s Department of Electrical
Engineering & Electronics including the following: targeting systems [42, 43], sensors
and imaging [44,45], navigation via visual scene matching [46], feature recognition and
tracking [47], weapon guidance [48], and task allocation algorithms [13,49].
There are several different key areas of simulation that must be carried out to establish
a test-bed for human factors testing. These are as follows:
• Weapon: Six Degrees of Freedom Simulation
• Weapon: Launch System Interface Simulation
• Network Protocol & Communications Infrastructure
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• Remote Operator Station
• Distributed Interactive Simulation Networking
• Target Simulation
These elements can be considered parts of an overall holistic simulation environment.
Chapter 3 covers the methods of simulation in more detail.
2.3 The Human Side of Complex Systems
Given the new features that NEC and NEW provide the military, the Human Factors
issues that surround the use of future remote operator systems must be investigated to
ensure that any interface system developed is fit for purpose. Whilst studies in Human
Factors for network enabled systems may be conducted by manufacturers and other
defence organisations, it is also important for the academic community to engage with
this topic. Such engagement allows advances from academic research to be fed into the
design and development of new military systems. Known methodologies from related
human factors research can be applied to existing or future military systems such that
improvements can be made, from increasing the SA of the operator, to expanding their
potential job role through effective ecological interface design – a framework used to
avoid interfaces contributing to the difficulty of a task [50]. Relevant information in this
research area should be visible to and comprehensible by the general public to avoid
misinformation being propagated in the absence of valid research. From the coverage of
recent conflicts in the Western media, it is clear that confidence in remotely controlled
military operations is at a low ebb [51], and although a recent YouGov poll suggests
that the public are becoming more accepting of Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) for
civilian use in principle, opinion is still divided as to the foreign policy determining their
use by the military [52]. More openness and clarity can be found through collaborative
academic-military research.
Historically, the responsibility for a weapon fell with the person who fired it. How-
ever, the capabilities provided by NEC allow for the handover of control authority to a
third party. The person that fires the weapon is responsible for it when it is fired, but
then has to transfer responsibility to a remote operator. At all points in time someone
has control authority of the weapon (on the weapon pylon and in the air) and someone
has eyes on target. The effect of NEC is that where these roles were once managed by a
single crew on an aircraft, they can now be distributed and/or transferred off platform.
Responsibility is monitored, recorded and assessed such that the chain of accountability
can be traced. This is all too important for systems such as the MBDA Fire Shadow
– a loitering munition that remains circling above a battlefield for a number of hours
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until needed [5]. However, the Loitering Munition element of the UK MoD’s Complex
Weapon program has not conducted a capability demonstration in Afghanistan ‘due to
system maturity’ [53] (pg. 17).
For any remote operator terminal system there needs to be a robust networking pro-
tocol and a usable interface to provide decision making cues to an operator. There are
several areas to draw knowledge from regarding how best to present re-tasking infor-
mation to an operator. Once such area is the research into Decision Support Systems
(DSS). These are systems that facilitate human decision making when information may
be difficult to process in its raw form – or needs to be relayed through electronic com-
munication channels before being reconstituted on a display. The following sections
introduce the areas of psychology that must be considered when developing the neces-
sary human computer interfaces to support decision making when using NEC systems.
2.3.1 Situational Awareness and Decision Making
NEC is primarily concerned with effecting major improvements in the military through
increasing the amount of information available to commanders and operators of remote
systems, and providing them new capabilities using new network connections. However,
having large amounts of information, or data, does not necessarily translate into having
good SA or improving the decision making of personnel. SA is defined in three levels
as: “the perception of the elements in the environment within a volume of time and
space, the comprehension of their meaning, and the projection of their status in the
near future” [54]. The three levels of SA are split therefore as follows [55]:
• SA Level 1: Perception – The perception of cues and elements in the current
situation.
• SA Level 2: Comprehension – The integration of multiple pieces of information
and a determination of their relevance to the person’s goals.
• SA Level 3: Projection – The ability to forecast future situation evens and dy-
namics.
These three levels increase from basic perception of the situation – seeing that there
is a blip marked on a radar screen, to comprehension – that blip is an enemy aircraft,
to projection – the positioning and path of the enemy aircraft indicates it is probably
going to attack. What SA provides therefore is a basis upon which an individual can
make a decision.
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Figure 2.4 shows Endsley’s SA model in Dynamic Decision Making [56]. It includes
in the centre, the model of SA, including decision making. It also expands into
Task/System factors and Individual factors relating to SA. Of the Task/System fac-
tors, issues such as interface design and stress/workload are identified. Further, Endsley
states “The highlighted emphasis on SA in current system design has occurred because
(a) we can now do more to help provide good SA through decision aids and system in-
terfaces, and (b) we are far more able to actually hinder SA through these same efforts
if, as designers, we fail in adequately addressing the SA needs of the operator.” [55]
(pg. 6).
SA is built up by an individual processing information from a number of different
sources. Endsley presents a model for these different sources in Figure 2.5 [57]. Infor-
mation cues are interpreted through senses but are based upon either direct observa-
tion, indirect observation through a system interface, or from SA attained by others
and communicated to the individual (for example rally drivers using cues from their
co-driver). Endsley’s models [54–58] are typically applied to pilots of aircraft, however,
they are still relevant for many complex systems that require information from many
sensors to be interpreted by an operator.
20
System
Real World
System
Knowledge
Interface
Knowledge
System
Real World
System 
Knowledge
Interface 
Knowledge
SA
Team Members 
& Others
Direct Observations
Figure 2.5: Sources of SA Information
The move towards remote systems – particularly with regard to NEW – involves the
removal of the operator from the direct environment in which the actions of entities
are taking place. Lots of subtle cues exist in the real world environment that are lost
through remoteness and the effects of these are yet to be fully rationalised. In the
environment where remote operators of NEWs will carry out their jobs, the user inter-
face will be burdened with providing operators almost all of their environmental cues
to facilitate operators’ ability to build SA. It is therefore imperative that SA design
principles are taken into consideration when investigating the user interface.
Endsley published a set of thirteen SA design principles as part of her work on the
Situational Awareness Global Assessment Technique (SAGAT) [54, 58]. The six main
principles that are salient to the research and investigations developed in this thesis
are:
• Minimise divided attention requirements, information should be grouped in terms
of spatial proximity and multiple pieces of information embedded within objects.
Attention shifts should be minimised and the number of display sources reduced
(Req. 1).
• Information grouping should be used to attach multiple attributes to each object,
whilst minimising the total number of objects shown. “The entire display should
be viewable in a single glance” and pictorial coding of information used where
possible (Req. 2).
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• It is unnecessary to display systems functioning normally and instead only de-
viations from normal system states should be presented when they occur (Req.
5).
• Information that contains information about trends or rates, or that allows the
trends or rates to be determined should be available (Req. 6).
• “The most important information should be the most salient perceptually to
insure focussed attention after pre-attentive processing” (Req. 7).
• “Verbal information requirements on short term memory should be minimised,
particularly for spatial information” (Req. 9).
Memory in its entirety is used in a variety of ways when relating to SA and the process
of decision making. There are currently three widely accepted forms of memory:
• Long-Term Memory is the store of knowledge and experiences that have been
acquired by a person over their lifetimes [59].
• Short-Term Memory is the part that “can hold a limited amount of information
in a very accessible state temporarily” [59].
• Working Memory is a multi component system that holds and manipulates infor-
mation in Short-Term Memory; it is used to plan and carry out behaviour [59,60].
It is also described as the attention-related aspect of Short-Term Memory [61].
The attention of individuals (and thus working memory) must be drawn to important
elements displayed on interfaces to maintain SA. A study by Jones and Endsley found
that failure to attend to information that was available to individuals was the most
frequent factor associated with errors in SA despite the research being carried out on
fully trained and experienced aviators [62].
Where long term memory impacts on SA is when additional SA is gained through
applying previous experiences to a current situation. Typically these experiences will
enhance the third level of SA - Projection. Experienced individuals apply pattern
matching to the information they are presented to form a mental model of the current
situation and then use this to guide their decision making. The Recognition Primed
Decision model describes this process in depth – and discusses the benefits and mis-
givings of this experience based decision making [63]. The use of previous experience
to enhance SA and make decisions reduces the cognitive load on Working Memory ca-
pacity of individuals as they do not rely on Working Memory to evaluate and compare
multiple options before making a decision. However, this approach has risks as the
decision making process can be biased and the interpretation of important information
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presented may be disregarded in order to maintain the current schema (mental model)
being applied to the situation resulting in errors in SA [64]. Poor application of mental
models to situations was found to represent 18% of SA errors in Jones and Endsley’s
study [62].
However, it has been found that experienced decision makers using mental models
generally outperform novices when making decisions in time critical, high stake situ-
ations [65]. It has also been shown that in these high stake, time-limited scenarios,
where there are few quantitative cues, that experienced decision makers rely on heuris-
tic, simple problem solving strategies [66–70]. These mental models applied by experts
are often useful in practice. Nonetheless, novices can still provide useful insight when
carrying out principle testing of DSS usability. The use of novices mitigates against
the potential of unknown mental models being applied to the task – which is beyond
the scope of the research presented herein.
Decision making cannot be duly covered without mention of Boyd’s Observe Orient
Decide Act (OODA) loop [71]. The loop, shown in Figure 2.6, is a decision cycle
posited in four main levels. Observe, Orient, Decide and Act. Decision making is
argued to occur in this cycle whether in military uses or in other areas such as busi-
ness. It is argued that the speed at which this process can be repeated indicates the
individual’s ability to make effective decisions. The OODA loop relates to the studies
presented herein in that individuals must be able to process information quickly and
then act on the information. Network Enabled Weapon interface systems must allow
for quick acquisition of the information available to assist in decision making.
Orient
Act
Observe Decide
Figure 2.6: Boyd’s OODA Loop
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The problem that designers face is the disconnect between data and information. The
information that is needed in order to support effective decision making may not, and
often does not, correspond directly to the data that is produced. Data must be sorted
and processed by the human to find and integrate the information needed for good
SA before making an effective decision. More data, does not mean more information,
nor does it mean good SA or a better Decision Making process [55]. Therefore it is of
great importance to establish the benefit of different methods of displaying data and
information so that decision making is facilitated rather than hindered.
2.3.2 Graphical vs. Numerical Display Format
The study of graphical vs. numerical displays for DSS is a well covered area of Hu-
man Factors research that stems from perceptual based reasoning and the ecological
approach to visual perception and interface design [72, 73]. However, little of this re-
search has been applied to the area of Network Enabled Weapon systems outside of the
security-limited commercial world of the defence industry. This thesis aims to bridge
this gap.
It is widely accepted that there are two main types of information processing that
occur within the brain, Analytical and Perceptual processing.
• Analytical processing: “focussing on a salient object independently of its context”
(page 467) [74]
• Perceptual processing: “attending to the relationship between the object and the
context in which the object is located” (page 467) [74]
Unsurprisingly, it has been shown that spatial or geo-spatial information is associated
with perceptual processing and that specific data extraction, or obtaining direct values,
are associated with analytical processing [75]. The Theory of Cognitive Fit suggests
that to achieve effective and efficient decision making, the DSS format should ‘fit’ (i.e.
match) the context of the task [75]. Failure to do so will increase the level of cognitive
effort required to respond and complete the task and lower the accuracy of decision
making. Therefore, for spatial tasks, graphs are more useful than tables in facilitating
timely decision making, but do not improve decision accuracy. Similarly for symbolic
tasks, tables/symbolic representations outperform graphical representations in decision
making speed, but both have equivalent performance in accuracy [75].
As with all developing theories, there have been some opposing findings within the
Theory of Cognitive Fit as to which display method induces better performance from
participants. Speier [76] showed that increased decision accuracy and faster decision
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making can be achieved using spatial representation for all tasks, except those that
were complex-symbolic tasks (those tasks which require participants to establish the
relationships between words). In the complex-symbolic tasks both graph and table rep-
resentation drew similar decision making times from participants. Cao [77] found that
cognitive load is reduced when using image/graphical presentation for a geo-spatial
resource allocation task. It has also been found that for dynamic situations, decision
making performance in terms of reaction time and accuracy between graphical and
numerical representation was similar, with only a difference in attention levels [78].
In Gonzalez & Golenbock [78] participants were tasked to distribute water amongst
tanks using a simulated water purification plant control terminal. By measuring eye
movement it was determined that throughout the trials participants attention within
the graphical condition remained constant over time, whereas participants in the nu-
merical condition had increased attention in the same period. This suggests that more
effort is required when the information representation is numeric. Studies have shown
that there is a solid link between attention and effort, and that spare capacity – the
indication of the amount of effort being exerted by a subject [79] – can be inferred from
the level of attention given to a task [80–85].
More recently, individual differences have been quantified when using different dis-
play methods to communicate heath risk and treatment risk to patients [86]. They
found that graphical literacy (one’s ability to interpret data represented graphically)
was a good indicator of an individual’s ability to interpret graphical and numerical
forms of data. High graphical literacy translates to higher performance when using
graphical displays and low performance when using numerical displays. The opposite
is found of those with low graphical literacy. However, numeric literacy (one’s ability to
understand and use mathematics) only affected participants’ ability to use numerical
displays and has no effect on ability to use graphical displays.
Weapon re-tasking is a geo-spatial task, i.e. the operator is in control of an object
located within physical space. Further, the RAR is a conceptual boundary to the ca-
pability of the weapon system that also exists in a physical space. Therefore, according
to the Theory of Cognitive Fit, the design of a DSS to be used for aiding re-tasking
decisions should represent key information graphically, rather than numerically, to aid
quicker decision making from participants. Further, it should be expected that deci-
sion accuracy would be similar with either representation. These theories provided are
interesting for the purpose of guiding initial development into the displays to be used.
It has been already highlighted that there are still differences in opinion as to how to
best represent types of information across the board, therefore investigation into how
this applies to the direct context of Re-tasking for Network Enabled Weapon systems
is needed.
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2.3.3 Decision Priming and Approach-Avoid Conditions
Another influential role of individual performance at tasks is the priming a participant
receives in the lead-up to an experiment. Priming is when an exposure to an object,
event or condition then influences the response to another object, event or condition.
Early research into priming found implications that words are more quickly recognised
when following associated words [87]. This type of priming has been expanded into the
area of approach-avoid motivations. Humans, as organisms, will approach favourable
conditions and avoid those that might be dangerous or disadvantageous [88].
The conditioning of participants to what is an advantageous outcome is a construct
that needs to be explicitly stated to an individual. This is particularly important for
participants in a trial using a new or modified form of abstract interface such as a DSS.
Without cause or justification an individual will not be motivated to take any actions.
Further, using pre-emptive force (in a military scenario) as a positive motivator may
be difficult based upon the implications of what using force might involve (pain, stress,
fear). Negative stimuli can be used to invoke an approach condition to solve a goal, for
example lashing out in defence. However, a behavioural inhibition system is known to
generate the emotion of anxiety when seeking to resolve such cases and it is therefore
favourable to set goals in a positive context [89,90]. When using a DSS, operators may
have no feelings of approach/avoidance based upon the stimuli presented (graphical ob-
jects on a sterile screen, remote from any danger) without being provided a clear and
distinct goal. It is hence necessary to establish such a goal for participants to complete
by presenting them with a proposition:“[Goal] in order to [underlying reason]” [91,92].
Moreover, with the potential for numerous types of scenarios that might occur in the
environment, the goal proposition must be holistic so that all possible scenarios are
accounted for. Care must be taken when stating the goal in the form of an avoid-
ance motivation. Avoidance motivation is used as the main reason for some activi-
ties. For Example, Air Traffic Control (ATC) is associated with monitoring negative
possibilities (collisions) and acting to avoid them. This is known to be draining for
controllers [93,94], who as a result have very strict work patterns with increased breaks
at specific times to alleviate stress. It is therefore important to provide a clear goal
and use it as an approach motivation, rather than an avoid motivation, to invoke the
participant to perform actions ‘correctly’ based upon stimuli presented to them.
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In the trials presented in this thesis, the participants were prompted to perform the task
through developing a scenario context of providing CAS to friendly troops in the first
trial (Chapter 5) and then in a Suppression of Enemy Air Defence (SEAD) scenario to
remove the threat of friendly transport aircraft being shot down by enemy SAM sites
(Chapter 6). In both trials the participants were also told that accuracy and speed
were being measured to encourage their motivation to perform well.
2.3.4 Applications for Decision Support Systems
DSS are widely used for a range of purposes. One of the more investigated areas of
the use of DSS is in aviation, where cockpit displays for instruments and ATC systems
are continuously investigated to help increase SA and support decision making. This
may be due to the problem of ‘Pilot Error’ that still exists within aviation despite
the increase in DSS technology. In the decade from 2000-2010 57% of fatal air acci-
dents were caused by Pilot Error [95]. Other areas that are heavily reliant on DSS are
Space, ATC and Military Systems. This section will highlight relevant studies into DSS.
Chua’s [96] work on Landing Point Designation (LPD) is similar to re-tasking a weapon
in flight. In LPD, pilots use an interface with graphical overlays to safely designate
a landing point for a lunar module moving towards the lunar surface, within a time-
limited decision window. A fuel contour is overlaid onto a map of the lunar surface
and used to bound the edge of the landing zone. Its secondary purpose is to imply fuel
usage through proximity of the landing point to the centre of the fuel contour, with
points further away from the centre incurring extra fuel usage.
Rather than comparing graphical vs. numerical displays, Chua’s [96] work is focussed
on automation and the differences between human participants (experienced pilots) and
an automated LPD algorithm. It was found that pilots only performed better than, or
equal to, the automated LPD algorithm in 18% of cases based on the scoring system
used. The scoring system took into account fuel consumption, proximity to a desig-
nated Point of Interest (PoI) and the safety rating of the landing site chosen. Pilots
incurred a heavy cost associated with the fuel wasted during the time it took them to
make a decision. Pilots took from 12-28 seconds to process the information available
and make their decisions. However, pilots performed better in terms of the safety of the
landing site selected and closeness of the landing point to the desired PoI on the lunar
surface than the automated process [97]. Moreover, the automated process carried no
fuel cost penalty due to the near instantaneous computation of a LPD.
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Clearly, in the above case, pilots prioritised the safety of the lander over the cost of
fuel, whilst the automated process weighed each of the three factors equally and thus
was not capable of making the same judgement. The model used for automation and
the behaviour of human operators was not the same and therefore cannot be directly
compared. It could be argued, therefore, that pilot performance is better than the auto-
mated system when the fuel cost is removed and the proximity and safety of the lander
are prioritised such that their weighting is significantly higher than that of fuel. This
is indicative of the behaviour summarised by Weiner & Curry [98] when discussing au-
tomation of aircraft flight decks. Pilots have the ability to be creative and adapt when
given a task to solve. Weiner & Curry [98] also discuss the role automation plays in pi-
lot engagement with their tasks. Too much automation causes pilots to be disengaged
and bored, whereas too little causes pilots to be overworked [99]. The investigation
of Human Factors issues with regard to the complex area of NEW is therefore vital
if interface designs are to be utilised in a way that allows for operators to adapt to
novel situations and facilitate confident decision making. Automated processes that do
not match an operator’s method of devising a solution to a complex problem can be
both confusing and cause disengagement. Therefore, any automation process should
be properly scoped, with high levels of input from subject matter experts, before being
included in a DSS. Taking note that human oversight is always needed and that an
operator should understand how the automated process is making its decisions.
Another cause of overworked operators is providing them with too many options to
choose between when making a decision [100]. Cummings carried out a number of re-
search trials investigating possible interfaces for use with the Tomahawk Land Attack
Missile (TLAM) [36]. These investigations sought to find operator capacity limits on
the re-tasking of TLAMs in a naval context. One study investigated the maximum
number of TLAMs that could be simultaneously controlled by an operator. It found
that the maximum limit on the number of entities that can be supervised by an oper-
ator was 12 [36]. Three difficulty levels were investigated – 8, 12 and 16 simultaneous
missiles. When supervising 16 TLAMs there was significant degradation in three sep-
arate performance metrics; Decision Time, Accuracy of Decision and Percentage Busy
Time (workload measurement).
Similar capacity limits were observed amongst ATC staff who were capable of han-
dling 10 aircraft, but when that number increased to 17, the operators were unable
to perform their tasks accurately [101]. Objective and subjective workload measures
were taken (Pupil Diameter and Rating Scale for Mental Effort [102]) as they are
suitably sensitive and reliable in simulated ATC tasks [103] as well as direct perfor-
mance measures of the ability of controllers to accurately predict conflicts in the scenes.
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Both studies state the reason for the drop off in performance is the lack of sufficient
cognitive workload capacity of the participants. Operator workload capacity is the fi-
nite limit of the number of mental actions or tasks that can be achieved in a given time
frame. If there is too much information presented, or too many tasks to be completed
within a given time frame, the operators’ workload capacity can be exceeded and the
operator may become either ineffective by way of partial task completion, or become
so overwhelmed that they cannot carry out any of the remaining tasks. With operator
workload capacity in mind, it has been found that 70% utilisation (percentage busy
time) is a good indicator of the maximum utilisation achievable in a system before
seeing a drop off in operator performance [36].
The number of TLAMs being supervised by one operator in Cummings [36] is facilitated
through the use of a decision matrix which matches weapons with appropriate tasks,
and makes it clear to operators which assignments are possible with the weapons avail-
able [104]. Essentially the interface system presents the operator with clear instructions
on procedure that bounds their decision making process. Further, the time-scales for
their decision making is the minutes range rather than seconds. This is clearly different
from the re-tasking scenarios proposed in this thesis – where decisions need to be made
in very short time periods.
In the ATC task [101], aircraft were already established on predefined flight paths
and controllers were only instructed to intervene to prevent collision. It would be far
more interesting to see investigations into the maximum number of aircraft that can
be handled during approach control at a busy airport. This role requires more direct
control of aircraft heading and speed to manage their safe landing at airports.
When automation is reduced, and more direct control is required such as physical
use of a flight control stick, it has been found that the maximum number of simul-
taneously controlled objects falls to four [105]. Clearly the level of autonomy within
the system also influences the drop off point of performance and SA. Further, if the
tandem between automation and the DSS is designed effectively, operator limits could
in theory be increased.
Ruff further hypothesised three key levels of autonomy in remotely operated sys-
tems [105]; Manual (non-autonomous), Management-by-consent, and Management-
by-exception [106]. Management-by-consent is used to describe a system that does
not carry out its next task until the operator gives express permission. Conversely,
Management-by-exception describes a system that acts independently but can be over-
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ridden at any point by the operator. An important finding by Ruff [105] was the inher-
ent trade-off between workload and trust in the system when dealing with autonomous
systems. Manual control of several UAVs increases workload but also increases the op-
erators’ trust in the system. Conversely, whilst Management-by-exception lowers the
operator workload it also lowers the operators’ trust in the system – almost to a level
half that of when in full control of the UAVs. This would suggest that Management-by-
exception autonomy does not provide operators with sufficient trust in the system, and
given the potentially catastrophic consequences of failure, it should be avoided. For ex-
ample, should a management-by-exception system decide to prosecute a target – which
could ultimately result in death – and an operator misses the cue to opt out, rather
than opt in, the decision has effectively been removed from the operator. Management-
by-consent, however, provides a safety barrier of inaction, rather than action, should
an operator miss a cue or need more time for deliberation.
It has been found that for time limited decisions, increasing the time allowed for deci-
sion making does not increase performance, and participants will often attempt more
complex solutions, resulting in them failing to complete the task [107]. Chua [70] con-
firmed this finding in analysis of participant data from the LPD task. Across the pilot
group, those who took significantly longer to complete the LPD task achieved worse
scores than those who made their decisions quickly. Deliberating on an action can be
costly. For DSS that are designed for use in time pressured weapon re-tasking scenarios,
it is important to impart on the operator the time pressure that exists due to the often
short duration and inevitability of air-to-surface weapon flights.
The TLAM and ATC scenarios, whilst similar in subject matter, resemble little in
relation to the procedures likely to be used by military operators when coordinating
dynamic and real-time reconnaissance or targeting missions. The TLAM scenarios used
in the Cummings study only tested one aspect of an operator’s role – the decision of
which of the missiles should hit a specific set of non-time-sensitive targets. Hence this
study could represent an underestimation of an operator’s workload when faced with
the need to make a snap decision on emerging threats.
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2.4 Summary
The position of this body of work within the wider literature has been discussed, and
the areas where information has been drawn highlighted. The remaining chapters of
this thesis will include further exploration of the literature with specific relation to
weapon system and network simulations, as well as more detail on the design of user
interfaces and the experimental methodologies used when conducting participant trials.
The main takeaways from this chapter are that in principle re-tasking air-to-surface
weapons is achievable within industry. This raises problematic questions as to how this
capability might be integrated into some coherent role for an operator. The network-
ing infrastructure is to be discussed in detail in Chapter 3, but the issue surrounding
how such a capability might be developed with regard to a human operator has been
discussed here.
If Re-tasking Network Enabled Weapons is to be achieved, there are a number of
psychological issues that must be addressed. Firstly, an interface must provide a high
level of SA to a physically remote operator of a complex system. The interfaces should
facilitate good decision making by reflecting the decision making processes that op-
erators will use when performing their tasks. This can be achieved by applying the
theory of cognitive fit during the design stage. Moreover, caution should be taken
when enhancing either SA or decision making through the use of automation to avoid
disengagement and confusion of participants when automation either takes over too
many tasks, or performs tasks in an unintelligible way.
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Chapter 3
Simulation Facility Development
NEC provides operators with a new way in which to interact and control remote weapon
systems. One of the main areas is re-tasking weapons to different targets once launched.
A representative simulation of both the DSS that aid an operators decision making,
and the objects that may appear in test scenarios are needed for meaningful participant
trials. There are several independent systems that will make up a complete system of
systems that can then be tailored to fit the specific aims of the automated task alloca-
tion solution and the two participant studies discussed later in this thesis.
The decisions made by operators in air-to-surface re-tasking scenarios require knowl-
edge of the weapon system in flight and its behaviour in different phases of flight. As
air-to-surface weapons are widely varied in role and capability, a mission requirement
must be developed which will require a dedicated weapon type. Once this mission re-
quirement is fully realised, a simulation of the required weapon can then be modelled
and used in a trial. The development of two weapon systems and the necessary targets
will be discussed.
For the Remote Operator System to represent information from the simulation, data
messages must be relayed from the simulation to the operator terminal, which may be
operating on separate Personal Computer (PC)s in a distributed facility. Similarly, in
order for an operator to re-task a weapon remotely, command intent must be logged by
the remote operator system and then transmitted to the weapon system. The develop-
ment of a simulated communication channel between the two independent systems will
be discussed.
Lastly, different simulated entities such as release aircraft, weapons, and targets must
all be present in the same simulated interactive environment. The development of a
bespoke shared simulation environment will be discussed.
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3.1 Simulation Models
Modern computing provides many useful resources and capabilities for engineers. One
such capability is simulation – the ability to replicate a real world object or process in
the digital environment. Simulation can be used for a number of reasons, from proto-
type testing – where it may take too long or be too costly to manufacture a real object,
to training – where the systems developed are detailed enough to allow personnel to be
trained with simulations before using the system in the real world.
Simulations require different levels of fidelity dependent on the requirements of the
system being modelled. Fidelity is a term used to describe the level of detail used
in the simulation formula, and the quality of the visualisation environment and other
sensory stimulation presented to a user – particularly audio, tactile and motion simu-
lation. The main levels of simulation are termed High-Fidelity, Medium-Fidelity and
Low-Fidelity. A High-Fidelity model may represent a large number of degrees of free-
dom, where a Medium-Fidelity model may only model a few, and a Low-Fidelity model
may only represent the object as a point mass. The simulation formula is based upon
basic equations of motion, which are then adapted to include specific properties of the
object or system that is to be simulated. The time step is a term used to describe the
length of time that elapses for each loop around a simulation. For example, a simula-
tion of a simple point mass object might have a 1 dimensional velocity of 5 metres per
second, and a time step of one second. This means that for each time step, the point
mass object will move 5 metres. If the time step were only 0.1 second, each time step
the point mass would move 0.5 metres. The term resolution can be used when refer-
encing the time step of the model. A fine resolution may be a high frequency of around
200Hz – a time step of 0.005 seconds, and a low resolution may be a low frequency of
1Hz.
There are two main areas in which simulation was necessary for the research to be
conducted in this thesis. These are Weapon Systems and Target Systems. The weapon
systems are bombs and missiles that are used to prosecute targets, and the targets are
objects of significance that need to be destroyed.
3.1.1 Weapon Systems
This section will detail the development of two Six Degrees of Freedom (6DoF) air-
to-surface weapon system simulations for the two participant trials. A low fidelity
surface-to-air missile model will also be discussed.
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3.1.1.1 Types of Weapons
There are four main types of weapons that can be used to effect damage on ground
targets; these are guns, rockets, bombs and missiles. Guns and rockets are unguided,
bombs can be either unguided or guided, and missiles are guided systems. The differ-
ent weapon types are used for different effects that match the types of targets being
prosecuted. These effects are generated by the different warheads on the weapon. Con-
ventional types of warhead include Blast – detonation produces a strong shock wave,
Fragmentation – detonation causes metal fragments to be projected at high velocity,
Shaped Charge – the explosive charge is shaped to focus energy and project a hyperve-
locity jet of metal that perforates heavy armour, or High Energy (Kinetic) Penetrator
– there is no explosive charge but the kinetic energy is high enough to cause damage
localised to the impact area. Table 3.1 shows a list of typical warheads and their target
types (reproduced from Rigby [108] pg. 8).
Table 3.1: List of Typical Warhead for Target Type
Warhead Type
Target Type Blast/frag Shaped charge HE penetrator
Troops X
Block wall buildings X X
Hardened buildings X
Soft-skinned vehicles X
Missile launchers X
Armoured vehicles X
Aircraft X
Radar installations X
Ships X
Airfields X
Further, the stand-off range and the mobility of the target dictates the type of weapon
and guidance that needs to be used. Stand-off ranges on air-to-surface weapons relate
to the maximum range that a weapon can be launched at a target. This is crucial
when needing to avoid enemy air defences, and so weapons have been developed that
incorporate lifting wing surfaces, and motors, to extend their range. The expected
target motion contributes to what type of guidance capability is required. If the target
is highly mobile and dynamic, such as a road vehicle, then lateral accelerations might
be needed from the weapon to intercept the target. If the target is static, such as a
building or fortification, then reduced lateral acceleration will be needed, and unguided
free fall bombs could be used instead of complex guided missiles.
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The scope of this thesis is to determine the ability for human operators to extend the
capability of re-tasking weapons in flight by using NEC and Tactical Data Link (TDL)s
between operator stations and the weapons themselves. A guided short-range free fall
bomb and a long range guided missile were chosen as candidates for the testing of
operator ability to re-task weapons in flight. These two types of air-to-surface weapon
are greatly different in guidance method and range. A re-tasking system for each
application (weapon system) must be developed and tested before commenting on the
applicability of re-tasking scenarios for each weapon type. Before a system can be
developed, information on how the weapon systems behave during flight is vital. As
this information for specific weapon systems is highly classified it was necessary to
develop generic models to represent these systems.
3.1.1.2 Generic Airframe/Bomb/Missile Simulation
As mentioned previously, the motion of a point mass can be described with simple
equations. First the object must have a set of properties or states that tell us infor-
mation about the behaviour of the object. In a three dimensional coordinate system
such as North East Down (NED) the states may be position and velocity. This system
has only three degrees of freedom, i.e. the model handles only translational motion in
three axes. However, aerodynamic bodies such as aircraft, bombs, rockets or missiles
require further degrees of freedom to account for the orientation of the object. This is
because aerodynamic bodies are affected by the direction of travel through air, and can
affect motion (either translation or rotation) by changing the shape and orientation of
its aerodynamic surfaces.
The number of degrees of freedom that a simulation model of a rigid body airframe
requires is based upon the requirements set out by the designer. For simple planar en-
gagements, three degrees of freedom can be modelled, for example, translation in two
axes and a single rotation [109]. However, for three dimensional simulation there are
three translational axes and hence three rotational degrees of freedom, more commonly
known as a 6DoF model [110].
A generic airframe has three axes in which both translation and rotation can occur.
These axes are as shown in figure 3.1; the longitudinal axis runs through the nose to
tail of the airframe (front to back). The lateral axis runs through the wing tips, per-
pendicular to the longitudinal axis and parallel to the horizon (when not banked). The
normal/vertical axis is perpendicular to both other axes. Rotation about these axes
are, Roll – rotation around the longitudinal axis, Pitch – rotation around the lateral
axis, and Yaw – rotation around the normal/vertical axis. The origin of the three axes
is located at the airframe’s centre of gravity.
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Orientation allows for the object to be given an attitude in a three-dimensional en-
vironment, but a common set of coordinates are needed to position it. Due to the
earth being spherical, the Latitude, Longitude, Altitude (LLA) system allows for a po-
sition to be identified relative to the earth. However, often in simulation environments,
the small distances travelled allow for a Cartesian coordinate system to be used such as
NED. In the NED system the three axes (x, y, z) are aligned with the North direction,
East direction and Down direction as shown in figure 3.2.
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Origin at Centre of Gravity
Figure 3.1: Translational and Rotational Degrees of Freedom of a Generic Airframe
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Down (z)
Flat Earth
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Latitude and Longitude
Figure 3.2: North East Down Coordinate Reference System
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A general set of equations can be used to represent a 6DoF model of an airframe/
bomb/missile for the purpose of simulation. These equations are standardised in a
number of technical documents from the US’s NASA Ames Research Centre [111] to
the Australian DSTO [110]. A brief overview of the simulation equation set will be
discussed, in reference to figure 3.3 – a flow diagram of the 6DoF equations of motion.
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Figure 3.3: 6DoF Equations of Motion Flow Diagram
There are six aerodynamic coefficients that correspond to the 6DoF of the model. The
coefficients are as follows:
• Drag (Axial) Force Coefficient (CA also known as CD)
• Side Force Coefficient (CY )
• Lift (Normal) Force Coefficient (CN also known as CL)
• Rolling Moment Coefficient (Cl)
• Pitching Moment Coefficient (Cm)
• Yawing Moment Coefficient (Cn)
These terms are generated by taking into account the various shapes of the parts of
an airframe, and then summing the effect of each part on the overall behaviour of the
airframe in its current position and attitude. There are several components that make
up the 6 coefficients needed for the 6DoF Equations of Motion to be calculated. The
following equations list the terms that contribute to the coefficients:
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CA = CA0 + CAαα+ CAββ + CAδpδp+ CAδqδq + CAδrδr + CAδxδx+ CAα2α
2 + CAβ2β
2...
+ CAδp2 δp
2 + CAδq2 δq
2 + CAδr2 δr
2 + CAδx2 δx
2 +
S
2V
(CAα˙α˙+ CAβ˙ β˙ + CAPP...
+ CAQQ+ CARR) (3.1)
CY = CY0 + CYαα+ CYββ + CYδpδp+ CYδqδq + CYδrδr + CYδxδx+ CYα2α
2 + CYβ2β
2...
+ CYδp2 δp
2 + CYδq2 δq
2 + CYδr2 δr
2 + CYδx2 δx
2 +
S
2V
(CYα˙α˙+ CYβ˙ β˙ + CYPP...
+ CYQQ+ CYRR) (3.2)
CN = CN0 + CNαα+ CNββ + CNδpδp+ CNδqδq + CNδrδr + CNδxδx+ CNα2α
2 + CNβ2β
2...
+ CNδp2 δp
2 + CNδq2 δq
2 + CNδr2 δr
2 + CNδx2 δx
2 +
S
2V
(CNα˙α˙+ CNβ˙ β˙ + CNPP...
+ CNQQ+ CNRR) (3.3)
Cl = Cl0 + CLαα+ Clββ + Clδpδp+ Clδqδq + Clδrδr + Clδxδx+ Clα2α
2 + Clβ2β
2...
+ Clδp2 δp
2 + Clδq2 δq
2 + Clδr2 δr
2 + Clδx2 δx
2 +
S
2V
(Clα˙α˙+ Clβ˙ β˙ + ClPP...
+ ClQQ+ ClRR) (3.4)
Cm = Cm0 + CLαα+ Cmββ + Cmδpδp+ Cmδqδq + Cmδrδr + Cmδxδx+ Cmα2α
2 + Cmβ2β
2...
+ Cmδp2 δp
2 + Cmδq2 δq
2 + Cmδr2 δr
2 + Cmδx2 δx
2 +
S
2V
(Cmα˙α˙+ Cmβ˙ β˙ + CmPP...
+ CmQQ+ CmRR) (3.5)
Cn = Cn0 + CLαα+ Cnββ + Cnδpδp+ Cnδqδq + Cnδrδr + Cnδxδx+ Cnα2α
2 + Cnβ2β
2...
+ Cnδp2 δp
2 + Cnδq2 δq
2 + Cnδr2 δr
2 + Cnδx2 δx
2 +
S
2V
(Cnα˙α˙+ Cnβ˙ β˙ + CnPP...
+ CnQQ+ CnRR) (3.6)
where:
α is with respect to angle of attack
β is with respect to angle of sideslip
δp is with respect to deflection angle of the control surfaces used to roll the airframe
δq is with respect to deflection angle of the control surfaces used to pitch the airframe
δr is with respect to deflection angle of the control surfaces used to yaw the airframe
δx is with respect to deflection angle of the control surfaces used to slow the airframe
α2 is as above squared – sign is maintained
β2 is as above squared – sign is maintained
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δp2 is as above squared – sign is maintained
δq2 is as above squared – sign is maintained
δr2 is as above squared – sign is maintained
δx2 is as above squared – sign is maintained
α˙ is with respect to the rate of change of alpha
β˙ is with respect to the rate of change of beta
P is with respect to Roll rate
Q is with respect to Pitch rate
R is with respect to Yaw rate
The components of the six coefficients can be summed and used in the dynamic 6DoF
equations of motion model shown in figure 3.3. Firstly, the forces are calculated using
the coefficients and multiplying them by their reference areas and dynamic pressure,
as well as terms to represent the effect of gravity:
FX = −Mg sin θ − 0.5ρV 2SCA (3.7)
FY = Mg cos θ sinφ− 0.5ρV 2SCY (3.8)
FZ = Mg cos θ cosφ− 0.5ρV 2SCN (3.9)
where:
M = mass
g = acceleration due to gravity (9.81m/s2)
ρ = density of air
V = airspeed
S = reference area
CA = Axial Force Coefficient
CY = Side Force Coefficient
CN = Normal Force Coefficient
Then accelerations can be calculated based upon the forces currently being exerted
on the airframe:
AX = −wQ+ vR+ (FX)/M (3.10)
AY = −uR+ wP + (FY )/M (3.11)
AZ = −vP + uQ+ (FZ)/M (3.12)
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u = Velocity along X axis (body)
v = Velocity along Y axis (body)
w = Velocity along Z axis (body)
P = Roll Rate about X axis (body)
Q = Pitch Rate about Y axis (body)
R = Yaw Rate about Z axis (body)
The small change in body axes velocities can be calculated based upon integrating
the acceleration over the model’s time-step:
δu = AX∆T (3.13)
δv = AY ∆T (3.14)
δw = AZ∆T (3.15)
∆T = model time step in seconds
The small change in body axes velocities can then be summed with the initial velocity
to find the new velocity after the model time-step has elapsed:uv
w
 =
uv
w
+
δuδv
δw
 (3.16)
It is also necessary to convert the body velocity into earth axes so that motion can be
represented in Three Dimensional (3D) space. This is done though rotating the body
velocity vector through the three rotational axes in the order; heading, pitch, roll:X ′Y ′
Z ′
 =
 cosψ sinψ 0− sinψ cosψ 0
0 0 1
uv
w
 (3.17)
X ′′Y ′′
Z ′′
 =
cos θ 0 − sin θ0 1 0
sin θ 0 cos θ
X ′Y ′
Z ′
 (3.18)
VNVE
VD
 =
1 0 00 cosφ sinφ
0 − sinφ cosφ
X ′′Y ′′
Z ′′
 (3.19)
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X = Position in X (′ first transform, ′′ second transform)
Y = Position in Y
Z = Position in Z
VN = Velocity in North Direction
VE = Velocity in East Direction
VD = Velocity in Down Direction
The change in position in Earth axes can then be calculated:
δN = VN∆T (3.20)
δE = VE∆T (3.21)
δD = VD∆T (3.22)
A similar process, as described above for the forces, is carried out for the moments.
First the moment coefficients are converted into moments using the reference area,
dynamic pressure and their moment arm:
L = 0.5ρV 2SlCl (3.23)
M = 0.5ρV 2SlCm (3.24)
N = 0.5ρV 2SlCn (3.25)
l = length of moment arm
Then the change in the angular velocities are calculated based upon these moments,
the airframe’s current rotation rates, and its moments of inertia (axially symmetric
airframe):
δP
δt
= (−RQ(Izz − Iyy) + L)/Ixx (3.26)
δQ
δt
= (−PR(Ixx − Izz) +M)/Iyy (3.27)
δR
δt
= (−PQ(Iyy − Ixx) +N)/Izz (3.28)
Ixx = moment of inertia (xx)
Iyy = moment of inertia (yy)
Izz = moment of inertia (zz)
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The change in angular velocity can be calculated for the model’s time-step as follows:
δP =
δP
δt
∆T (3.29)
δQ =
δQ
δt
∆T (3.30)
δR =
δR
δt
∆T (3.31)
Then the Euler angle rates can be calculated:
δθ
δt
= (Q+ δQ) cosφ− (R+ δR) sinφ (3.32)
δψ
δt
= (Q+ δQ) sinφ/ cos θ + (R+ δR) cosφ/ cos θ (3.33)
δφ
δt
= (P + δP ) +
δψ
δt
sin θ (3.34)
ψ = Heading
θ = Pitch
φ = Roll
Lastly, the change in Euler angles can be calculated for the model’s time-step:
δψ =
δψ
δt
∆T (3.35)
δθ =
δθ
δt
∆T (3.36)
δφ =
δφ
δt
∆T (3.37)
The above equations have found the expected changes in the Position, Velocity, Attitude
and Angle Rates of the model, which are then summed with the model’s initial state
and the final values are output. This process is then repeated each time step:
Position:
NE
D
 =
NE
D
+
δNδE
δD
 (3.38)
Velocity:
uv
w
 =
uv
w
+
δuδv
δw
 (3.39)
Attitude:
ψθ
φ
 =
ψθ
φ
+
δψδθ
δφ
 (3.40)
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Angle Rates:
PQ
R
 =
PQ
R
+
δPδQ
δR
 (3.41)
Not only do the aerodynamics of the airframe need to be simulated, but the whole
guidance and flight control system, and propulsion systems too. The guidance and
flight control systems are critical for identifying the target using a seeker, establishing
a set of guidance errors, and then displacing aerodynamic control surfaces to prosecute
a target successfully. The propulsion system needs to be simulated and managed such
that the weapon either maintains a specific air speed or Mach number, or that a rocket
motor is sufficiently modelled to output various thrust levels based upon the burn pro-
file of the motor and so that the change in mass from burning fuel is accounted for.
Figure 3.4 shows the time step flow chart for a generic simulation model. The above
formula is part of the Missile Dynamics block within the overall weapon simulation
time step.
SEEKER
GUIDANCE
TRANSFER FUNCTION
ACTUATOR CONTROL
MISSILE DYNAMICS
WEAPON SIMULATION TIMESTEP
Position and Attitude
Target Position and Velocity
Guidance Errors
Desired Control Surface Deflections
Actual Deflections Achievable
Update Position of Missile
Figure 3.4: Generic Weapon Simulation Functions in Single Time Step
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The other processes that occur in the main simulation time step are as follows:
3.1.1.2.1 Seeker
The seekers used in air-to-surface weapons range from Synthetic Aperture Radars,
to mm Wave Radars, and Electro-Optical sensors that use Visual and/or Infra Red
band light. The sensors then use various methods to turn the received signal into an
angular offset from the weapon. In simple cases, such as for laser guided weapons, the
seeker searches for a coded laser spot on a target provided by an third-party laser. In
complex cases, an air-to-surface weapon may have a search radar to initially find and
fix a target and then switch to a tracking mode where the radar scans a smaller area
around the target at a higher resolution. Further filtering will take place, particularly
for moving targets, so that the seeker can provide a state estimate of the target to the
guidance system. For the purpose of this thesis the position and velocity states were
generated from the seeker function by idealised GPS and Inertial Navigation System
(INS) systems to provide the weapon’s location. A standard Kalman Filter [112] was
implemented to maintain estimates of position and velocity for the target from GPS
based target position updates in-flight. The velocity estimations from the Kalman Filter
allow for the target position at impact time to be estimated. Whilst not necessary for
stationary targets, it is an important feature for mobile targets. The function outputs
the estimated state of the target for the guidance system, specifically position and
velocity in the North East Down coordinate reference system. The complexities of the
end-game seeker (Find-Fix-Track-Target) have been omitted as it is beyond the scope
of the modelling required to support the research in this thesis.
3.1.1.2.2 Guidance
Guidance systems used in air-to-surface weapons range from simple Line-of-Sight (LoS)
guidance, typically used in beam riding systems, to complex Optimal Control Theory
(OCT) which strives for efficient and optimal engagements using complex sets of algo-
rithms and target manoeuvre estimation. The main set of guidance laws are as follows:
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• Line-of-Sight Guidance
– Command Line-of-Sight (CLoS) – The command system requires that the
weapon fly along the aim-point of a fire control radar or other sensor. The
weapons deviation from the desired course is sent via a data uplink.
– Beam Riding – The command system requires that the weapon fly along
the aim-point of a fire control beam - usually a laser. The weapon has
an Electro-Optical sensor to measure deviation away from the commanded
path.
• Pursuit Guidance
– Pure-Pursuit (PP) – The weapon aims to position either its velocity vector
or longitudinal axis such that it points directly at the target.
– Deviated-Pursuit (DP) – The weapon aims to position either its velocity
vector or longitudinal axis such that it points at a point ahead of the target’s
motion.
• Proportional Navigation (PN) – The weapon aims to impact the target based on
a proportional constant by keeping the target LoS angle constant and closing on
the target in range [113].
– Augmented Proportional Navigation (APN) – The weapon aims to impact
the target based on a proportional constant by keeping the target LoS an-
gle constant and closing on the target in range with an additional term to
account for a manoeuvring target [38,114].
– Differential Geometry (DG) – The weapon aims to impact the target based
upon curvature control commands [115,116].
• Optimal Control Theory – The weapon uses advanced algorithms to classify target
motion and predict performance as well as optimise the weapon’s own intercept
trajectory [117,118].
In this thesis the air-to-surface weapons used the DP guidance law, with the LRAGM
using an additional way-point autopilot for early stages of flight.
3.1.1.2.3 Transfer Function
The transfer function is used to take the desired guidance accelerations that are needed
to maintain the guidance of the air-to-surface weapon and turn them into control sur-
face deflections needed to effect those accelerations. In order to calculate the control
surface deflections needed, the transfer function first calculates the weapon’s stability
based upon its current attitude and flight conditions with neutral control deflections.
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Next the transfer function estimates the effect of small control surface deflections in
the roll, pitch, yaw rotational axes and the accelerations that these produce. Then, by
subtracting the steady state accelerations from the output from the small perturbations
in each axis the overall control surface deflections needed to achieve the guidance accel-
erations commanded can be calculated using linear extrapolation. The extrapolation
assumption is based upon the linearity of the lift curve slope for a symmetrical thin
aerofoil [119]. The region of interest for both weapons developed in this thesis is control
surface deflections of ±10 degrees.
3.1.1.2.4 Actuator Control
The actuator control system uses the desired deflections generated by the transfer
function to drive the actuators that demand a control surface deflection. This hardware
can be servo motors or gas driven solenoids amongst others. For the Guided Bomb Unit
(GBU) the control surface deflections are governed by bang-bang control, compressed
gas is used to extend the control surface to maximum deflection, and a spring is used to
return the control surface to neutral. The control surfaces can only be fully deflected
or neutral. The LRAGM uses an electrically driven servo motor that allows for precise
deflection angles to be achieved and held without further use of power. Both systems
have a maximum deflection limit of 10 degrees, and a first order delay of 0.03 seconds
is applied to the commanded deflection of the control surfaces.
3.1.1.2.5 Dynamics
The dynamics function calculates the dynamic response of the airframe given its current
state and the updated control surface deflections (and any change in thrust from the
motor). The dynamics function first calculates any change in the weapon’s moments of
inertia due to fuel use, any change in the centre of gravity, and the forces experienced
from the thrust. Then the airframe aerodynamic coefficients are generated, based upon
the Mach number, altitude, airspeed, thrust and constant properties of the airframe
such as canard/fin dimensions, body shape etc. The aerodynamic coefficients are then
passed to the 6DoF function to calculate the updated states of the airframe for the
time step. These final states are then output as the last step of the time step loop, and
the process starts again at the seeker function.
3.1.1.3 Weapon Configurations
Two main air-to-surface weapon configurations were used in the operator trials pre-
sented later in this thesis. As mentioned these were a generic guided free fall bomb,
and a generic small diameter, long range air-launched cruise missile. These will be
termed GBU and LRAGM herein. These two systems are both able to fulfil the same
targeting role. The target type being anything from troops, buildings, to both soft
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and armoured vehicles (depending on the fitted warhead). Their guidance systems are
to be designed such that they are able to intercept ground vehicles in motion. Their
main difference is that the GBU is unpowered with only canards and fins, whereas the
LRAGM has both a motor, and a main lifting wing to extend range.
3.1.1.3.1 GBU - The Guided Bomb Unit
Tail FinsCanards
Top/Side View
Figure 3.5: Control Surface Configuration for an Air-to-Surface GBU
The GBU is a guided free-fall bomb that uses GPS/INS or Laser guidance to home in
on ground targets – stationary or moving. The main aerodynamic features are shown
in figure 3.5. The weapon has four fins and four canards to stabilise flight. Controlled
manoeuvres to reduce guidance errors are effected by displacing the canards. The
control system uses simple bang-bang control to reduce the guidance errors to zero.
Bang-bang control is where the actuators for changing the angle of a control surface
do not have proportional travel in the mechanism and therefore can only vary between
neutral or fully deflected. A spring system is used to return the control surfaces to
their neutral positions, hence the name bang-bang control. The system is mechanically
simpler and cheaper than a proportional control system, however, it means that the
airframe is prone to wobble. A compressed gas system is used to drive the control
surfaces during flight. The amount of compressed gas places a limit on overall duration
that the control surfaces can be deflected for. The bang-bang system is mechanically
and computationally simple, but inefficient in its use of the finite compressed gas avail-
able. The compressed gas is quickly expended by the system which must continuously
correct itself during flight.
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3.1.1.3.2 LRAGM - The Long Range Air-to-Ground Missile
Tail FinsWings
Top View
Figure 3.6: Control Surface Configuration for an Air-to-Surface LRAGM
The LRAGM is a medium to long range glide missile with range extending wings and
is controlled by three fins. It uses GPS/INS and mm Wave Radar for guidance with a
proportional control system for navigation. The missile is designed for stand-off ranges
around 100km. This allows the launch platform to deliver the payload whilst remaining
safely away from enemy air defences.
The LRAGM has three main phases of flight/guidance. First the weapon glides, un-
powered, to a predefined cruise altitude. When launched from high altitude (around
25’000ft) this extends the range of the weapon by approximately 30km. Once at a
cruise altitude of 1500m the missile then levels out and maintains altitude, and ignites
the motor to maintain airspeed. During the glide and cruise phases, the missile will
bank-to-turn in order to fly a straight intercept to the target. The intercept angle or
attack heading can be specified. The missile will automatically plan a route to the
target from launch point that includes up to three way-points, and two turns, to line
itself up appropriately with the target. Finally in terminal phase – when the slant
range left to the target corresponds with the last 5 seconds of flight, the altitude hold
is switched off and the missile flies a direct path to the predicted target intercept point.
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3.1.1.4 Generating Re-Targeting Capability Information
Re-tasking any bomb or missile in the air requires knowledge of the airframe’s current
flight parameters, and of its ability to hit other targets. The RS is the term used
to describe the area on the ground that a weapon can be safely targeted at point of
launch. A computer on-board the launch aircraft will calculate the possible trajectories
and create a bounding polygon of the valid area before launch.
3.1.1.4.1 GBU RAR Estimation
For the GBU the RAR calculation starts with the predicted ballistic impact point of
the weapon. This is the impact point if no further control deflections were to occur in
flight. Then, from this point, false targets are generated at large distances along a num-
ber of bearings that are defined by the desired resolution passed to the function. For
example 4 points would generate a rectangular RS for the weapon, although this would
not be sufficient for generating an accurate RAR due to the general crescent shape of
the GBU RS. The weapon simulation is propagated forward until impact towards these
false target positions which require the maximum possible control deflection to achieve.
The impact points are then used to generate a RAR polygon. Figure 3.7 shows the
output set of the basic open-loop solution of the RS depicting the change in shape over
time. The navy blue outer polygon indicates the RAR at launch, and the red inner
polygon indicates the last RAR generated before impact. Note that there may be a
section of time between the last perceivable RAR and impact.
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Figure 3.7: Change in RAR Size for Basic Algorithm (Full Output Set)
The solution shown in Figure 3.7 is the open-loop RAR solution, however, as the weapon
is re-tasked to the limits of its physical manoeuvrability the time of flight is increased
as is the demand on the finite level of compressed gas. If the time of flight is longer than
the battery life available and/or the cumulative control deflection needed to achieve a
particular intercept is exceeded, then clearly the weapon will be unable to reach the
targets. The open-loop basic calculation includes these limits but allows the weapon to
continue unguided and without power until impact, meaning that the weapon has no
capability to attack moving targets at such extreme distances away from the ballistic
flight path. To inhibit this, a limit is placed on the system that the weapon must not
exceed battery life or the compressed gas available. This simple limit, called the Valid
Set, constrains the RS. The limit is in the form of a maximum range limit from the
ballistic flight path, and only restricts those areas ahead of the flight path of the GBU.
A simple line intersection was used to stitch the Valid Set with the open-loop RS for
the overall RAR shown in Figure 3.8. The Valid Set produced is course in comparison
to the main RS calculated, and as such the shape can change in a way that produces
the jagged shapes seen in Figure 3.8.
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Figure 3.8: Change in RAR Size for Basic Algorithm (Valid Set)
Should a more complete estimation of the RS of the weapon be needed, there is the
option of calculating a full closed-loop solution which is based upon the maximum time
of guided flight (battery and compressed gas limits). It is more reliable than the ba-
sic solution, however, takes significantly longer to calculate as it maintains the same
resolution of the RAR. To do this it must iterate along each bearing from the ballistic
trajectory to find the point at which the GBU exceeds either the battery life or the
compressed gas available. Figure 3.9 shows the closed loop solution. The size of the
RS is larger than that calculated by the basic valid set calculations, meaning that the
Valid Set is a significantly limited under estimation of capability.
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Figure 3.9: Change in RAR Size for Closed-Loop Algorithm (Output Set)
The time taken to run the GBU RAR calculation is directly proportional to the height
of the system and the number of points to be generated. If the weapon is required to
hit mobile targets, then guidance commands are needed throughout the flight. This
requires the use of either the closed-loop RAR or the Valid Set output from the basic
RAR algorithms. These solutions factor in the battery life and amount of gas available
for control deflections and can be used to ensure that guidance will be available to the
weapon until point of impact if needed. The closed-loop solution adds considerable
time to the basic RAR computations. This is because the closed-loop function assesses
whether the initial open-loop positions were achievable using the available battery time
and compressed gas for control surface deflections. If the positions are unachievable,
the function reduces the distance of the aim point from the neutral free fall position
iteratively until the overall flight time of the weapon does not exceed the battery time
available and the total control deflections needed do not exceed the limit placed by the
amount of compressed gas available.
54
Figure 3.10 shows the time taken to run one iteration of the RAR calculation for the
GBU through a typical ballistic flight from 15000ft in both the open-loop and closed
loop solutions. The additional time that the closed-loop solution takes is due to the
iterative process used to find the maximum capability of the GBU and the number of
iterations needed is the source of the variance seen in figure 3.10.
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Figure 3.10: Time to Complete RAR Algorithm vs. Altitude of Weapon at Time of
Calculation (Closed-Loop and Basic RAR Algorithms) – note: the x-axis is inverted
such that from left to right is representative of decreasing TTG of the weapon
Considering the amount of time needed to run the simulation model each time step,
and a requirement for use in a real-time environment, the closed-loop algorithm takes
too much time to execute at higher altitudes. The Valid Set produced by the basic
algorithm provides a somewhat cautious RS, however, it calculates sufficiently fast, that
the output can be updated at least at 1Hz if not more (depending on PC specifications).
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3.1.1.4.2 LRAGM RAR Estimation
As the LRAGM was a new model developed for the second of the two participant trials
presented later in this thesis, an investigation into the capability of the weapon system
was needed to find the expected RS of the weapon and then a data set and algorithms
that could be used to generate a real time RAR. Due to the LRAGM being powered,
having range extending wings, and having a proportional feedback control system that
requires significantly fewer cumulative control deflections to reach a target, the way in
which the RS and RAR are calculated is quite different than that of the unpowered,
ballistic GBU (where battery life and compressed gas used for control deflection are
the main limitations).
The LRAGM has three specific phases of flight. These are a glide phase, a cruise
phase and a terminal phase. After launch the weapon glides, unpowered, down to pre-
set cruise altitude. Then its motor starts and the weapon cruises towards the target –
making turns if necessary to intercept moving targets. A prediction is made for mov-
ing targets that places the aim point up to 30 seconds ahead of where the target is,
based upon an estimation of the target velocity. This reduces the amount of terminal
guidance needed to intercept the target, albeit slightly reducing the RS.
In order to generate the RS of the LRAGM, two sets of Monte Carlo simulations
were run. In these Monte Carlo analyses the off bore-sight angle and the range of
the target were varied. Two conditions were analysed; model initialised with target in
varying locations, and model initialised with target directly ahead then updating the
target off bore-sight angle after the glide phase has been completed. These two cases
were chosen as they expose the two main sections of flight where turns will impact on
the flight capability of the weapon. Unlike the GBU, and other missiles with no main
lifting wing surface, when the LRAGM performs turns it has a limited impact on the
range and capability of the weapon. Instead, the turn radius and range of powered
flight have the dominant effect on the RS of the weapon.
The following figures show the results of the Monte Carlo analysis for the two different
test conditions. The control deflection for each phase of flight will be presented, along
with the total deflection required and the accuracy of the weapon in each test case.
The plots show range along the x-axis, with the off bore-sight angle shown on the y-axis.
Figure 3.11 shows the cumulative control surface deflections for Phase 1 (glide phase)
of an engagement against a stationary target, where the turn against an off bore-sight
target occurs in the glide phase. As can be seen, for targets immediately ahead of the
weapon, with no update to off bore-sight angle, there is a constant amount of control
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deflection needed in the glide phase. As the off bore-sight angle is increased, there is
an increase in the amount of control deflection required. However, as there is an initial
control needed to start a turn manoeuvre, and one to then continue straight flight,
the smaller off bore-sight angles require slightly more control surface deflections than
the larger off bore-sight angles, which are roughly the same. Figure 3.12 shows the
cumulative control surface deflections for Phase 1 where the off bore-sight turn occurs
in the cruise phase of flight. As expected there is no variation in the control deflections
needed for the glide phase. There is one erroneous case where the control deflections
shown is zero, this case was omitted from the RS due to the lack of sufficient accuracy
when targeting that position (shown in figure 3.20).
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Figure 3.11: Turn in Glide - Phase 1 Cumulative Control Surface Deflection
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Figure 3.12: Turn in Cruise - Phase 1 Cumulative Control Surface Deflection
58
Range (m)
×104
2 4 6 8 10 12
An
gl
e 
(de
g)
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
To
ta
l C
on
tro
l S
uf
ac
e 
De
fle
ct
io
n 
(de
g)
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
60
65
70
Figure 3.13: Turn in Glide - Phase 2 Cumulative Control Surface Deflection
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Figure 3.14: Turn in Cruise - Phase 2 Cumulative Control Surface Deflection
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Figure 3.15: Turn in Glide - Phase 3 Cumulative Control Surface Deflection
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Figure 3.16: Turn in Cruise - Phase 3 Cumulative Control Surface Deflection
60
Figure 3.13 shows the cumulative control surface deflections for Phase 2 (cruise) of the
Turn in Glide Phase engagement. The total cumulative deflections vary between 20-70
degrees across the ranges and off bore-sight angles tested. However, for the Turn in
Cruise Phase engagement, the amount of cumulative control deflection varies between
around 50 and 150 degrees. It can be seen from figure 3.14 that as off bore-sight
angle increases, the cumulative control deflections increases and close range, high off
bore-sight angles, and long range, high off bore-sight angles, require higher levels of
cumulative control deflections.
In both the Phase 3 (terminal) engagement types similar levels of cumulative con-
trol surface deflections can be seen of around 60 degrees (see figure 3.15 and 3.16).
However, at the upper and lower limits of range and off bore-sight angles (combined)
there is an increase in the cumulative control surface deflection required and some cases
are omitted due to inaccuracy or too high a control surface deflection required.
Figures 3.17 and 3.18 show the overall total control deflection needed for all phases
of flight.
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Figure 3.17: Turn in Glide - Total Cumulative Control Surface Deflection
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Figure 3.18: Turn in Cruise - Total Cumulative Control Surface Deflection
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Figures 3.19 and 3.20 show the accuracy of the LRAGM across all of the cases for the
Turn in Glide and Turn in Cruise phase engagements respectively. The cases where
too much control deflection was needed have been removed, as well as erroneous cases
outside of the weapons manoeuvrability. Further, cases where the accuracy exceeded
2.5 metres have been omitted. It can be seen that turning in the glide phase offers an
increased range and off bore-sight capability than when conducting a turn in the cruise
phase. However, the weapon system developed allows for a very large RS in relation to
the GBU.
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Figure 3.19: Turn in Glide - Accuracy for Acceptable Cases
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Figure 3.20: Turn in Cruise - Accuracy for Acceptable Cases
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In general, the accuracy of the LRAGM is very good and of comparable accuracy to
those seen in programs such as AMSTE (3m Circular Error Probable) [25]. It is impor-
tant to remember that the test cases were run in an idealised simulation environment
with controlled variables. There is some variability with the accuracy, and particularly
in areas where the range is low, the accuracy reduces to around 1.6m. Accuracy levels
of greater than 2.5m were omitted as indirect hits against small armoured targets would
likely prove ineffective.
As already alluded to, the main contributing factors to the RS of the LRAGM are
the turn radius and the powered range of the system. Targets that are at a range that
is less than the glide slope range of the weapon from launch can still be prosecuted,
but will require the weapon system to deliberately extend its range and make a large
turn to prosecute the target effectively. The turn radius of the weapon is designed
around a maximum roll angle of 60 degrees. Figure 3.21 shows the two engagements
of an initial target off bore-sight angle, and an update in cruising flight for eight off
bore-sight angles.
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Figure 3.21: Figure of Cumulative Control Surface Deflections for Selected Trajectories
(Left) Top Down View of Trajectories (Right)
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In banked turns, a change in heading is achieved through rolling the airframe. This
offsets the normal vector such that there is a vertical and horizontal component of
the total lift force. The vertical component must match the weight of the airframe to
maintain altitude, and the horizontal component then acts to turn the airframe. The
following expressions can be used to calculate the overall lift force needed to maintain
altitude in a turn:
L sinφ =
mv2
r
(3.42)
L =
mg
cosφ
(3.43)
r =
v2
g tanφ
(3.44)
Figure 3.22 shows the velocity profile of the LRAGM in a typical flight, with the
different phases of flight marked. Given that radius of a turn is proportional to the
square of the airspeed and inversely proportional to the tangent of the bank angle, the
turn radius for the LRAGM therefore varies between approximately 2500m (at 205m/s)
to 5500m (at 305m/s). This is quite a large variation, but can be used to estimate the
minimum turn radius that the LRAGM can achieve en-route to its target, or any other
potential targets.
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Figure 3.22: LRAGM Velocity Profile
3.1.1.5 Real-Time Simulation Adaptations, Constraints and Validation
Simulation models are limited in speed of execution by the processing power of the
computer being used, the efficiency of the code developed and the complexity of the
model’s equations. The frequency of the time step needed for simulation and the
requirement for graphical output in MATLAB place significant strain on a computer’s
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processing abilities. A small enough time step should be used so that the errors that
occur in the integration process are small enough to be acceptable for the model such
that it does not affect the stability and accuracy of the model. If the time step is too
large then many guidance actions may be omitted from the simulation, and a control
input to correct a manoeuvre may not be able to be effected quickly enough to prevent
a model from becoming unstable. However, reducing the time step too much may cause
unnecessarily long simulation execution time. Adapting a simulation so that it runs
in real time is dependent on finding a time step that provides the resolution needed
to maintain accuracy and stability whilst taking less time to execute computationally
than the time step in the real world. In this case the LRAGM was run at 200Hz.
3.1.2 Target Systems
Simulation of target models was carried out to ensure that the two weapon types were
able to hit mobile vehicle targets of different types. To do this several vehicle model
types were simulated and used as targets for weapon system validation. The trials
presented in Chapters 5 and 6 did not use mobile targets, however, the use of the two
weapon systems against mobile targets was an important feature to build in for the
longevity of the research project.
3.1.2.1 Vehicle Simulation
Simulation of five typical types of road vehicles were developed and their properties are
listed in Table 3.2 [120,121].
Table 3.2: Typical Road Vehicle Dynamics
Vehicle Length Max Velocity Max Accel Max Braking Jerk
ft M mph m/s ft/s2 m/s2 ft/s2 m/s2 ft/s3 m/s3
Passenger Car 14 4.27 75 33.528 10 3.048 15 4.572 7 2.134
Single-Unit Truck 35 10.67 75 33.528 5 1.524 15 4.572 7 2.134
Semi-Trailer Truck 53 16.15 67 29.952 3 0.914 15 4.572 7 2.134
Dbl. Trailer Truck 64 19.51 61 27.269 2 0.610 15 4.572 7 2.134
Bus 40 12.19 65 29.058 5 1.524 15 4.572 7 2.134
An overall object class was coded in MATLAB to simulate each vehicle with a standard
set of functions. The simulation model works by moving the vehicle object through a
series of way-point coordinates. These way-point coordinates are passed to the object
from a master code. The vehicles then use vehicular dynamics to drive along these
routes. These routes could be made up of way-points that represent road networks.
There is therefore a handle to attach road network speed limits so that the vehicle will
aim to cruise at the speed limit rather than accelerate to its maximum speed. Further,
the vehicle has been developed to slow down and reduce lateral acceleration in turns
to replicate normal driving conditions.
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Vehicle turning is simulated through the creation of additional route way-points around
corners. These way-points smooth the corners such that a variable turn radius is used
rather than snap turning. The minimum radius for turns is based upon information
from the National Cooperative Highway Research Program Report 348 [121] and is
used for turns greater than or equal to 90 degrees. Although there are differences in
road layout style between countries, the minimum turn radius of 7.62 metres is used for
standard vehicles. Larger radiuses are required for vehicles such as buses and trucks
and a minimum of 10-15m turn radius is used. Lateral g-force is used as a limiting
factor for the speed of a turn. Passenger comfort requirements set a lateral g-force
limit of 0.41g (4m/s2) which at 90 degrees gives a speed limit of 5.52m/s (12.35mph).
When a turn angle is less than 90 degrees the radius of the turn increases using the
following:
Rturn =
turnRadiusmin
tan ∆φ2
(3.45)
where: turnRadiusmin is the minimum turn radius for a 90 degree turn, and φ is the
required turn angle between legs of a route.
The increase in turn radius increases the limit speed limit for the turn. The upper
limit of velocity in m/s can be found using the following:
Vmax =
√
lataccelmaxRturn (3.46)
where: lataccelmax is the maximum lateral acceleration tolerated by passengers (comfort =
4m/s2).
Acceleration and deceleration occur using the simple SUVAT formulae. The formu-
lae are used to find the acceleration and deceleration points when vehicles must slow
down before making a constant velocity turn. This can be the case when sharp turns
require the vehicle to drive slower than the road’s current speed limit.
Each time step the simulation model starts by holding the previous time step out-
put states for turning, heading, and speed. Then the model clears any manoeuvre flags
so that the model presumes that it is travelling straight and at constant speed. Then
the model finds the next way-point and the current road type speed limit. Following
this it calculates the heading difference between the heading between the previous and
current way point, and then the current way-point and that immediately following it.
This allows for a calculation of the required change in direction needed at the next
way-point. Using this information an expected speed for the turn is calculated so that
the vehicle does not have too much lateral acceleration.
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If the distance to the way-point is equal to or less than the turn start dist then
the vehicle will begin turning. Further, if the vehicle req turn speed is lower than
the current road speed limit then the model will estimate the point at which braking
should occur to slow the vehicle for the turn. If the vehicle has passed the turn, it may
need to accelerate back to the speed limit. Based upon these additional way-points and
conditions, flags are set that indicate the state of the vehicle in accelerating, braking
and turning. The flags are then used when executing the main time step to move the
vehicle. This inspects the flags and changes the dynamics of the vehicle if necessary to
satisfy the manoeuvre requirement.
3.1.2.2 Route Planning
The Open Street Map (OSM) database is much like open source software packages.
The website hosts mapping information similar to mainstream commercial map makers,
however, all of the data used to create these maps is freely downloadable in XML for-
mat. OSM XML files can be imported into MATLAB structures using OpenStreetMap
Functions for MATLAB [122].
Upon running the function parse openstreetmap on a downloaded openstreetmap.xml
file the resulting two structures are: parsed osm and osm xml. Both files contain
the same information although the formatting of the parsed osm structure is more
favourable as it has fewer sub structures and simpler formatting. The parsed osm
structure is as follows:
• parsed osm.bounds [minlon, maxlon,minlat,maxlat];
• parsed osm.node struct
• parsed osm.node.id [1xn] vector of node id values
• parsed osm.node.xy [2xn] vector of node xy coordinates in long, lat decimal
degrees
• parsed osm.way struct
• parsed osm.way.id [1xm] vector of route id values - routes are sets of nodes
• parsed osm.way.nd {1xm} [1xk] vector of node ids that make route
• parsed osm.way.tag{1xm}{1xj} set of information varies from 1-3 containing
the following:
• parsed osm.way.tag{1xm}{1xj}.Attributes
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• parsed osm.way.tag{1xm}{1xj}.Attributes.k string type of attribute (‘natural’,
‘highway’, etc.)
• parsed osm.way.tag{1xm}{1xj}.Attributes.v string sub type of attribute (‘coast-
line’, ‘primary’, etc.)
• parsed osm.Attributes contains string information about the source copyright
etc.
The OpenStreetMap Functions also contain connectivity functions. The following three
functions are used in sequence:
• [connectivity matrix, intersection node indices] =
extract connectivity(parsed osm);
• intersection nodes =
get unique node xy(parsed osm, intersection node indices);
• dg = or(connectivity matrix,connectivity matrix’);
The output from these functions can be used to find the shortest path between two
nodes using Dijkstra’s algorithm [123]. The limit of the built in route planner func-
tion is that it will only work if both the start and end points chosen are intersection
nodes. This is because the connectivity matrix only contains nodes that are inter-
sections. Consequently the output route provided by the route planner is made up
of only intersection nodes. This would suffice if each road between intersection points
were made up of only one point to point line, however, it is far more common that the
roads in-between these intersection nodes contain a number of nodes that represent the
road between them.
In order to have a robust node-to-node shortest path algorithm that is not depen-
dent on intersection nodes, and provides the complete route with all nodes between
intersection points, a new function was created named route planner any node. The
function uses several key steps in order to find the complete route.
• Check if Start and End points are intersection nodes.
• If they are not intersection nodes, find the ‘ways’ (roads) that they belong to.
• On those roads, find the nearest intersection nodes.
• Use those intersection nodes to run the route planner algorithm.
• Append the nodes needed to get from the Start point to its nearest intersection
node.
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• For each intersection–>intersection node route leg provided by route planner
append the way nodes between them.
• Append the nodes needed to get from the last intersection node to the End point.
• Extract the Latitude and Longitude for the complete route. The route planner any node
returns a number of vectors containing information about the complete route.
These are:
• Route id - holds the actual id number of the nodes used in the route [1xn].
• Route index - holds the index within the parsed osm.node array.
• Route LL - holds the decimal degrees [longitude;latitude] pairs in a [2xn] array.
• Way id - holds the actual id number of the way to which the node belongs [1xn].
• Way index - holds the index within the parsed osm.way array.
The way id/index values are output for use by the moving target’s simulation. Each
way has a set of attributes that contain a ‘key’ and a ‘value’. The ‘key’ is used to identify
the type of information contained in the way - for example ‘natural’ for geographical
features, or ‘highway’ for road networks. The ‘value’ then contains information about
the type of the key, for example the ‘highway’ key contains values to describe the type
of road, ‘motorway’, ‘primary’ etc. This information can be used by the moving targets
simulation to infer speed limits along the different sections of the route to be driven.
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Figure 3.23: Simulation of a Car Type Vehicle in MATLAB Driving on OSM Roads
Figure 3.23 shows the overview of a simulation of a car type vehicle on roads loaded
in from an OSM database. Actual speed, desired speed, actual heading and desired
heading are shown, as well as the current position and the desired mode that the vehicle
is in – accelerating, braking and/or steering.
73
3.2 Networking
The NEC requires a well established digital communication network that includes both
the traditional Radio Frequency (RF) channels as well as Internet Protocol (IP) based
systems. Within NEC, the remote re-tasking of air-to-surface weapons requires links
between a number of assets. The delivery aircraft, the weapon itself, and a ground
station, all need to be within the same network to allow remote operators to re-task
weapons in flight. These systems are independent and remote from each other, requir-
ing RF data links to be used to establish these networks.
An RF Data Link system consists of a host Tactical Data System (TDS), an IDM
and a Combat Net Radio (CNR). These systems work in tandem to generate the rele-
vant data on-board the host system, for example positioning information, convert the
data information into a standardised message format with appropriate header, convert
the digital message to analogue format for broadcasting using the CNR.
RF communications are limited primarily by the power used by the radio system and
line of sight between the sending and receiving systems, and these need to be taken into
consideration when simulating the communication network without the use of real RF
systems. This section will describe the method of simulating an RF communications
network using Local Area Network (LAN) and Wide Area Network (WAN) IP.
3.2.1 Military Communication Standards
Military organisations both within sovereign states and overarching organisations such
as NATO have set standards for data communications. These standards are used to
ensure the compatibility of hardware and software used in the field. Variable Message
Format (VMF) is a Military Standard (MIL-STD) for digital data communications
which is ideally suited for Fire Support, CAS, and SA purposes. Older message stan-
dards such as Link 11 and Link 16 are limited in their flexibility due to the way in which
information must be coded into pre-defined data words. This means that messages have
defined lengths, and that whole message structures need to be sent, even if some data
fields are redundant. This limitation is particularly problematic when the longevity of
military systems is considered. New capabilities are being developed at such a prolific
rate that the hardware of TDLs is becoming a limiting factor rather than the technology.
A typical VMF system configuration has three main elements, a Bearer, Message Header
and the Message to be sent. Each element is defined in a separate MIL-STD. The break-
down of standards is as follows:
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• CNR Protocols: MIL-STD-188-220 - Interoperability Standard for Digital Mes-
sage Device Subsystems
• Header: MIL-STD-2045-47001 - Interoperability Standard for Connectionless
Data Transfer Application Layer Standard
• Message: MIL-STD-6017 - K-Series Message Set [Classified]
A typical data stream is packaged with CNR Protocols leading the Header, followed by
the Message and then by the terminating CNR Protocols. Figure 3.24 shows the form
of the transmitted data stream [124].
CNR
PROTOCOLS
HEADER MESSAGE
CNR
PROTOCOLS
MIL-STD-188-220 MIL-STD-2045-47001 MIL-STD-6017 MIL-STD-188-220
Data Packet
Figure 3.24: Data Packet Structure and Relevant Standards
Implementation of the VMF ‘K-Series’ message set requires detailed knowledge of MIL-
STD-6017, which is a classified document. However, small parts of its structure are
available from indirect sources [124].
The message set is categorised into Functional Area Designators, followed by the mes-
sage number. For example, K05.1 is Functional Area Designators (FAD) 05 (Land
Combat Operations), Message 1 (Position Report). In this case, the Position Report
includes several nested structured entries. These data entries are preceded by flags that
indicate the presence of certain elements within the message:
• Field Presence Indicator (FPI)
• Field Recurrence Indicator (FRI)
• Group Presence Indicator (GPI)
• Group Recurrence Indicator (GRI)
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Some fields are marked as mandatory (M), mandatory for implementation (X), or
optional (blank). For those fields marked mandatory there will not be a preceding
field presence indicator. GPIs are used to identify the presence of a group of fields, for
example see Index Number 1.8 for G1 in the K05.1 Position Report message, which
contains course and speed data (see Figure 3.25 [124]). FRIs and GRIs indicate whether
the messages contained will be repeated within this message.
Figure 3.25: Position Report K-Message Series
Data from the message is then concatenated in the order listed in the index. Manda-
tory fields are always included, as are FPIs and GPIs. However, if the FPI or GPI
is zero, this means that the message following is not present and is omitted from the
concatenated data. Repeat codes (R1) mean that a group may be repeated, and a num-
ber in brackets after such a code indicates the maximum number of group occurrences
permitted.
Although a complete K-Series message set library is unavailable due to classification,
the FAD are known to be as follows:
0. Network Control
1. General Information Exchange
2. Fire Support
3. Air Operations
4. Intelligence
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5. Land Combat Operations
6. Maritime Operations
7. Combat Service Support
8. Special Operations
9. Joint Task Force Ops
10. Air Defence/Airspace Control
The communication protocols for the re-tasking of air-to-surface weapons need to exist
within this framework of the VMF FAD structure. Re-tasking can be seen as an
extension to the CAS function, where airborne bombs and missiles are considered to be
air assets that can be called upon for CAS. If this is the case then within the scope of
VMF, CAS exists as part of the Fire Support FAD. A CAS Request and engagement
is made though a series of messages [125]:
• K02.27 - Close Air Support Request
• K02.28 - Close Air Support Mission Battle Damage Assessment Report
• K02.31 - Mission Request Rejection
• K02.32 - Close Air Support Request Acceptance
• K02.33 - Close Air Support Aircrew Briefing
• K02.34 - Aircraft On-Station
• K02.35 - Aircraft Depart Initial Point
• K02.36 - Aircraft Mission Update
• K02.57 - Aircraft Attack Position and Target Designation
• K02.58 - CAS Aircraft Final Attack Control
• K02.59 - Request for K02.57
These messages bear some similarity to the NATO CAS 9-Line Brief, which includes
the following information:
• Destination ID
• Callsign
• Initial Point
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• Target Distance from Initial Point
• Target Position
• Target Elevation
• Target Description
• Mandatory Attack Heading
• Friendly Distance
• Time on Target
• Marker
• Laser to Target
Without access to the VMF message set in more detail it is unclear what specific data
would be included in the K02 messages. However, it is clear that certain data, such
as position and elevation of the target are imperative, as well as data relating to the
unit tasked to prosecute the target, and data relating to the unit that has identified
and marked the target, will be included in this data structure. A typical scenario may
involve a number of steps to transfer the relevant information between an attack aircraft
and the FAC who is calling in the attack. Figure 3.26 shows this scenario, highlighting
the different messages that may be sent in such an engagement.
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K02.32 CAS Accept
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K02.33 Aircrew Briefing
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Figure 3.26: Messages Sent in CAS Mission Using VMF K-Series Messages
3.2.2 Types of Digital Networking Communications
One of the communication principles behind the development of VMF was that it uses
Ethernet type principles. For example, all computers that exist on a LAN or WAN
listen and receive data, however, computers only process data that is addressed to them
individually, or those addressed to a whole sub-network (LAN). VMF is organised into
LANs of up to 12 units, then using IP are connected to other LANs in a WAN. This
allows for messages to be transmitted to individuals, groups, or all units within a force.
With modern computing capabilities, several simulations of different functioning roles
can be simulated side by side on the same computer system. However, in order to
sufficiently represent a military CNR network each independent entity was simulated
on a physically separate computer system. The computers were set up initially in a
LAN using the Campus Area Network for access to the Internet. To be able to com-
municate directly between computers a Transport Layer is needed. This acts much like
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the CNR MIL-STD-188-220 and handles various services that allow for communication
to occur. Several different Transport Layers exist and so analysis as to which best suits
the architecture of Military RF Networks was needed. The main transport layers are:
• User Datagram Protocol (UDP)
• Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP)
• Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP)
• Datagram Congestion Control Protocol (DCCP)
Table 3.3: Transport Layer Specifications
Feature UDP TCP SCTP DCCP
Packet Header Size (bytes) 8 20-60 12 12/16
Transport Layer Packet Entity Datagram Segment Datagram Datagram
Connection Oriented No Yes Yes Yes
Reliable Transport No Yes Yes No
Preserve Message Boundary Yes No Yes Yes
Ordered Delivery No Yes Yes No
Flow Control No Yes Yes No
Congestion Control No Yes Yes Yes
Explicit Congestion Notification No Yes Yes Yes
Multiple Streams No No Yes No
Table 3.3 shows the different features present in each Transport Layer. Each feature
listed provides a particular service or characteristic of the transport layer protocol as
described below:
• Packet Header Size is the number of bytes that needs to be present at the begin-
ning of a data packet to enable the receiver to successfully identify the message
and its transport layer properties.
• The Transport Layer Packet Entity can take two forms, Datagram or Segment.
Datagram means that the entire intended message is sent as a discrete packet.
Segment means that a message is split into segments when sent and then recon-
structed at the receiver using information in the packet header.
• A Connection Oriented architecture means that the Transport Layer protocol
locks the specific channel that is being used for communication. These channels
are known as ports and have a specific numerical value.
• Reliable Transport means that the Transport Layer accounts for each packet that
is sent and ensures that each message is received without corruption. If the
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message received is corrupted, or there is a missing packet in a stream, the send-
ing system will continue to send the packet until acknowledgement of successful
receipt of the packet is received.
• Preserve Message Boundary means that the message is sent complete, rather than
in segments.
• Ordered Delivery means that, if several packets of data need to be sent, in a
particular order such as individual words in a sentence, then the order in which
packets are sent is maintained.
• Flow Control is then a feature that controls the flow of consecutive ordered packets
of data.
• Congestion Control is a feature that controls how congestion is handled when a
receiver cannot process incoming packets as quickly as they are being received.
• Explicit Congestion Notification allows for transmitting systems to slow their
packet transmission to prevent congestion.
• Multiple Streams is the ability to send multiple packet streams at the same time.
CNRs have very limited bandwidth and are affected by a range of propagation issues
and losses. It is suggested that UDP is therefore the preferred type of Transport Layer
used in these systems [126]. UDP allows for data to be sent in bursts or individ-
ual packets rather than requiring a complex continuous structure as used in TCP/IP
which would lock up a communication channel on the CNR network until a message
had been successfully been sent.
Within UDP are several types of routing schemes for packets. Some of the more ap-
plicable schemes are listed below and are represented in Figure 3.27, 3.28, and 3.29.
These routing schemes define how information is directed around a network:
81
• Unicast - Transmission of messages to a single network destination identified by
a unique IP address.
UNICAST
Figure 3.27: Unicast Routing Scheme
• Multicast - Transmission of messages from one to many network destinations
identified by a unique IP address that exist as part of a group of recipients.
MULTICAST
Figure 3.28: Multicast Routing Scheme
• Broadcast - Transmission of messages to all recipients simultaneously. It is largely
used to send messages to all members of a LAN.
BROADCAST
Figure 3.29: Broadcast Routing Scheme
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The network used in the simulation facility needed to link weapons, operational and
simulated aircraft, and ground operator terminals, but maintain the individual host
systems as separate entities. Seven different computer systems were used to run the
simulation environment as a whole. Figure 3.30 details the system architecture.
SERVER
REMOTE OPERATOR
TERMINAL
FLIGHT SIMULATOR
UAV SIMULATOR
GBU SIMULATOR
LRAGM SIMULATOR
TARGET SIMULATOR
VMF
Figure 3.30: System Architecture for Distributed Simulation Environment
The VMF type messages are transmitted between distinct points in the network. Each
block in Figure 3.30 represents an individual computer system. The LRAGM and GBU
simulations are linked to the Remote Operator Terminal using only VMF type messages.
They are unaware of each other on the network, but have additional communications
protocols with their launch platform up until the point of handover to the Remote
Operator Terminal. Targeting is handled initially through the flight simulators; the
sensor pods are used to locate and identify targets generated by the Target Simulator.
Once the weapon is released this information is passed to the Remote Operator Terminal
using VMF, and then if necessary sent as target updates from the Remote Operator
Terminal to the weapon that needs its target updating. Figure 3.31 shows the network
message protocol for transferring targeting information to the weapon before launch
(using a direct link), and then during flight (using VMF).
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Figure 3.31: Network Message Protocol for Transferring Target Information Amongst
Entities in Distributed Simulation Environment
Unicast UDP routing was used as it provides the simplest addressing format for the
networked messages. However, the implementation of the unicast system within the
messaging program means that the network representation is essentially multicast. The
messaging software sends the same message out to all known unicast routes. Due to
the rules on the use of the university network, broadcast UDP was not allowed and
the physical distance between the different simulation computers used meant that a
bespoke LAN was not possible. Therefore grouping all of the unicast addresses and
then sending the messages to all allows a representative broadcast network to exist.
3.2.3 Handover, Acknowledgement and Handshake Procedures
As all messages are transmitted to every entity on the network, the bespoke archi-
tecture needs to maintain appropriate identification and acknowledgement principles.
When sending VMF/CAS type messages, there must always be a Destination ID and
Callsign attached to each individual asset within the simulation environment. When
a message is received the first few bytes are decoded that contain the Destination ID
and Callsign of the intended recipient. These are then cross-checked with the Destina-
tion ID and Callsign of the receiving unit. If they match, the rest of the message is
processed, otherwise the message is ignored.
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One of the missing features of UDP is a reliable and coherent message receipt acknowl-
edgement architecture. This required the inclusion of a custom read back acknowledge-
ment and handshake system. The requirements of the messaging system mean that a
receiver of a message must first read back the entire message to ensure that no corrup-
tion has occurred. Then the receiver must relay whether they are acting on the message
or not. With reference back to Figure 3.31, also shown is the flow diagram of a single
CAS request using the custom UDP VMF system. Firstly the message is converted
into the correct format and sent to all listeners on the network. It is received by the
intended system and the message is sent back with an acknowledgement of receipt of
the message. The initial sender then transmits that the message is intact and correct.
The receiver then replies whether they have accepted or rejected the mission. The
flexibility of UDP to be able to include a customised acknowledgement was important
such that the network system was representing a robust but imperfect system where
packets could potentially be dropped, rather than a perfect system where there is no
risk of communication failure.
3.2.4 Delays and Missed Messages
As there is a defined structure for acknowledgement of messages, the message creator
and sender will know if the message has been received or not. In a condition where the
message is missed, due to dropped packets or drop out of the network, the acknowl-
edgement procedure has a built in time-out. This time-out only listens for responses to
the sent message for 15 seconds before timing out the message. This accounts for any
delays in the transmission of messages, or delays due to processing time at the receiving
end by an automated system or a human operator receiving a message. In the latter
case, the operator will only be presented the information on which to make a decision
after the first three stages of the acknowledgement procedure have occurred.
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3.3 Interactive Simulation
Personal computing and the computer games industry have developed significant capa-
bility for presenting a user with interactive and graphically representative simulations
of the real world. The hardware in most medium specification personal computers or
laptops is capable of driving significantly complex graphics engines. In tandem, the
computer games industry have produced virtual worlds with stunning detail. The role
of interactive simulation in this body of research is to allow pilots as well as ground
operators to interact in a large scale simulation environment.
3.3.1 Visualisation Environments
Flight simulation has been a vitally important industry for its utility as a training tool
for the airline industry and the military, as a research tool in academia and as a gaming
environment for enthusiasts. Several different companies have released bespoke flight
simulation software, such as Microsoft (Microsoft Flight Simulator series), Laminar
Research (X-Plane series), and Flight Gear. The complexities of these visualisation
environments has developed to a point where the terrain modelling includes real world
road networks, ground vehicles, real world buildings, airports and aviation traffic.
3.3.1.1 XPlane vs. MSFSX
At the outset of the project the selection of appropriate software was key. X-Plane
9 (Later upgraded to 10) was already pre-installed onto the Avionics Testbed Facility
(ATF) Simulator, however, another and arguably the largest PC format flight simulator
on the market is Microsoft Flight Simulator X (MSFSX). These two simulators were
selected as main contenders due to their leading positions in the simulation software
market. A comparison between the two was key to making an informed decision between
the software. The following areas needed consideration before making a decision as to
which software was better suited to the application in this body of research.
• Realism
• Data Accessibility and Control
• Software Updates and Effects
It was important to identify a strong visualisation tool that would be maintainable for
the longevity of the project and the facility, as there are significant learning overheads
associated with the familiarisation of coding practices for each piece of software. Should
a function be needed later in the development of the facility that was not properly
identified early in the project there could have been serious delays in the project. The
three main areas for consideration will be discussed in the next few sections:
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3.3.1.1.1 Realism
The two simulation suites offer different levels of both visual and physical realism,
where visual realism is the degree to which the simulation represents the real world in
terms of graphics and physical realism is the degree to which the simulation represents
the aerodynamics and flight characteristics of the aircraft being flown.
The visual representation of the graphics capabilities of both X-Plane 10 and MS-
FSX are high. What is particularly relevant is that X-Plane 10 has accurate road
map data for the UK, and indeed almost the entire globe, as it uses OSM as its data
source [127]. This was deemed particularly useful as the scope of this research project
included targeting moving vehicles. Further, as the Remote Operator Terminal would
be developed using map data from the same source, it would make integration simpler.
In terms of physical realism X-Plane 10 also out-performs MSFSX in how it calculates
the dynamics of aircraft within the simulation. Whilst MSFSX uses the industry stan-
dard Total Forces and Moments Method, X-Plane uses Blade Element Theory which
slices each aerodynamic surface into several sections which results in an increase in
accuracy by approximately 20% [128]. Blade Element Theory is typically used to find
the forces on helicopter rotors [129] and has been modified to analyse the aerodynamic
surfaces of aircraft in X-Plane [130]. Whilst the weapon systems are represented by
external MATLAB models, the release aircraft were not modelled and default aircraft
from the simulation software were used.
3.3.1.1.2 Data Access and Control
X-Plane and MSFSX offer a Software Development Kit (SDK). A SDK allows for
additional feature implementation through writing code that can be called from the
simulation software in its internal runtime. The ability to develop within the SDKs
is still limited by the scope of the SDK, and the areas that plug-in software can be
developed must be considered in relation to the custom functionality that might want
to be added to the simulator.
MSFSX is split into four core categories [131]:
• Core Utilities Kit
• Environment Kit
• Mission Creation Kit
• SimObject Creation Kit
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X-Plane is split into eight core categories [132]:
• Data Access
• Processing
• User Interface
• Graphics
• Camera Control
• Navigation and the Flight Management Computer (FMC)
• Aircraft
• Widgets
Whilst both software applications offer considerable customisation and development
tools, one critical element not provided by MSFSX is Weaponry. MSFSX is tailored
towards civil flight simulation and does not include a system for weapons. X-Plane 10
has a range of weapon types implemented into the simulation from guided air-to-air
missiles, rockets and bombs. The limits on the X-Plane built-in weapons system is its
inability to guide weapons to ground targets. The guidance of air-to-surface weapons
has not been developed in X-Plane.
3.3.1.1.3 Software Updates and Effects
Considerations of the effect of version updates on the development of plugin code were
also made when deciding which simulation environment to choose. X-Plane 10 (released
in 2012) has full backwards compatibility with plugins generated for X-Plane 9.70. The
plugins built for Microsoft Flight Simulator 9 (2004) are not compatible with MSFSX,
nor are they with Microsoft’s latest Flight Simulation software, “Microsoft Flight”.
This makes the longevity of software plugins in the Microsoft Flight Simulator franchise
through future releases very difficult, and will require re-development of plugins with
each new release.
3.3.1.1.4 Overall Considerations
The final decision was made to use X-Plane as a visualisation environment for this
body of research. There is a larger scope for data access and control through the use of
plugins. There is more longevity of plugin development with backwards compatibility.
X-Plane has a far more realistic flight model dynamics for piloted aircraft, and has
comparable graphical fidelity with the inclusion of OpenStreetMap road networks.
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3.3.2 MATLAB Weapon Simulation Integration with X-Plane Plug-
ins
X-Plane has a range of data which it can either send over a network via UDP packets or
a larger set that can be accessed via DataRefs in plugin development [132]. A DataRef
is an internal memory address within X-Plane that allows for reading and writing spe-
cific properties used within the simulation. For example, setting the altitude property
to 5000 (ft), would place the user aircraft at that altitude.
The complete DataRef list is expansive, with over 4800 items that can be interacted
with through plugins developed using the SDK [133]. DataRefs are accessed with a
string handle (a data type made up of characters) that navigates through the DataRefs
structure. The specific set of DataRefs that are of significance to the integration of
MATLAB weapon simulations are accessible through the ‘sim\weapons\...’ leader,
followed by the string related to the specific data needed.
North East
Down
Flat Earth
Origin at Reference
Latitude and Longitude
XOGL
YOGL
ZOGL
Figure 3.32: Open GL Coordinate System and NED Flat Earth System
The main variables that need to be set to show weapons within the X-Plane environment
with data generated from MATLAB are positional and attitude information. The X-
Plane 3D environment uses the OpenGL coordinate system, and attitude is set using
the quaternion rather than Euler angles. This data can be written to the simulation
using the ‘x’, ‘y’, ‘z’, and ‘q1’, ‘q2’, ‘q3’, ‘q4’ handles. x, y, z in OpenGL relate to
NED as shown in Figure 3.32. The quaternion is a form of representing rotational
information in three axes with four unit quantities. The Euler Angle representation of
orientation can be obtained by converting the quaternion as follows:
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ψθ
φ
 =
arctan 2(2(q1q2 + q3q4), 1− 2(q22 + q23))arcsin (2(q1q3 − q4q2))
arctan 2(2(q1q4 + q2q3), 1− 2(q23 + q24))
 (3.47)
Conversion from Euler to quaternion is achieved using the following:
q1 = cos (φ/2) cos (θ/2) cos (ψ/2) + sin (φ/2) sin (θ/2) sin (ψ/2) (3.48)
q2 = sin (φ/2) cos (θ/2) cos (ψ/2)− cos (φ/2) sin (θ/2) sin (ψ/2) (3.49)
q3 = cos (φ/2) sin (θ/2) cos (ψ/2) + sin (φ/2) cos (θ/2) sin (ψ/2) (3.50)
q4 = cos (φ/2) cos (θ/2) sin (ψ/2)− sin (φ/2) sin (θ/2) cos (ψ/2) (3.51)
where qn is the nth quaternion (total of 4)
In addition to the weapon DataRefs, the MATLAB simulation needs to know where to
set the origin of its NED coordinate system so that the MATLAB simulation and the
X-Plane environment share a common position. The LLA above sea level are used as
a common geo-referencing system. The weapon simulation in MATLAB is initialised
at point of release with the current LLA. This becomes a Reference LLA and is stored
for the duration of the simulation of each weapon (GBU or LRAGM). This Reference
LLA is set to zero altitude and is then used to position the NED coordinate system’s
origin, placing the weapon at 0 metres North, 0 metres East and at the initial altitude
in metres in the Down direction.
As the weapon simulation is running, position updates are sent to X-Plane for vi-
sualisation. The positions of the weapon in MATLAB are first converted from NED
to LLA to be sent to X-Plane. When X-Plane receives the position update in LLA,
with attitude information in a Quaternion, X-Plane then converts the LLA into the
OpenGL XYZ reference system and updates the DataRef that holds the weapon data,
as well as the Quaternion. The graphical object in X-Plane then updates its position
in the simulation environment.
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User Input
Set Constants
Weapon Type
Define Structures & Timing Constants
Initialise Senders, Receivers & Counters
Connect to X-Plane
Initialise Model Variables
Test Action Mode
If Action Mode = 0
Get X-Plane Data
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Run Weapon Model Time
Step (Release Flag = 0)
Output Time to Release
If Action Mode = 1
Start While Loop
Run Weapon Model Time
Step (Release Flag = 1)
Send Data to X-Plane
Test While Loop
Condition (Impact)
If Action Mode = 2 or
While Loop Break
End Simulation
Close X-Plane Connection
End While Loop
Set Action Mode = 2
Figure 3.33: Flow Diagram of Weapon Simulation Including Networking Links With
X-Plane
The MATLAB simulation of the weapon will only cease when an impact condition is
met. This is defaulted to be when the weapon hits the ground. However, the MAT-
LAB simulation is run in an idealised flat earth NED representation and cannot detect
ground elevation information from within X-Plane. Instead, X-Plane must handle the
condition of when a weapon hits the ground. A flag is then sent to the MATLAB
simulation indicating that the weapon has hit the ground in X-Plane. X-Plane also has
an SDK function that allows the ground elevation data to be read at a specific set of
coordinates. When the impact flag is set, the SDK function ‘terrainYTest’ is run to
obtain the ground elevation data at the position of weapon impact in the X, Z plane.
The weapon is then set to this position in OpenGL coordinates and converted to LLA
to be sent to MATLAB. Figure 3.33 shows a diagram of this process, from initialisation
of the weapon to the handling of an impact condition. This process is common between
the GBU and LRAGM weapon simulations.
The data structure used to transfer model information between X-Plane and the MAT-
LAB simulation is shown in Figure 3.34. The structure includes several additional
pieces of information that are required for initial targeting of the weapon, and to pro-
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vide launch information to pilots in X-Plane. It is used to initialise the weapon with
a target and update the physical location of the weapon in the X-Plane simulation
environment, and differs from the VMF Re-tasking message structure in its message
content and requirement for acknowledgement.
LAT Latitude of Weapon
LON Longitude of Weapon
ALT Altitude of Weapon
X OpenGL X Coordinate (metres)
Y OpenGL Y Coordinate (metres)
Z OpenGL Z Coordinate (metres)
VX OpenGL X Velocity (metres per second)
VY OpenGL Y Velocity (metres per second)
VZ OpenGL Z Velocity (metres per second)
P Roll Rate (radians per second)
Q Pitch Rate (radians per second)
R Yaw Rate (radians per second)
Q1 Quaternion Element
Q2 Quaternion Element
Q3 Quaternion Element
Q4 Quaternion Element
ACTION_MODE Weapon mode (caged, launched, hit)
TARGET_INDEX Index of X-Plane Target (if user object)
TTR_MIN Time To Release – Minimum (seconds)
TTR_MAX Time To Release – Maximum (seconds)
TTR_OPT Time To Release – Optimum (seconds)
TTG Time To Go (seconds)
CROSS_AXIS_LIMIT_L Max off-boresight Angle – Left (degrees)
CROSS_AXIS_LIMIT_R Max off-boresight Angle – Right (degrees)
TYPE X-Plane weapon type reference
LAT Latitude of Weapon
LON Longitude of Weapon
ALT Altitude of Weapon
X OpenGL X Coordinate (metres)
Y OpenGL Y Coordinate (metres)
Z OpenGL Z Coordinate (metres)
VX OpenGL X Velocity (metres per second)
VY OpenGL Y Velocity (metres per second)
VZ OpenGL Z Velocity (metres per second)
P Roll Rate (radians per second)
Q Pitch Rate (radians per second)
R Yaw Rate (radians per second)
Q1 Quaternion Element
Q2 Quaternion Element
Q3 Quaternion Element
Q4 Quaternion Element
ACTION_MODE Weapon mode (caged, launched, hit)
TARGET_INDEX Index of X-Plane Target (if user object)
TTR_MIN Time To Release – Minimum (seconds)
TTR_MAX Time To Release – Maximum (seconds)
TTR_OPT Time To Release – Optimum (seconds)
TTG Time To Go (seconds)
CROSS_AXIS_LIMIT_L Max off-boresight Angle – Left (degrees)
CROSS_AXIS_LIMIT_R Max off-boresight Angle – Right (degrees)
TYPE X-Plane weapon type reference
LAT_REF
LON_REF
WEAPON
LASER
LAT Latitude of Weapon
LON Longitude of Weapon
ALT Altitude of Weapon
X OpenGL X Coordinate (metres)
Y OpenGL Y Coordinate (metres)
Z OpenGL Z Coordinate (metres)
VX OpenGL X Velocity (metres per second)
VY OpenGL Y Velocity (metres per second)
VZ OpenGL Z Velocity (metres per second)
P Roll Rate (radians per second)
Q Pitch Rate (radians per second)
R Yaw Rate (radians per second)
Q1 Quaternion Element
Q2 Quaternion Element
Q3 Quaternion Element
Q4 Quaternion Element
ACTION_MODE Weapon mode (caged, launched, hit)
TARGET_INDEX Index of X-Plane Target (if user object)
TTR_MIN Time To Release – Minimum (seconds)
TTR_MAX Time To Release – Maximum (seconds)
TTR_OPT Time To Release – Optimum (seconds)
TTG Time To Go (seconds)
CROSS_AXIS_LIMIT_L Max off-boresight Angle – Left (degrees)
CROSS_AXIS_LIMIT_R Max off-boresight Angle – Right (degrees)
TYPE X-Plane weapon type reference
ON Is Laser On
LOCKED Is Laser Locked
CODE Numerical ID Code
LAT Latitude of Laser Spot
LON Longitude of Laser Spot
ALT Altitude of Laser Spot
DATA STRUCTURE
Figure 3.34: Flow Diagram of Weapon Simulation Including Networking Links With
X-Plane
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3.3.3 MATLAB MEX Functions for UDP Messages
MATLAB MEX files allow for compiled C++ code to be included as functions within
the MATLAB native environment. This additional functionality was used to generate
a UDP message sending and receiving service between different instances of MATLAB
(for the different simulations) and other programs such as X-Plane. The advantages
of using compiled MEX code are that the execution speed is faster than using the
MATLAB runtime environment and the structure of messages must be declared before
compiling the MEX files.
Figure 3.35 shows a screen shot of two moving armoured targets simulated in MATLAB
and visualised in X-Plane using graphical objects. MATLAB MEX files are used to
send positioning information from MATLAB to X-Plane for real-time simulation.
Figure 3.35: Two Armoured Vehicles on an OSM Road in X-Plane
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Figure 3.36: Test GBU Launch Against a Mobile Armoured Target
Figure 3.36 shows a simulated test firing of a GBU against a mobile armoured target
moments before impact. Debug graphics can be seen overlaid onto the screen including
launch aircraft status, a radar and a high visibility cross to show weapon position.
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Chapter 4
Real-Time Task Allocation for
Remote Weapon Operators
4.1 Introduction
Over the last ten to fifteen years, there has been a rapid increase in the use of digital
communication networks to share data between military systems. NCW in the US [7]
NEC in the UK [1] allows a commander to link many sensors spread across a number
of platforms, and then to distribute the resultant picture to personnel at the front line.
This sensor-to-shooter capability can provide real-time situational updates to weapon
operators [9], the main aim being to enhance effectiveness whilst reducing the risk of
collateral damage/casualties.
The ultimate example of the NCW approach is the use of UAVs and remotely op-
erated weapon systems. This is a major area of growth for the US [134], the UK [135]
and an increasing number of countries around the world. The use of such platforms
raises a number of legal and ethical issues that have been the subject for much recent
debate [136]. One of the chief concerns in such discussions is the role of the operator
and the ability of the operator to make informed, reasoned and ethical decisions when
he/she is remote from physical danger [137]. This is an important area of active research
that touches on ethical/legal constraints, human-computer interaction, the psychology
of decision-making and the physical limits of the technologies involved [138]. In such
complex multi-faceted systems, it is crucial that great care is taken to ensure that all
factors are addressed.
A key decision in the development of any remotely operated system is the level to
which tasks are delegated to an automated or autonomous sub-system, with the hu-
man operator retaining supervisory control over the whole system. The distinction
between automated and autonomous sub-systems is important. An automated system
reacts to input data in a predefined and well-regulated way, whilst an autonomous
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system is able to make reasoned decisions, based upon a range of possible input data.
Automated systems are common; ranging from simple central heating systems to com-
plex aerospace flight control systems. Autonomous systems are rapidly becoming more
common; as physical robots that can sense, explore and reason about their environment
and software internet bots to take much of the drudgery out of repetitive analysis tasks.
It is essential that a human operator retains the final decision regarding the prose-
cution of a valid target because only a human operator has the legal (and ethical)
authority to commit a weapon to a target. Whilst current doctrine and RoE require
an operator in the loop, electronic systems are required to provide all of the relevant
information to enable them to make their final decision within operational, legal and
ethical constraints. It is important, therefore, to ensure that the information is timely,
appropriate, and that it adapts to the changing situation on the battlefield.
An evolving area of applying automation techniques to support military decision mak-
ing is though automatic task allocation problems. If there are a given number of assets,
with different types of effects that can be delivered, how best should they be distributed
in a given scenario for optimum effect and efficiency? There are a range of different
optimisation techniques that can be applied to these types of distribution problems
where the aim is to either minimise or maximise some function. The scenario used
for configuring the task allocation software was focussed in the air-to-surface weapon
domain. A number of aircraft, with different payloads, were available to be tasked
amongst a mixed set of targets that require different effects.
This chapter presents an investigation of the applicability of resource-task allocation
algorithms when run in a real-time environment and incorporated into an operator ter-
minal. The resource-task allocation algorithms take into account the resources available
for deployment; including the physical limitations on aircraft and guided weapon sys-
tems moving in to engage a target, the operational constraints around using certain
types of weapon against certain targets, the occurrence of targets of opportunity and
the need for sensors to be deployed to provide positive target identification and poten-
tially laser designation of the target [13].
4.1.1 Remote Operation of Multiple Air Platforms
UAVs or Unmanned Weapon System (UWS)s in use today tend to be remotely piloted
systems, with some automated systems largely responsible for the non-critical elements
of the flight management systems. An operator might be responsible for flight, weapon
and sensor systems. Some advanced reconnaissance UAVs have a wide range of sensors,
including multiple wide field of view imagers, multi-spectral thermal imagers, imaging
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radars and electronic warfare systems. Each of these systems often requires a dedicated
operator to manage the sensor, make assessments and relay the intelligence gleaned.
Weapon loads for armed platforms tend to be more limited than their sensors. An
armed UAV will have a limited number of guided weapons that can be deployed against
ground targets or in self-defence, often far fewer weapons than a manned platform: a
mixture of precision guided bombs, anti-armour missiles and air-to-air missiles. Added
to this is a new generation of small UWS, loitering munitions, which have a limited du-
ration compared to a full-sized UAV but far longer flight duration than a conventional
weapon system.
This chapter examines a situation where the current generation of remotely piloted
systems has advanced to a stage where more of the flight-critical tasks can be dele-
gated to autonomous systems and a remote operator has more of a supervisory role.
This supervisory role could cover a number of different UAVs and UWSs and may
involve a range of different tasks and targets. Tasks may be subject to different opera-
tional constraints (e.g. risk of collateral damage, priority tasks due to troops in contact,
or laser designation required). The air platforms may have different capabilities (maxi-
mum speed, duration, time on station), and each platform may have a different weapon
load, which depends on the weapons loaded at launch and the targets/tasks that have
been assigned previously to that platform.
As already discussed in Chapter 2, research in the field of remote weapon operations
for TLAMs [36] has found that a remote operator can supervise up to 12 weapons,
but that operator effectiveness is significantly degraded when an operator is required to
supervise 16 weapons. Similar performance degradation has been noted for ATC staff
supervising similar numbers of aircraft [101]. In both of these examples, the platforms
that the operators/controllers were responsible for were of a similar type and had similar
roles. For example, all weapons of the same type in the TLAM scenarios and all piloted
aircraft with similar performance in the ATC example. The factors associated with the
different platforms/weapons and the tasks complicate the job of the operator and are
likely to lead to reduced operator effectiveness if too many platforms/tasks are assigned.
In light of these studies, the algorithms discussed, although designed to deal with
an arbitrary number of platforms and tasks, are optimized to be able to provide infor-
mation to an operator in real-time (at a refresh rate of approximately once per second
or once per two seconds) for up to about ten platforms and a slightly larger number of
tasks. It would not be possible to guarantee real-time information for arbitrary num-
bers of platforms and tasks because the allocation problem is an example of optimal
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scheduling, which is known to be NP-complete. The time taken to find an optimal
solution therefore scales in a non-polynomial way as the number of tasks and assets
increases (assuming a deterministic algorithm).
4.2 Scenario Generation
Forming a representative scenario is a limiting factor due to the potential issues sur-
rounding security and classification of documentation. Further, a true test of the re-
source task allocation algorithms is to be able to find a solution to a range of different
scenarios rather than optimise for a single case example. There are three main variables
that exist for the establishment of a scenario. These are the platforms available, their
respective weapon and sensor payloads, and the targets in the scene.
The platforms used in the examples are of four types, taken to represent a range of
possible scenarios:
1. an unarmed reconnaissance UAV
2. a weaponised Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle (UCAV)
3. a loitering UWS
4. a manned CAS aircraft
With the exception of the unarmed reconnaissance UAV, each aircraft may be loaded
with ordnance selected from five weapon types:
1. an inertially-guided bomb equipped with an impact fuse (GBU)
2. an inertially-guided bomb equipped with an air-burst fuse (GBU)
3. a Laser-Guided Bomb (LGB) with an impact fuse (LGB)
4. an Autonomous Anti Armour Weapon (AAAW)
5. a Laser-Guided Anti Armour Weapon (LGAAW)
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In the case of the UWS, it may contain a unitary warhead corresponding to one of these
types of weapon or it might dispense sub-munitions corresponding to these warheads.
This set of weapons were included to represent a range of operational scenarios and
a range of guidance requirements (fully autonomous once deployed or requiring semi-
active laser guidance). The targets represented are of four general types:
1. Personnel
2. Vehicle
3. Building or Structure
4. Unknown
An unknown target type was included to allow the scenario to evolve dynamically and
allow a reconnaissance UAV to be tasked to interrogate the target. The unknown target
could then be removed if it was determined to be non-threatening, or assigned to one
of the other three classes of task if it was identified as a threat, possibly requiring a
reassignment of assets/resources. A sixth (non-weapon) resource was required to repre-
sent such a sensor scan and can only be allocated to non-UWS platform types. Typical
load-outs for each aircraft type are shown in Table 4.1 along with the performance
characteristics of the platform.
Table 4.1: Aircraft Capabilities and Load-Outs
UAV UCAV UWS CAS
Station Time (minutes) 127 60 30 30
Attack Speed (Knots) 49 103 75 247
Weapon Count 0 4 1(self) 10
GBU 0 0 1 0
LGB 0 4 0 4
AAAW 0 0 0 0
LGAAW 0 0 0 6
Seeker Scans 99 9 0 99
The scenario generator also allows for tasks to be added and/or removed at different
times to represent the changing nature of the battlefield. Whilst the operator supervises
the automated allocation of assets to tasks via the interface, it is crucial that a platform
is only finally assigned to the task when the operator confirms (or amends) the alloca-
tion. A re-allocation of platforms suggested by the algorithms in an evolving scenario
can be flagged to the operator in the system, but the operator takes all re-assignment
decisions. The system is not truly autonomous since it requires human supervision and
intervention. However, decision making within the allocation algorithm is logical and
subject to the same operational constraints that the human operator is subject to, and
allocations may be analysed in a debrief mode.
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4.3 Real-Time Sensor-Effector Allocation
The allocation of tasks to platforms is performed using two allocation matrices, the
allocation matrix (A) and the resource matrix (R):
Am,n =

n1,1 n1,2 · · · n1,Nt
n2,1 n2,2 · · · n2,Nt
...
...
. . .
...
nNp,1 nNp,2 · · · nNp,Nt
 (4.1)
Rm,n =

r1,1 r1,2 · · · r1,Nt
r2,1 r2,2 · · · r2,Nt
...
...
. . .
...
rNp,1 rNp,2 · · · rNp,Nt
 (4.2)
The allocation matrix has a row for each platform (1 Np) and a column for each
task/target (1 Nt). For each platform, the entries are either zero meaning that the
task is not allocated to that platform or a number, indicating the order in which the
tasks are to be performed. The resource matrix has the same size as the allocation
matrix and contains the resources to be used for that task: weapons to be deployed or
sensors to use. These matrices are used within the allocation algorithms and an output
task list is produced and passed to an operator interface, using a standard CAS-like
format and VMF type network protocols (see Chapter 3).
The allocation is a multi-stage process that starts by taking into account a set of
practical and operational constraints:
• Required Time on Target.
• Platform Maximum Speed.
• Maximum Time on Station of the Platform.
• Availability of a Suitable Weapon/Sensor.
If the platform cannot reach the task/target location within the time frame required
or the platform does not carry a suitable weapon or sensor, then the task cannot be
allocated by the algorithms. There are some combinations of resources (weapons) and
tasks (targets) that are strictly forbidden and these are not included in the solution
search e.g. a weapon may be deemed to carry too high a risk of collateral damage
when used against certain targets. For each search step a sub-list of permitted tasks is
generated to enforce these constraints.
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Once the tasks/platforms have been checked against constraints, the tasks are allocated
randomly to each platform. The algorithms then optimise the assignment against a cost
function using three separate operations:
• random shuﬄe of three or more tasks between platforms
• reordering of tasks allocated to each platform
• random task removal
In addition, a final check is performed to allow for two platforms to be allocated to one
task to allow co-operative laser designation if the weapon/task requires it.
The operations used in the allocation optimisation process were selected because previ-
ous work on related tasks [13,139–141] has shown that these operations have relatively
low computational overheads and rapidly converge to optimal or near-optimal solu-
tions. For the optimisation process itself, a standard simulated annealing algorithm
was used [142]. Simulated annealing allows a non-monotonic cost function to be op-
timised/minimised whilst searching a number of local minima to arrive at the global
minimum.
The cost function that is optimised is a sum of costs associated with a number of
factors. These factors can be split into two main types: those associated with the cost
of the assignment (CA), and those associated with time dependent costs (CT,i). The
total cost for a particular candidate assignment is then calculated using:
CTotal(A,R) =
∑
alltargets&resources
CA +
∑
alltimedelays
CT,i∆ti (4.3)
where ∆ti are time delays
The costs associated with the assignments were agreed with a non-attributable source
within the defence industry and are formalised as follows:
• Weapon Types Allocated - different weapons are optimised for different types
of target/role. E.g. anti-armour weapons are better used against vehicles than
against personnel, but they may have a secondary role against buildings if no
primary weapon is available. Certain weapon types are prohibited for certain
tasks (see above), but some tasks may be allocated to several different weapon
types. In such cases, there will be a preferred weapon and other non-preferred
weapons. Non-preferred (but allowable) weapons incur a penalty cost, whilst the
allocation of a prohibited weapon is not possible.
E.g. Cost(vehicle, anti armour) = 0, Cost(building, anti armour) = 50.
101
• Missed Target given the complexity of the allocation task, it is not always possible
to guarantee that all tasks are achievable within the constraints that have been
applied. It is possible that a task might not be allocated to allow the allocation
of other tasks.
E.g. Cost(missed target) = 200.
• Missed Priority Target - some targets are flagged as priority if there are troops in
contact that require immediate CAS. Missing such targets carries a high penalty
cost.
E.g. Cost(missed priority target) = 2000.
• Time between Targets - even if two targets may be prosecuted in rapid succession,
a minimum gap is required between each task to be supervised to allow the
operator to process and confirm the attack. This is to avoid the operator workload
rising to the point where he/she cannot make reasoned assignments of resources
to tasks.
E.g. Cost(time between targets <2 mins) = 200.
• No Laser Designation - some weapons require a coded laser designation signal to
operate effectively. This can be provided by a platform with a suitable sensor
and laser system, but some platforms (notably UWS) would be unlikely to have
this type of facility and would require the presence of a second platform to be
allocated to provide the laser signal. The lack of such a designator has a high
penalty cost for laser guided weapons.
E.g. Cost(LGB No laser designation) = 500.
The time dependent costs are as follows:
• Late on Target - each task has a specified Time on Target. If a platform is
allocated but may not arrive by the scheduled time, a penalty cost is applied.
E.g. Cost(late target per min) = 2, Cost(late priority target per min) = 20.
• Total Time of Tasks/Distance Travelled - where a number of tasks are allocated
to one platform, the shortest distance between tasks should be preferred so a
relatively small penalty cost is attached to the total time used or distance travelled
between tasks.
E.g. Cost(per min total tasks) = 1 per minute.
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The final stages of the algorithm re-evaluate the optimisation process using small per-
turbations to the costs (5% variations in each contributing factor) to ensure that the
final solution is stable and insensitive to small variations in the parameters. Whilst
it is important to obtain an allocation that is optimal, a near-optimal solution that is
robust may be preferred over a slightly lower cost solution that is unstable to small
variations in the cost function. Figure 4.1 shows the overall flow of the task allocation
algorithm.
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Figure 4.1: Flow Diagram Showing Allocation Search Strategy
4.4 Remote Operator Interface Developments
This section will build upon this and detail the aims and requirements of the remote
operator interface that was needed, discuss the features that were developed, and finally
will review the overall remote operator terminal that was designed to display the Task
Allocation Algorithm output.
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4.4.1 Aims of the Display
DSS are required when facilitating complex decision making in dynamic real-time envi-
ronments – such as the real time task allocation of a set of aircraft to a set of targets to
achieve some military (or other) objective. The first element of designing these systems
is to identify the source of information and the way in which it might be natively rep-
resented. In this case the information presented is sets of allocations for each aircraft
and the associated times for each task, along with associated costs and timings. There
were three main areas to include in the interface:
• Map display showing the positioning of aircraft and targets in the scene
• Scheduling of tasks and which tasks are to be carried out by each aircraft
• Network status, displaying whether the connections to each aircraft operating as
expected
4.4.2 Implementing the Main Display Elements
4.4.2.1 Map Display
The majority of the remote operator terminal is used to display a large map of the
engagement area. Overlaid on top of this map are icons representing the different
assets and targets in the engagement area. Also displayed are the routes that each
asset is due to fly. Icons used to represent the entities take on standard forms and
colours for the type of object. Friendly aircraft are coloured blue/cyan and known
enemy threats coloured red – as is standard for NATO guidelines for displays [20,143].
It is also important to represent the aircraft heading with a line pointing from the
centre of the object in the direction of travel. The map window can be zoomed in
and out, and panned side to side to allow the user to position their view in the most
appropriate way for their current engagement. The map can also be switched between
different types; from Terrain, to Satellite and Hybrid variants.
4.4.2.2 Schedule Display
The aircraft-to-target schedule list is shown in the bottom right hand corner of the
user interface and is used to list the order in which the targets will be prosecuted by
the available aircraft. The time on target is displayed in the column relevant to the
aircraft that has been tasked to that target. This provides the operator with a complete
overview and an estimate of how long until each task will have been completed. As
the scenario evolves, the loss of assets or the repositioning of targets may change the
tasking of aircraft or the ordering of attacks. Furthermore, if an urgent request for
CAS is added during the scenario, the schedule list will display this to the operator to
ensure the new information is available. Any changes are updated on the aircraft to
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target schedule list and are displayed to the user in real time. Changes in the ordering
or task allocation are indicated to the operator by flashing the changed data.
4.4.2.3 Connection Data
The status bar at the top of the window is present to indicate the current system state
to the user. Green statuses show that there is good data for the selected element. For
example a green ‘A/C DATA’ indicates that positional and other information is being
received from the aircraft in the engagement. An orange indicator indicates missing
information. For example an orange ‘TGT DATA’ indicates that there is information
missing from the target data set. This could be shown because a target is of the
‘Unknown’ type and has not yet been scanned by available sensors to be identified.
The status bar also displays the current ‘ZULU’ time (Coordinated Universal Time –
UTC) and the local time for the area in which the engagement is taking place, as well
as a user triggered stopwatch timer.
4.4.2.4 Additional Functions
At the bottom of the Remote Operator Interface is a list of clickable buttons (soft keys)
used to control the interface. The first set of soft keys is used to re-centre the map
screen on the selected relevant aircraft or target. This is particularly useful if the op-
erator loses track of the aircraft and targets on the map. The next functions are those
that aid the targeting process. A manual update function is available which allows the
user to enter an updated target position manually for any of the targets on screen. The
‘Click for Tgt Lat Lon’ button places a cross-hair on the mouse and allows the user to
interrogate the objects on-screen and have their positions displayed in a window on the
bottom bar (in decimal degrees).
The remote operator also has the ability to draft or forward a NATO standard CAS
9-Line Brief order [144] by clicking on the ‘Create CAS 9 Line Brief’ button. It allows
9-line briefings to be created, and/or edited and then sent to an aircraft. This aircraft
will then attempt to prosecute the assigned target as a matter of urgency. This is likely
to cause the task allocations to change once the algorithm has found the new optimum
including the high priority target.
4.4.3 Display Overview
The information displayed on the main page of the Remote Operator Interface can be
seen in Figure 4.2 with an expanded view of the Task Allocation Table (TAT) in Figure
4.3. The different features on the display are shown including both a long format CAS
9-Line Brief window and a short format Target Update box.
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Figure 4.2: An Example of the Remote Operator Interface, Showing a Range of Targets
and Assets with an Example 9-Line Brief Overlay
Figure 4.3: An expanded view of the Task Allocation Table (TAT)
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4.4.4 Networked Elements of the Display
The remote operator terminal communicates with other elements within the distributed
simulation environment. The remote operator has the ability to see the full environ-
ment, including piloted aircraft, unmanned aircraft, and weapon systems. The aircraft
may be purely simulated or be a manned flight simulator; current capabilities allow
two full motion and two fixed flight simulators to be interfaced to the remote operator
terminal. These links include digital data transfer and broadcast and/or person-to-
person voice links. The environment also includes a number of stand-alone computers
that run reconfigurable autonomous weapon models, which can emulate radio data link
protocols to simulate networked weapons.
In order to simulate the distributed environment, a UDP is used to transmit/receive
information between the different elements of the system. The content of this UDP com-
munication channel is constrained to digital messaging standards currently in service,
in particular the NATO standard VMF [124, 145]. The benefit of using a distributed
simulation system employing a VMF style communication protocol ensures that each
element only has information that would typically be available during NCW, and that
individual systems are not over-aware of other platforms’ behaviour via an unintentional
hidden channel.
4.5 Example Scenario
As already expressed, there are limitations to the number of tasks an operator can
supervise. With this in mind, an 8 asset, 12 target scenario has been drawn up. The
scenario effectively has 12 tasks, possibly more should a co-operative assignment be
necessary in order to deliver a laser-guided weapon from a platform that does not have
its own laser designator. Figure 4.4 shows the scenario overview.
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Figure 4.4: Overview of Example Scenario
To start the scenario, a random area was chosen to be the engagement area. The ge-
ographic areas represented in the example scenario are just for visualisation purposes
and are in no way related to any previous or future military engagements. Assets and
targets have been placed to the left and right of an imaginary vertical line representing
the boundary between allied and enemy territories. It is assumed that the red team
have no aircraft or air defence systems.
The positioning of targets and aircraft are random within their territories. However,
a rule has been incorporated to cluster UWS whilst loitering. The aircraft capabilities
and load-outs are shown in Table 4.1. Table 4.2 shows the breakdown of the number
of aircraft and targets, and their types for the example scenario.
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Table 4.2: Number of Aircraft (A/C) and Targets (TGT) in Example Scenario
Type Description
# of
A/C
# of
TGT
A/C 1 UAV 1
A/C 2 UCAV 2
A/C 3 UWS 4
A/C 4 CAS A/C 1
TGT 1 Personnel 3
TGT 2 Vehicle 3
TGT 3 Building 4
TGT 4 Unknown 2
Running the Task Allocation Algorithms on the current scenario provides the task
listing as shown in Table 4.3. The aircraft callsigns are listed across the tops of the
columns. UAVs, UCAVs, UWS and CAS A/C have the callsigns ‘Overwatch’, ‘Spectre’,
‘Striker’ and ‘Speeder’ respectively, followed by a two digit numerical identifier. The
first column shows the target prosecution order. Each aircraft column is then used to
represent the target/targets that the aircraft has been tasked to, and the time it will
take until the target is prosecuted.
Table 4.3: Task Allocation Table (TAT)
AC 1 AC 2 AC 3 AC 4 AC 5 AC 6 AC 7 AC 8
OVER
24
SPEC
19
STRI
75
STRI
76
STRI
77
STRI
78
SPEC
20
SPEE
64
TGT02 00:03:15
TGT12 00:04:05
TGT08 00:04:59
TGT06 00:05:21
TGT07 00:05:39
TGT09 00:06:37
TGT10 00:07:18
TGT11 00:07:21
TGT04 00:09:04
TGT03 00:09:55
TGT05 00:13:03
TGT01 00:13:18
The numerical values populating the TAT show the time on target for the aircraft of
that particular column onto the target for that particular row in HH:MM:SS format.
As most aircraft are capable of carrying more than one weapon, a single aircraft may
be tasked to prosecute several targets. Furthermore should a cooperative task arise,
where an aircraft is required to laser designate for a platform that does not have that
capability, there will be more than one column containing a time for a specific target
row. Lastly, should an aircraft not have any tasks in the current engagement, its cor-
responding column will remain blank.
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In the example scenario shown the time to prosecute all the targets in the engage-
ment is 13 minutes 18 seconds. However, in this scenario there are unknown targets.
Upon being scanned by sensors the unknown targets may be classified as legitimate
targets. If this occurs the algorithms will update the TAT and may re-assign aircraft
to different targets in order to prosecute the new threat along with the current or re-
maining threats in the scenario.
Figure 4.5 shows a schematic diagram of the engagement routing between the tar-
gets for each aircraft. This schematic is not the actual flight path but rather the
way-point routings. Once programmed in, the UAVs, UCAVs, UWS and CAS A/C
will fly the optimum routes to engage the targets, taking into account any mandatory
attack headings.
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Figure 4.5: Overview of Example Scenario with Aircraft Routes
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4.6 Results
The scenario used in this chapter is an example only. It was selected to represent
the complexity of a resource-task allocation problem that could be encountered by a
remote weapons operator. The algorithms described above were developed to operate
in real, or near-real, time. The two main factors in designing the algorithms were the
time taken in finding a solution to the allocation problem and the efficacy and the
robustness of the final solution. The average time taken by the algorithms for different
numbers of targets and assets is shown in Figure 4.6; the average was calculated by
selecting random sub-sets of targets and platforms from the scenario and performing the
search on a standard laptop computer (running as a background process on a multi-core
medium specification laptop PC). Even for the full scenario with 8 platforms and 12
targets, the update rate of once every 2.5 seconds is sufficiently fast for the algorithms
to be used with the remote operator interface.
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Figure 4.6: Average Time to Find Search Result for Example Scenario for Variable
Number of Assets/Platforms and Different Number of Targets (both randomly selected)
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The robustness and the efficacy of the solution is a more complicated problem. Finding
a single perfect solution, where each target is to be prosecuted by the ideal platform
and weapon combination at the desired time on target, cannot be guaranteed for a
general problem. There may be a number of different ways to allocate platforms and
weapons to targets and tasks, or there may not be any ideal way to allocate the assets.
If there are insufficient resources to prosecute all of the targets, the algorithms need
to be able to prioritise the targets according to their importance and the urgency with
which they may be prosecuted. This is achieved using the cost allocation described
earlier; some tasks, such as the priority targets have a sufficiently high cost that they
will be allocated before any other tasks (e.g. troops in contact). As long as the overall
cost of the allocation solution is less than the costs associated with these essential tasks,
then these tasks must have been allocated and this fact can be flagged to the remote
operator through the interface. Equally, where a priority target cannot be prosecuted,
this fact must also be flagged to the operator and the operator engaged to find an
alternative solution through the request of additional resources or external assistance
– or, in the absence of external resources, a low level fly past by a platform or a show
of force to inhibit the opposition forces movement on blue troops.
The numerical robustness of the individual solutions is checked within the algorithms
themselves, using a perturbative assessment of the cost function around the preferred
solution. The temporal robustness of the solutions is also important, in dynamically
changing engagements in particular, where the numbers of targets and assets may vary
whilst the engagement is under-way. To this end, the individual solutions generated
by the allocation algorithms are monitored by the remote operator interface. In cases
where multiple solutions are found with similar costs, the interface tracks the solutions
being generated and selects the solution with the most temporal persistence, as deter-
mined by the frequency of occurrence and the stability over a period of time determined
by the times on target in the engagement. For the example considered in this chapter,
the time interval for the engagement is approximately three to thirteen minutes first
target to last. It is worth noting that this temporal robustness function is also used in
Satellite Navigation aids that use live traffic data to provide updates to the quickest
route to a destination. These systems only offer faster options to the users rather than
changing them automatically due to the confusion this could cause.
For an operational system, the algorithms should also allow for other factors to be
included in the optimisation, such as the distribution of known threats, such as air
defence systems, and the risk of collateral damage. Understandably, the risk of non-
combatants being injured and/or friendly fire is seen as a major factor influencing the
ability to prosecute ground targets. Even a precision weapon will have an area of effect,
which is often characterised in terms of a RED [19], and this area can be asymmetric
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and potentially include features such as the protective effect of cover (terrain, buildings,
vehicles, etc.). To minimise the risk of collateral damage and to allow the weapon plat-
forms to navigate around known threats, the allocation algorithms could be extended
to define angles of approach to the targets (preferred attack headings), which could be
included in a route-planning tool.
4.7 Conclusions and Summary
This chapter has described a set of real-time task-resource allocation algorithms pre-
viously developed as part of a non-real-time battlefield analysis tool [13]. The algo-
rithms provide an allocation of the available platforms and weapon loads to the set
of targets currently identified, taking into account a range of different operational fac-
tors: priority of target, preferred time on target, platform speed, and the suitability of
the weapon to the target type and the danger of collateral damage. The algorithms
also allow for co-operative attacks involving multiple platforms using laser designation
systems. The algorithms are based on the minimisation of a cost function, which is
defined as the sum of the individual costs that reflect these operational factors. The
number of allocations to be searched is reduced by vetting the targets against the
ability of the platform to reach the target and the ability of the weapons on each plat-
form to prosecute the target. Forbidden weapon/target combinations or unreachable
platform/target pairs are excluded from further searches. The remaining candidate al-
locations are searched using a simulated annealing minimisation method combined with
a series of allocation/re-allocation methods, including multi-platform/task swapping,
single platform task reordering, and task removal.
With this type of capacity to optimally task and re-allocate aircraft and payloads
amongst targets, the next logical step is then to increase capability to a stage where an
operator can instead re-task the weapons after they have been launched. As the stand-
off range of modern air-to-surface weapons increases, the increase in weapon flight time
creates the opportunity for the situation on the ground, or the mission objectives, to
change. Where the focus of this chapter was to generate adequate user interfaces to
allow operators to obtain and effect task allocations to aircraft, the new focus will be to
re-task weapons in flight. If all of the weapons in the scenario described in this chapter
were already launched, could a remote operator perform the same role by interfacing
directly with the weapons themselves? This is a paradigm shift that may occur in the
air-to-surface weapons domain and must be investigated thoroughly.
The following two chapters will now detail the investigation into such an interface sys-
tem with, in Chapter 5, a single short range air-to-surface bomb, and then in Chapter
6, multiple medium-long range air-to-surface missiles.
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Chapter 5
Participant Study 1
This chapter develops the initial investigation into the resource-task allocation opti-
misation algorithms presented in the previous chapter. Due to the extended stand-off
range of modern air-to-surface weapons, there is an implication that once data-linked,
future systems will be able to be re-tasked remotely during flight. It is necessary
therefore to investigate the way in which this will impact on an operator carrying out
re-tasking of remote weapons. This chapter will present an investigation into the re-
tasking of individual short range data linked bombs against emerging targets in short
time frames.
5.1 Introduction
Re-tasking of Remotely Operated air-to-surface bombs and missiles requires knowledge
of the bomb or missile’s capability to be re-tasked to alternative targets. The previous
chapters have highlighted how a bomb or missile’s current flight conditions, and remain-
ing fuel if available, can be used to calculate a Re-task Availability Region (RAR). The
RAR is the area on the ground to which a weapon may be successfully be re-tasked.
The potential issue with the use of RARs for re-tasking weapons in flight is that they
are not static. RARs change their shape over time – in general reducing in size as the
weapon gets closer to the target. This prompts the research question of how best to
display the RAR to operators to support their remote re-tasking duties.
Operators of remote systems require information to be presented to them in a way
that facilitates decision making. This information can be verbal, audible and/or visual
in form depending on the context. The information displayed visually must be sup-
porting of the task at hand and displayed in a way that is not confusing or distracting.
Chapter 2 has already highlighted the range of research conducted into the develop-
ment of DSS as well as the underpinning theories of SA and decision making. With
these theories and studies in mind, there is a need to apply these to the novel area of
re-tasking remotely operated weapon systems.
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This chapter presents a participant trial that tested the suitability of two modes of
displaying RAR information on a remote operator terminal Graphical User Interface
(GUI). Participants took the role of a remote operator in charge of re-tasking guided
bombs to new high priority emerging targets. Their performance was measured in a
range of tasks in which new targets appeared either within or outside of the capability
of the guided bomb, or no new target appeared at all. The participants’ performance
and responses to other metrics and demographic data are presented and discussed in
relation to the applicability of the two different display modes to adapting existing
remote operator terminals.
5.2 Summary of Trial
A NEW, in this trial the GBU, was launched from an aircraft against a static target.
The control of the GBU was handed over from the launch aircraft to a remote operator
in a ground control station immediately after launch. The remote operator then be-
came responsible for the GBU during its flight. The participants acting as the remote
operator saw a total of 15 different scenarios. In each scenario there was a chance that
a higher priority target would emerge (66% of scenarios). The participant must then
decide whether or not to re-task the GBU in flight to this new emergent target using
graphical overlays of weapon capability presented on the remote operator terminal.
Some targets appeared within the RAR and some appeared outside (50% of scenarios
with new targets). It was explained to participants that RoE were satisfied, and that
the weapon in flight must be re-tasked to the new high priority target if it were safe to
do so.
The scenarios were constrained such that only one action was required to either re-
task or deny the re-task request. This allows for the accuracy and reaction time of
participants to be measured in a controlled manner. The scenario itself could exist in
a much larger dynamic environment of air-to-surface weapon engagements, examples
of which include friendly troops under fire requesting CAS, or a high value ‘target
of opportunity’ emerging. In these situations the additional capabilities of NEC and
NEW will increase the range of roles a Remote Operator may have, adding to their
workload. Any DSS developed must be designed to work effectively as possible, and
human factors issues must be explored early in the design phases of Remote Operator
Terminals for NEW [146,147].
116
5.3 System Development
Chapter 3 discusses the overall facility development for remote operation of simulated
weapon systems. For this trial there were three main functioning programs that fa-
cilitated the experiment. These were; the Remote Operator Terminal software, the
Network Protocol Code for Re-tasking messages, and the GBU weapon simulation.
5.3.1 Remote Operator Terminal
The Remote Operator Terminal, is a map display which represents key information
to the user (shown later in Figures 5.1 & 5.2). This information is pulled from the
data available from VMF type messages received from the weapon and from remote
targeting systems such as an aircraft mounted targeting pod or a FAC CAS 9-Line
Brief. These messages must be processed by the remote operator terminal system
before being displayed to the user. The main functions within the Remote Operator
Terminal software are:
• Map Function - loads the background map based on the current world position
being interrogated by the user. The function loads relevant map tiles from open
source mapping databases in either satellite, map or hybrid views.
• Objects Function - loads objects onto the map view to represent assets, targets
and other information about objects within the battle-space.
• Status Function - displays the current weapon status to inform users of the state
of the weapon that they are controlling.
• Key-press Function - records the human interaction with the keyboard control
device and carries out the appropriate command. In this interface the potential
keyboard commands are minimised to; ‘R’ re-task weapon, ‘O’ keep the original
target, and ‘Return’ proceed to next scenario.
• Decision Aid Function - displays one of two variations in display type used to aid
decision making by the user.
• Network Function - reads data from the network protocol used to send and receive
information between the user interface PC and the NEW simulation PC.
The Remote Operator Terminal developed is similar to those developed for the B-1B
weapon operator interface [34,35]. The B-1B weapon operator interface displays circu-
lar shapes on a digital map along with the expected flight path of the aircraft. These
circles represent the LAR for the weapons to be launched against pre-configured tar-
gets. When the aircraft is within these LARs the weapon operator can release the
weapons onto their targets. However, the interface does not produce RS – areas on the
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ground that can be hit from the current launch position of the aircraft. The Remote
Operator Terminal display for this trial is fixed in position, displaying a map with mov-
ing objects to represent the current weapon in flight and the target(s). Rather than
LARs being produced for each target, a single RAR is generated for the weapon. This
can then be displayed to operators to aid them in assessing the validity of re-tasking
an air-to-surface weapon to a new target.
A current UK capability to re-task weapons in-flight exists in the C2 of the Hellfire
missile system used in the Apache. The Hellfire uses semi-active laser homing to guide
itself to the target, which is lased by either the firing platform or a third party (note
some later variants of the Hellfire have been updated to include an active radar seeker).
As a mechanism of aborting the weapon, an operator can, in real-time, move the laser
designator away from the target to a safe location for the weapon to ditch. Similarly
this technique could be used to re-task the weapon to an alternative target whilst the
weapon is in-flight. Given the relatively short range, the time window for these types
of re-tasking are very minimal. The operator’s terminal is not specifically configured
for re-tasking roles, but this is an example of how existing systems could be used to
perform such tasks.
Two methods were chosen to display decision cueing information to participants. The
first, a geo-spatial graphical overlay, and the second a digital numerical display. These
displays were configured to represent the maximum extended range to which the weapon
in flight can be re-tasked to safely. Using a combination display was considered, how-
ever, the purpose of the trial was to establish direct differences between the two displays.
Using a mixed display would have removed the ability to distinguish which decision aid
element participants were using to support their decision making, introducing unnec-
essary confounding factors into the study.
The RAR graphical representation is a non-filled polygon shape which has the gen-
eral appearance of a semicircle. This semicircle protrudes forwards in the direction
of travel of the weapon with the flat edge facing the weapon, and the arc spanning
from the left most extent of the weapons range if it were to turn full left, through the
weapons forward maximum range, to the right most extent of the weapons range if it
were to turn full right. However, due to the dynamic nature of a weapon engagement
and ultimate descent into the target/surface, an air-to-surface weapon’s RAR reduces
to zero over time.
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In the early stages of GBU flight the RAR remains approximately the same size and
shape. However, as the GBU descends the area of the RAR reduces, with the overall
shape collapsing inwards to the centre. The main issue with this dynamic feature is
that the reduction in area overall is not uniform in all directions. The reduction in
off-boresight capability is the most obvious change in the shape of the RAR. This is
the reduction in the GBU’s ability to change its heading to prosecute other targets.
In Chapter 3, 3.9 shows an example of the change in shape of the RAR in 2 intervals
from launch until target impact. The use of polygons is common to display this type of
information (as seen in the B-1B WO display [34,35]). It is also used in nuclear power
station control rooms [148] as it has been shown that people are good at detecting
departure from a ‘normal’ system state using polygon displays [149]. A detailed map
is projected underneath the decision cues to ensure that all information required is in
a position to allow for efficient focus and eye movement of participants [150].
The numeric display used a digital number representation rather than an analogue
dial to represent the numerical values associated with the ability to re-task the GBU
weapon. This is because digital displays provide greater levels of precision [151]. Ana-
logue dials also rely on a participants ability to distinguish difference within graphical
forms, rather than from comparing numerical values. Participants were shown two dif-
ferent numbers, a numeric value representing the capability of the GBU, and a numeric
value of the capability necessary to re-task to the new target. This requires participants
to use basic mental arithmetic to ascertain whether the new target is within the RAR
of the GBU.
This calculation could be quickly made by the computer system and a number could
have been shown representing the difference between the maximum range available and
the range to the target. This was avoided in order to prompt participants to make an
assessment based upon the relative closeness of the new target to the maximum range
of the weapon, which is not directly visible to the participant if they are only provided
with a numerical value instructing them that the new target is inside or outside of the
range capability of the weapon. It also does not provide the participants with direct
information to assess the rate of change of the maximum range of the GBU. Any un-
derstanding of the rate of change is inferred by the rate of change of the numbers on
the display. The Range To Target was placed immediately above the Range Available
so that the two numbers could be easily compared with each other. The numerical
format provides the operator with no geo-spatial cues to build SA, however, there is
still sufficient information available for an operator to develop the third ’Projection’
level of SA [56].
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When using a map display it is important that the decision cues are made more easily
available to participants by increasing their graphical salience on the single display [152].
The colours used for the two different decision cues were applied in order to achieve
the required increase in salience, as they do not interfere with high level emergent fea-
tures such as the shape of the RAR [153], and colour has been shown to increase both
decision making accuracy and reaction time [154].
The data refresh rate of the user interface is dictated by the time it takes to gen-
erate the RAR for the GBU. The time taken for each calculation of the RAR is based
upon the resolution (number of points in the polygon) and the type of RAR calculated
(open loop/closed loop solutions). This information is detailed in Chapter 3. An ap-
propriate refresh rate of 10 Hz was used as it provides a suitably high frame rate to
show motion, whilst allowing for a high enough resolution for a good RAR calculation.
Low refresh rates have been shown not to degrade performance of participants in dy-
namic tasks [155], and so a refresh rate of 10Hz should not impact on the performance
of participants within this trial.
5.3.2 Network Protocol
A custom developed UDP was used to send and receive information on both the NEW
and Remote Operator Terminal PCs. Chapter 3 discusses the message format in more
detail.
The information sent from the NEW to the Remote Operator Terminal are Position,
Attitudes and Velocity. The Remote Operator Terminal sends Target Position and
Velocity information to the NEW. It is assumed, for the purpose of this trial, that
the targeting information received from a third party source by the Remote Operator
Terminal is both timely and accurate.
5.3.3 Weapon Simulation
The weapon simulation is a full 6DoF model of a GPS/INS GBU. The GPS/INS guided
weapon is an unpowered guided bomb in the 1000lb class. It is canard controlled, uses
proportional navigation guidance and standard approximations for the aerodynamic
coefficients [114,156]. This model is also discussed in detail in Chapter 3.
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5.4 Study Aims and Methodology
5.4.1 Aims
The aim of this study was to compare the efficacy of two different display methods for
providing decision aid information to users of a NEW Remote Operator Terminal. In
this trial, participants were asked to make decisions as to whether a NEW in flight
could be re-tasked to a new target using either:
1. The RAR graphical display overlaid onto a map (shown in Figure 5.1), or
Figure 5.1: Graphical Display Method
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2. The Range Available and Range to Target numerical Displays (shown in Figure
5.2).
Figure 5.2: Numerical Display Method
Participants were required to complete 15 simulated tasks in which they monitor the
flight path of a network-enabled guided bomb. In some scenarios the NEW must be
re-tasked in order to hit a new target. Participants were instructed that if a new target
appears on the display it always takes priority over the initial target. The participants
were required to make their decisions in real-time and as quickly as possible, taking
into account that re-tasking the NEW may not always be possible as a new target
could appear outside of the weapon’s range capability. The typical flight time of each
NEW in this trial varied from 30-60 seconds depending on the specific scenario, with
re-task scenarios typically requiring more time because the weapon must travel further
to reach its new target.
The aim was to establish the suitability of each display method to the task and to
compare the two methods directly against each other. This was achieved by using
performance metrics recorded during the trial, information from cognitive load tests
(designed to test how mentally demanding a task is) and participant experience sur-
veys.
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5.4.2 Methodology
A single screen simulation test bed was developed which allows participants to monitor
the current flight path of the NEW during the trial. The display shows the position
of the NEW and any targets on-top of a map (see Figure 5.1 & 5.2). The map allows
the participants to gain a spatial understanding of the area of engagement. The dis-
play represents the weapon position with a green diamond and a solid line extending
outward from its centre to represent the heading. The marker is tagged with ‘WPN’
‘FLXXX’ and ‘GSXXXKTS’. ‘FLXXX’ is used to display the weapon’s flight level in
hundreds of feet, ‘GSXXXKTS’ is used to indicate the weapon’s ground speed in knots.
The display represents the initial target position with a filled red square and a ‘TGT’
tag. If a new target appears, the display represents this with a red square outline and
a ‘NEW TGT’ tag. When a decision is made as to which target to prosecute, the
approved target marker becomes, or remains, a filled red square and the denied target
marker becomes a red cross (X).
The two types of display differ in their method of displaying the re-task capability
of the weapon in flight. Figure 5.1 shows the RAR information in a graphical display
consisting of a polygon made from a series of points linked together with a thick dashed
line. This represents the current area that the weapon can be re-tasked to at that mo-
ment in time. The green ‘X’ at its centre represents the current unguided impact point
of the weapon. This is important to display as it provides participants with a reference
point to allow them to more easily interpret the distance of the new target when it
appears.
Figure 5.2 shows the numerical display layout. RAR information was displayed with
two numbers. The top number was the ‘Range to Target’ and the bottom number
was the ‘Range Available’. These numbers correspond to both the distance between
the current target location and the relative locations in the scenario. To calculate the
Range to target, the position of the original target and new target were inserted into
the standard normal distance equation 5.1. The Range Available was calculated by
finding the intercept point of the RAR and a line of infinite length extending outwards
from the original target, in the direction of the new target location. This intercept
point was then used in the adapted standard normal distance equation 5.2.
RangeTarget =
√
(PositionNewTarget − PositionInitialTarget)2 (5.1)
RngAvailable =
√
(RARIntersection(PositionInitialTarget, ψ)− PositionInitialTarget)2
(5.2)
where: ψ = Heading to New Target from Initial Target
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The two lines displaying the ‘Range to Target’ and ‘Range Available’ are always visible
on the screen, even when there are no new targets and hence no numerical values to
display. In this case the numbers are replaced by text which reads ‘No New Tgt’. This
keeps the display clear of misleading information that might lead participants to make
incorrect decisions.
There were three main prime types for the 15 scenarios. These were Re-task, Deny
Re-task and Do Nothing. Each case occurred 5 times within the scenario set, and ap-
peared in a random order. Additionally, a rotation and translation of the initial attack
heading and target location was made for each scenario, and the location of the initial
target was varied. Further, the time at which a new target appeared and its location
on the map were varied. This aimed to prevent the learning effect, where participants
perform better after being exposed to a repetitive trial numerous times and become
able to predict the time and location of new stimuli. Therefore, the window of opportu-
nity for participants to re-task was varied from 4-16 seconds, and the time that a deny
re-task prompt appears is varied from 5-21 seconds. The distance of the new target
away from the edge of the RAR when it appears was also varied from between -3km
(inside = re-task) and 4km (outside = deny).
Figure 5.3 and 5.4 show the RAR size and positions of the weapon, original target
and new target at the point when the new target appears for the two scenario prime
types; Re-Task and Deny Re-Task respectively. Table 5.1 shows the time a new target
appears and the window of opportunity for each scenario in sequence. The sequence
was randomised before being set for all participants and upon reflection the ordering
should have varied for each participant to remove any session effects.
Table 5.1: Scenario Sequence, Prime Type and Window of Opportunity
Scenario 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Prime (Re-task/Deny) - R D - R D D R R D - R - D -
Time Tgt Presented - 8 9 - 12 17 13 12 8 5 - 20 - 21 -
Window Of Opportunity - 4 - - 8 - - 12 16 - - 4 - - -
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Figure 5.3: RAR Imagery at Point of New Target Appearing for Re-Task Primed
Scenarios
125
Figure 5.4: RAR Imagery at Point of New Target Appearing for Deny Re-Task Primed
Scenarios
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5.4.3 Statistical Design
This experiment was a mixed factor design with the top level between subjects factor
(balanced) of display format as the main independent variable. The task priming was
a within subjects factor independent variable. Each participant saw the same set of 5
control, 5 re-task primed and 5 deny re-task primed scenarios and the same window
of opportunity/time target presented, regardless of the display format used in order
to maintain a completely crossed design. The window of opportunity and time that
a new target was presented were varied in order to test a range of datum points,
and moreover, to stop participants having the ability to predict when a new target may
appear in each scenario. Further, the incoming angle of the weapon was varied randomly
to further differentiate between each scenario. These changes act as within subjects
random effects variables, used for differentiating the scenarios. The main aim of this
experiment is to look for the influence of the main Independent Variable of display
format on reaction time and accuracy between the two display groups. Additional
variations in the scenarios regarding time and location of new target positions were
included to maintain internal validity of the experiment, and are not intended to be
Independent Variables.
5.4.4 Participants
A total of 34 individuals participated in the study. Participants were randomly assigned
to experimental groups. Half of the participants (n=17) were presented with a graphic
display to aid their decision making and the other half were presented with a numeric
display for a between subjects design. Participants ages ranged from 18 to 34 years of
age and the majority of participants were male (n=24).
5.4.5 Procedure and Materials
Training: Approximately one week prior to the experiment, participants attended a
group-based training event where they received information about the study. They
were each provided with the following information:
“You are asked to participate in a simulated exercise. You are the ground operator
of a military guided-bomb system. You will be sat at a computer and asked to use the
digital map and keyboard. You are responsible for updating the trajectory of a manoeu-
vrable weapon whilst in mid-flight.
The weapon will be travelling towards an original target which has been pre-selected
however sometimes a new target may be detected by the system. A new target will al-
ways take priority over the original target. Your job is to analyse whether it is possible
to re-task the weapon to the new target or whether the new target is outside of the
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weapons range. Your decision will be based on the graphical (numeric) display on the
computer screen
Targets are updated in real-time. Therefore a target may only be in range for a very
short time. This means that you must make your decision as fast as possible.”
Participants were told that they must use the keyboard to control the weapon. If
they wanted to re-task the weapon they were instructed to hit the R key. If the new
target was outside the RS of the weapon they were instructed to hit the O key. If no
new target was displayed they were instructed to do nothing. Participants were then
randomly assigned to either Group A (graphical display) or Group B (numeric display)
and given paper instructions to take home and study. The paper instructions contained
screen shots of what the screen would look like for each tasking option (re-task, un-
reachable target, no new target) depending upon which group they were assigned to
(graphical or numeric).
Pre-trial measures: On the day of the trial participants were measured for the fol-
lowing:
• Pre-test Control Measure - Participants conducted a pre-test to check that they
understood how to operate the system. If they were successful they were allowed
to progress to the full experiment. All participants passed this test.
• Digit Span Task - Participants completed a verbal assessment of their working
memory capacity and executive function-updating using the Digit Span Task
to measure their baseline cognitive functions [157]. This was to help measure
participants’ levels of ‘cognitive load’ during the simulation.
The trial: Once pre-trial measures were recorded, participants progressed into the ex-
periment room where they were sat at a computer. They were left alone in this room
and told that the experiment would start once they hit the Return key. They were
then presented with 15 randomly ordered scenarios where they had to either re-task
the weapon (n=5), maintain the original target (n=5) or do nothing. Measurements
from this task included: (i) speed of response; and (ii) accuracy of response.
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Post-trial measures:
• Digit Span Task - Immediately after completing the trial, participants once again
completed the Digit Span task to gather a post-trial measure of cognitive function
[158].
• Questionnaire - Participants completed a questionnaire to measure experiential
feedback through open questions. Participants also rated their perceived dif-
ficultly of the task by marking responses to a set of questions on a 14 point
rating-scale, adapted from the NASA TLX [159].
5.5 Results
IBM’s Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) [160] was used to analyse the
data produced by the trial. Due to the study being a between-subjects design, the
majority of tests were conducted to establish the difference between the two groups’
performance. The total number of participants was 34 and were split between each
group evenly (N=17). Due to the small sample population several checks were necessary
to establish whether the data could be assumed normally distributed and that the
assumption of Homogeneity of Variance between groups could be satisfied. In general
it was found that the assumption of normality could not be upheld, meaning that non-
parametric tests for statistical significance were used, rather than the more conventional
t-tests and Analysis of Variance (ANOVA)s, that are only valid when data is normally
distributed with homogeneity of variance satisfied.
5.5.1 Reaction Time
Figure 5.5 shows the reaction time of participants from each group for each scenario.
The reaction time data has been analysed at four different levels of detail in order to
look at data produced per scenario, prime type, display group and overall averages.
5.5.1.1 Per Scenario Reaction Time
Each scenario was investigated on an individual basis between groups. Using the Mann-
Whitney U (M-WU) non-parametric tests it was found that participants using the
Numeric Display take significantly longer to make their decisions in 8 out of the 10
scenarios than those using the Graphic Display (see Table 5.2). Note: the following
abbreviations are used in tables where necessary – Standard Deviation (SD), Mean
(M), Significance Value p (p), U-Statistic (U), Z-Statistic (Z).
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Figure 5.5: Reaction Times for Correct Decisions Per Scenario, A: Graphical Display
and B: Numerical Display – Box shows inter quartile range with mean at the centre,
and whiskers showing the upper and lower quartiles, outliers are shown as a red +
Table 5.2: Per Scenario Reaction Time Analysis
Scenario 2 3 5 6 7 8 9 10 12 14
Graphical
Mean 1.469 1.810 1.488 1.401 1.608 1.598 1.504 1.619 1.084 1.282
SD 0.526 1.309 0.469 0.304 0.867 0.583 0.366 0.747 0.360 0.610
Numerical
Mean 2.337 2.555 1.973 1.891 1.996 1.926 2.023 2.063 1.503 2.182
SD 0.883 1.384 0.907 0.748 0.722 0.839 0.879 0.906 0.498 0.458
U(17)
U 58 92 93 73 93 109.5 90.5 99.5 59.5 36
Z -2.980 -1.809 -1.774 -2.464 -1.774 -1.206 -1.861 -1.550 -2.928 -3.738
P (exact 1-tailed) 0.001 0.036 0.039 0.006 0.039 0.117 0.032 0.065 0.001 0.000
Difference 0.868 0.501 0.485 0.490 0.388 N/A 0.519 N/A 0.419 0.900
5.5.1.2 Per Scenario Prime Reaction Time
The data generated for each scenario were then grouped by prime type, Re-task or
Deny (the control condition was omitted). It was found that for Re-task primed deci-
sions, participants using the Graphical Display performed faster than those using the
Numerical Display (Graphical M = 1.42846, SD = .491380, Numerical M = 1.95232,
SD .840065, U(85) = 2202, Z = -4.396, p .000 [exact 1-tailed]). Similarly, for Deny
primed decisions, participants using the Graphical Display performed faster than those
using the Numerical Display (Graphical M = 1.77499, SD 1.093122, Numerical M =
2.13753, SD .905573, U(85) = 2473.5, Z = -3.550, p .000 [exact 1-tailed]).
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5.5.1.3 Per Prime Reaction Time
Grouping all of the scenarios by prime type only, i.e. was the correct decision to re-task
the weapon or was it to deny the weapon re-tasking, it was found that participants were
able to perform Re-Task primed decisions [Scenarios: 2,5,8,9,12] significantly quicker
than decisions where the participants were primed to Deny the Re-Task request [Sce-
narios: 3,6,7,10,14] (Re-task M = 1.6904s, SD = .73471, Deny M = 1.9563s, SD =
1.01714, U(170) = 11633, Z = -3.109, p = .002 [Asymp. est. 2-tailed]).
5.5.1.4 Total Average Reaction Time
Finally, grouping all decisions across all scenarios and prime types, it was found that
participants using the Graphical Display took significantly less time to make their
decisions overall than those using the Numerical Display (Graphical M = 1.60172, SD
= .862632, Numerical M = 2.0449, SD = 0.87578, U(170) = 9314.5, Z = -5.667, p =
.000 [Asymp. est. 2-tailed]).
5.5.1.5 Summary
The overall reaction time results show that there is a significant difference between
display groups in terms of reaction time. The Graphical Display group took less time
to make their decisions. Making re-tasking decisions takes less time than making the
decision to deny a re-task request. Further those using the Graphical Display group
perform faster in both prime conditions. Lastly, the Graphical Display group perform
decision making faster in 8 of the 10 scenarios. Table 5.3 summarises these results.
Table 5.3: Summary of Reaction Time Results
Graphical Display Numerical Display
M SD M SD p
RT Scenario Prime RT 1.775 1.093 2.138 0.906 .000
RT Total 1.602 0.863 2.045 0.876 .000
Re-Task Decisions Deny Decisions
RT Scenario Prime Correct Decisions 1.690 0.735 1.956 1.017 .002
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5.5.2 Accuracy
Figure 5.6 shows the accuracy of participants in each group for each scenario seen. A
participant was deemed accurate if they made the correct decision within the decision
time available, incorrect if they made the wrong decision or made the decision too
late, and were deemed to have made no decision if they did not interact with the
system during a scenario. The following are analyses of the main factors tested against
accuracy.
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Figure 5.6: Decision Accuracy Per Scenario, A: Graphical Display and B: Numerical
Display
5.5.2.1 Per Scenario Accuracy
In general, there was no significant difference found between accuracy on a per scenario
basis, apart from scenario 14 (P(Z = 3.234—H0)<5% Zcrit = 1.96, PGraphical 6=
PNumerical PG = 0.529 [52.9%], PN = 1 [100%], NG=NN=17, Fisher’s Exact Chi-Sq.
p .001).
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5.5.2.2 Per Scenario Prime Accuracy
When grouped by decision prime type (Re-Task vs. Deny Re-Task) it was found that
for Re-Task primed scenarios there is no significant difference between display type
groups for accuracy (PG = .929, PN = .929, PG = PN [92.9%]). However, for Deny
Re-Task primed scenarios there was found to be significant difference between display
groups for accuracy, with those using the Numerical display more accurate (P(Z =
2.857—H0)<5% Zcrit = 1.96, PGraphical 6= PNumerical, PG = 0.812 [81.2%], PN =
0.953 [95.3%], NG=NN=85, Fisher’s Exact Chi-Sq. p .004).
5.5.2.3 Total Average Accuracy
Lastly accuracy as a whole was found to be significantly different between display
groups, again with participants using the Numerical display outperforming those using
the Graphical display (P(Z = 2.229—H0)<5% Zcrit = 1.96, reject null hypothesis:
PGraphical 6= PNumerical, PG = 0.871 [87.1%], PN = 0.941 [94.1%], NG=NN=170,
Fisher’s Exact Chi-Sq. p .020).
5.5.2.4 Summary
Overall it was found that there was only one scenario where the difference between ac-
curacy achieved between groups was significant. For scenario 14, 100% of the Numerical
Display group made the correct decision, whereas the 53% of the Graphical Display
group made the correct decision. There is no difference between display groups when
primed to re-task a weapon. However, there is a significant difference when primed
to deny a re-task request, with the Numerical Display being more accurate than the
Graphical Display group. Overall, the Graphical Display group are 87.1% accurate
across all scenarios, whereas the Numerical Display Group are 94.1% accurate. A dif-
ference of 7% (see Table 5.4). It is worth noting that neither of these results are ideal,
in a training or exercise environment it would be expected that operators are always ac-
curate in their decision making when using a system that interfaces with a live weapon.
Table 5.4: Summary of Accuracy Results
Graphical Display Numerical Display
Analysis Accuracy % Accuracy % p value
Per Scenario Accuracy (14) 52.9% 100% .001
Per Scenario Prime Accuracy 81.2% 95.3% .004
Total Average Accuracy 87.1% 94.1% .020
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Figure 5.7 is a plot showing the change of altitude of the GBU over time, as well as
the area of the RAR footprint on the ground. Figure 5.8 then shows the times and
distances away from the RAR boundary of all the trial scenarios. These two Figures
show the dynamic change in size of the RAR. Early in the scenario, the area reduces
in size linearly and at a slow rate. Then at approximately 10 seconds into the flight,
there is an increase in the rate at which the RAR size reduces. This continues until
approximately 22 seconds, at which point the rate at which the size of the RAR area
reduces begins to slow, and tails off as the remaining RAR area reduces from 20km2 to
0km2. This non-linear behaviour required the operator to be aware of how the change
in rate could affect their ability to make a decision in the scenario so that their SA is
complete.
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Scenario 14, the trial with the largest accuracy difference between display groups, is the
scenario where a new target appears less than 150 metres inside the RAR boundary at
20 seconds into the weapon’s flight. At this point, the rate of decrease of the RAR area
is at its highest, and the total RAR area remaining is less than 50km. Although no
specific difficulty scale was used when generating the scenario set, it is clear that this
is the most challenging scenario for making accurate decisions for those participants
using the graphical display.
5.5.3 Subjective Experiences
A 14 point scale was used to measure participant responses to the following set of
questions:
1. How confident were you in your decision making?
2. How much anxiety did you experience during the task?
3. How easy did you find the task?
4. How worried were you about making the wrong decision?
5. How difficult was the RAR/numerical display to understand?
6. How accurate do you think your decision making was?
7. How much time pressure did you feel during the task?
8. How realistic did you find the look of the display?
From the set of subjective experience questions there were only three with significant
differences between the display types. Participants’ perceived difficulty was low, with
those utilising the numerical display rating their perceived difficulty higher than those
using the graphical display, (M 1.59; SD 1.502) vs. (M 3.25; SD 3.088), (U(17) = 89,
Z = -1.743, p = .041 [exact 1-tailed]). Perceived accuracy was generally high, with
participants in the Numerical display group rating their accuracy higher than those
using the Graphical display, (M 11.25; SD 1.77) vs. (M 9.12; SD 2.64), (U(17) = 74.5,
Z = -2.506, p = .006 [exact 1-tailed]). Interestingly participants utilising the numerical
display felt more time pressure than those utilising the graphical display (M 7.50; SD
3.81) vs. (M 4.35; SD 2.62), (U(17) = 68.5, Z = -2.629, p = .004 [exact 1-tailed]).
Figure 5.9 shows the overall results from the subjective experience task ratings.
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Figure 5.9: Subjective Experience Ratings – Box shows inter quartile range with mean
at the centre, and whiskers showing the upper and lower quartiles, outliers are shown
as a red +
When asked if the participant had ‘missed an opportunity to re-task’ 82% of the graph-
ical display said yes, compared to only 24% of the numerical display. In comparison to
the actual results, only 17.6% (3 of 17) of participants using the graphical display missed
an opportunity to re-task, with a total of 6 missed opportunities overall. Compared to
35.3% (6 of 17) in the numerical display group, with a total of 6 missed opportunities
overall. This suggests that participants’ awareness of their own performance is poor
for participants using the graphical display type in comparison to the numerical group.
This difference between participant groups at accurately recalling their success at the
task could be representative of findings from Unmanath & Schmell. They found that
recall is influenced by the appropriateness of a display type to the decision making task,
and that, for spatially oriented tasks, graphical interfaces may enhance participant’s
recall [161].
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5.5.4 Digit Span Task
The before and after Digit Span Task measurements were compared to see if there
was any measurable difference which would suggest a cognitively difficult task. A
Wilcoxon Signed Ranks test found that there was no data to suggest that the task
had any effect on participants’ short-term memory function updating after the trial
(Graphical Z = -1.427, p = .154, Numerical Z = -1.409, p = .159). There was also
found to be no significant impact on participant’s executive function updating, in fact,
those participants using the Graphical Display showed better digits backwards task
performance after performing the trial than their pre-trial scores (Graphical Z = -
2.803, p = .005, Numerical Z = -.864, p = .388). The task may not have been difficult
enough to have an effect of working memory capacity or executive function updating,
meaning that no conclusions can be drawn from the digit span tasks.
5.6 Discussion
The overall findings indicate that although decision making is generally faster when
using the graphical interface (1.60s vs. 2.05s), decisions are more accurate when using
the numerical display (87.1% vs. 94.1%). It was found that for scenarios prompting
a deny re-task action, with a small distance between the edge of the RAR and the
new target, the numeric display maintained 100% decision accuracy compared to the
graphical display with 53%. It is worth noting that the small sample used in this trial
may explain why the difference in accuracy was not significant across all scenarios and
this is an acknowledged limitation.
Overall, the time difference between display groups at making their decisions is around
half a second. From a practical perspective, the accuracy gained by using the numerical
display should outweigh the benefit of making a decision half a second quicker. The
large difference in performance of participants using the different display types seems to
occur when a new target appears close to, but not inside, the capability of the weapon.
However, this specific scenario could be mitigated by using an under-representation of
the capability of the weapon. As discussed in Chapter 3, the basic RAR algorithms used
in this real-time study, under-represents the true capability of the GBU. A limitation
in this particular study was that the reduced number of participants recruited meant
that there was not an opportunity to develop the scenarios presented to participants
in such a way to further examine the borderline cases.
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Post-task feedback adds further insight into causes of error. Some of the graphical dis-
play group participants indicated they were not expecting a new target to appear close
to the edge of the RAR despite being fully briefed and demonstrating they understood
their task. The open question ‘What thoughts did you have that led you to miss an
opportunity to re-task?’ prompted the following responses from group A participants:
• “Not expecting a new target” - Participant A3
• “...it was only inside the green box for a very short time.” - Participant A4
• “...I did not see that situation in previous trials.” - Participant A5
• “The new target appeared when the range of the missile reduced very fast so that
I didn’t have time to re-task.” - Participant A6
• “...new target was right on the green boundary and I hesitated” - Participant A9
• “...the green area was rapidly retracting when the new target appeared” - Partici-
pant A10
• “...by the time I pressed the key to move the grid lines moved...” - Participant
A13
• “...the target was initially in the RAR but was outside by the time I had a chance
to react” - Participant A15
Participant A5’s comment highlights the possible learning effect of seeing several sce-
narios where a new target appears a long way outside of the weapon’s capability in
the run up to a scenario in which a new target appears just inside the RAR boundary.
Participants may have performed better if this boundary case scenario had occurred
early in the scenario set. The scenario sequence is acknowledged as a limitation of this
study with regards to the potential learning effect. Regardless, further improvements
could be made by giving clear instructions on the additional procedures when border-
line scenarios occur.
It is also worth noting that whilst the significant differences seem small, if 100% decision
accuracy is a requirement, only 41% of participants achieved 100% using the graphical
display, compared with 59% of participants using the numerical display. Considering
the lack of experience the participants had, these results would be improved through
training and a stricter set of operating procedures, particularly in relation to new tar-
gets that appear close to the border of the weapon’s range capability. No participants
were removed from the data set.
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Given that this trial was the first study to test the effectiveness of the display, the num-
ber of decision aids was reduced to the minimum number necessary to allow participants
to make their decisions. Participants’ general remarks with regards to improvements of
the display types typically suggest improvements to the cue for a new target appearing
and that the system has received a command from the user. The main themes from the
qualitative data surround the inclusion of more active prompts to the user and system
feedback for actions made by the user. Further suggestions are to do with increasing
the manipulation of the colour of the different elements on the screen. Interestingly,
although the Numerical Display is sufficient for decision making and participants per-
form better when using it, 5 of 17 Numerical Display participants suggested the use of
a RAR boundary to aid decision making. Of these five participants, four achieved a
score of 100% correct decisions. This supports the notion that improvements need to be
made to display the effectiveness of a participant’s decision, for example by integrating
a Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) tool into the Remote Operator Terminal so that
more detailed feedback is provided that the weapon hit its intended target.
5.7 Chapter Summary
This chapter discussed a trial that sought to find meaningful significant differences
between different visual displays (graphic or numeric), and how their use influences
decision accuracy and reaction time when re-tasking a simulated guided free-fall bomb
whilst in flight. Decision making when using the graphical interface had a reduced
reaction time by an average of 0.45 seconds. Decision accuracy was higher when us-
ing the numeric interface, with which accuracy was higher by 7%. A large difference
between accuracy was found when participants were primed to deny a re-task request
to a target that was positioned just outside of the RAR. In this case all participants
using the Numerical display made the correct decision to deny the request, compared
to only 53% of those using the Graphical display.
These results suggest that designers of DSS for remote weapons operators must con-
sider how using different interface styles may have differing effects on the timeliness
and decision accuracy of the users of the system. Particular care must be taken when
handling cases where targets appear close to, or on the edge of, the RAR boundary
as this is where the largest difference in performance between the display types was
found. The inclusion of a tolerance level and an under representation of the RAR would
alleviate this issue, and logic built into the system would prevent incorrect re-tasking
decisions automatically. There is no real applicable benefit of a 0.45 second gain in
decision making time in this context. Both from a military and political stand-point
the operator of a re-tasking system should not be placed in positions of such expediency.
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Whilst this chapter described a complete trial into the use of RARs in the Graphi-
cal or Numerical form, it considers only one engagement at a time. However, it is
far more likely that in an operational context, more than one weapon will be released
against a target in the form of a ‘double tap’ [162]. Furthermore, there are scenarios
in which there may be multiple targets to prosecute simultaneously. The next chapter
will discuss the conversion of the findings of this trial into a more complex scenario
involving multiple targets in batteries and multiple in-flight weapons.
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Chapter 6
Participant Study 2
In the previous chapters the case was made that there is a potential for a remote opera-
tor to be able to re-task weapons after they have been launched. Chapter 4 discussed an
overview of a system that allowed operators to use resource-task allocation algorithms
to assign platforms and their weapons to sets of targets. Then in Chapter 5 an opera-
tor terminal for re-tasking individual short-range bombs was designed and tested using
human participants. An investigation into the ability of operators to re-task individual
bombs in time limited scenarios using two different display types found that the use
of a graphical RAR was not strictly necessary for providing operators with the cues
needed to carry out re-tasking duties. Instead, a modified numerical display system
proved to facilitate more accurate decision making on the whole, whilst delaying the
decision making of operators by only a fraction of a second.
In this chapter, the capability of the operator system was expanded to allow for re-
tasking of multiple in-flight air-to-surface weapons against numerous targets. An ex-
ample SEAD scenario was used as a baseline to design the remote operator system.
An investigation into the use of the system by participants as part of a human factors
trials is discussed, with direct comparison against an ‘ideal’ automated decision making
system designed for this SEAD role. The chapter concludes by presenting the results of
the human factors trials which were aimed at finding the limitations of operators when
in control of up to 32 missiles against two SAM batteries each with four SAM launchers.
MBDA Systems were consulted in the development of the scenarios herein. The in-
formation provided was of great use in positioning the enemy SAM sites and the salvo
sizes of own forces. It is an unrealistic scenario when considering the UK’s current mil-
itary and political motivations, and was developed out of academic interest. However,
it is envisaged that this type of capability may be possible as the SPEAR program
matures.
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6.1 Suppression of Enemy Air Defence (SEAD)
SEAD is a mission type in which enemy air defence units are destroyed or disrupted
so that friendly aircraft can safely pass through hostile territory without being at risk
from anti-air weapons. Typically hostile areas are not defended by just one system.
Often, several different types of anti-air system are used, such as SAM sites, and Anti-
Air Artillery (AAA). Each type of anti-air system is optimised for a set of ranges, both
distance and altitude, and type of target expected. A common air-defence network is a
layered approach, in which more than one SAM site are positioned such that two bands
of independent defence exist, where one must be defeated, before being able to reach
the second. Figure 6.1 shows this type of layered air defence.
Desired Aircraft Flight Path Into
Enemy Airspace
Enemy Air Defence Boundary
Identified SAM Sites
AGM In Flight
Figure 6.1: Overview of Suppression of Enemy Air Defence Scenario with Layered Air
Defences
With the proliferation of advanced radar and tracking systems, SAM sites are now
packaged into single Transporter Launcher and Radar (TLAR) systems such as the
Russian SA-15 (shown in Figure 6.2 [163]). These highly mobile and sophisticated air
defence systems pose great threat to aircraft, with quoted pkill values of up to 0.9 [164].
New precision strike ranged weapons, such as the MBDA SPEAR missile [4] can be
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carried in large numbers and are capable of destroying armoured targets such as the
SA-15. These weapons are capable of being interfaced with over data communications
networks under NEC. For the purpose of the research following – the LRAGM weapon,
detailed in Chapter 3, will be used as a representative SPEAR missile.
Figure 6.2: SA-15
This layered type scenario was chosen as the scenario type as it forces re-tasking of
incoming missiles between SAM sites. The engagement range of SAM systems forces
longer range weapons to be launched to protect the aircraft from being shot down.
Launching one weapon at a time is inefficient against a SAM site such as a SA-15
battery. In an SA-15 battery, four complete TLARs are arranged in a cluster and are
able to assign targets between themselves for greater utility of each system’s weapons.
Several weapons will be able to be launched to intercept the incoming missile, making it
highly unlikely that a single missile launched against an SA-15 battery will be successful
in hitting its target. To establish a guideline number of how many weapons it will take
to destroy a SAM site, several properties of the TLAR and the attacking missile system
are needed.
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6.1.1 SA-15 TLAR
Table 6.1: SA-15 Properties
SA-15 Properties
Maximum Simultaneous Tgts 4
Maximum In Flight Missiles 2
Missile Speed 850m/s
pkill against missile 0.25 (est.)
Maximum Detection Range 25000m
Maximum Tracking Range 12000m
Minimum Range 1500m
Reload Time 10mins
The SA-15 properties used from open source literature can be seen in Table 6.1 [164].
We can consider four TLAR systems as one SAM site. Therefore, a total stock of 32
missiles exists at the SAM site (without reloading). Further, with an estimated pkill of
0.25, it can be predicted that 8 of the enemy’s missile stock will hit their targets. If
each target at the SAM site must be hit twice, with a ‘Double Tap’ [162] procedure,
this requires 8 missiles to be destroyed by intercepting missiles, and 8 to destroy the
four TLARs. One question that must be considered though, is the possibility of losing
less than 8 missiles to the SAM site. If the SAM site is overwhelmed, is it possible to
lose fewer missiles?
MATLAB was used to create a simulation model of the SA-15 TLAR. This simula-
tion model was designed to control the detection, tracking and launching of SAMs at
incoming threats. The above information was used to create an object class that could
be loaded into the simulation environment within MATLAB. The SA-15’s SAMs are
individually launched at incoming targets. When within range of the tracking radar,
the next available missile is primed, and a suitable target is chosen (the closest first).
The missile is then launched (so-long as there is not a weapon currently in flight) and
the object then loops through the time step function until the SAM has reached its
target. Three dimensional equations of motion are solved to resolve the angles between
the SAM and its target, and provide the correct motion. The guidance of the SAM
is not modelled as it is outside of the scope of the project. Instead, a pkill is used to
define the likelihood of target intercept in order to determine whether the SAM hit its
target or not.
The flow chart in Figure 6.3 shows the model’s logical steps when deciding to launch
weapons at incoming threats and the differential equations used for the calculation of
the SAM’s motion over time. In Figure 6.4 is a graphical wire-frame representation of
the scenario displaying the two radar cones of detection for both detection and tracking
radar systems on the SA-15 TLAR.
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Figure 6.3: Flow Diagram of AA Site Launching Procedure and SAM Model Time Step
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Figure 6.4: Graphical Representation of the Simulated SAM Launching Sites with
Visible Missile Range Domes, and Radar Sensor Capability
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6.1.2 LRAGM
A brief overview is needed here for completion, however, for a more detailed description
of the flight properties of the LRAGM, and how they were calculated, refer to Chapter
3. Table 6.2 shows the range and cruise speed properties of the LRAGM.
Table 6.2: LRAGM Properties
LRAGM Properties
Maximum Range 120000m
Minimum Range (From FL250) 25000m
Minimum Range (From FL016) 2000m
Cruise Speed 300m/s
The LRAGM has a cruise velocity of 300m/s and approximate cruise height of 500m.
The missile has three main phases of flight. From initial launch the weapon glides,
unpowered, to its cruise altitude. During cruise the weapon uses altitude hold and
initialises the turbojet engine. Bank to turn is used in both glide and cruise phases
to aim the weapon towards the target. In the final 5 seconds the weapon switches to
terminal guidance, in which a pitch over manoeuvre is performed and the missile dives
onto its target. The maximum bank angle of the LRAGM is 60 degrees and provides a
turn rate of 3 degrees per second at cruise altitude and velocity, although this is higher
during terminal phase to facilitate use against mobile targets.
6.1.3 Scenario Outcome Estimation
An estimation of where and when missiles will be destroyed by the enemy SAM sites
can be calculated. The main influencing factor is the velocity difference between the
LRAGMs and the SAMs. The SAMs have almost three times the velocity of the
LRAGM, meaning that three SAMs can fly the distance of the maximum range of the
SAM system, in the time it takes one LRAGM to cover the same distance. This gives
the SAM site considerable advantage against the LRAGM. Note that there is a min-
imum range for the SAM site of 1500m. This is the minimum required distance for
safe launch, acquisition of the target and acceleration to an intercept condition. Once
through the minimum range of the missiles it is assumed the Air-to-Surface Missile
(ASM) will hit their target.
There are a number of launch properties that can be manipulated to maximise the
success rate and minimise the total number of weapons needed to hit all four targets.
Firstly there is the salvo size. Weapons on aircraft are typically symmetrically paired
across the pylons used to attach them to the airframe so as to balance the aircraft by
maintaining a cross sectional centre of gravity in a vertical plane aligned with the air-
craft’s nose to tail axis. When launched there are two settings that are used to control
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the timing and even launching of the weapons. These are known as Ripple Time and
Salvo Size. Ripple Time is the time between subsequent launches of the same weapon
type. Salvo Size is the total number of that particular weapon to be launched. For
example, a Ripple Time of 1 second and a Salvo Size of 4 will launch four weapons in
one second intervals from the pylons on both the left and right of the aircraft, two from
each side.
The next property that can be configured is the time between salvoes that are launched.
This is an action that must be carried out by the pilot or between pilots if more than
one delivery aircraft is being used (for larger number of weapons than can be carried by
one aircraft). The smaller the time difference between salvoes the more weapons there
are to be shot down at the same time by the SAM site. A combination of high salvo
sizes and reduced time between salvoes can result in overwhelming of the SAM site, as
there is a limit to the number of targets that the SAM site can shoot at simultaneously.
From an operator’s perspective, having weapons spread over time will allow for more
time to make any potential re-tasking decisions. Separating out the missiles allows
operators to approach the overall task in stages, and allows them to concentrate on
the missiles closer to their targets, and then switch their attention to following missiles
without becoming overwhelmed. This is the capability estimation this research aimed
to expose. At what salvo size and time interval do operators become overwhelmed?
An automated test case was generated to allow the calculation of the effect of salvo
sizes and time interval between salvoes on the enemy’s ability to intercept incoming
missiles. With the pkill of 0.25, and four launchers, the distance and time of each posi-
tive intercept of an incoming missile was calculated. An assumption was made for the
worst case scenario from the perspective of the attacker. A missile was guaranteed to be
intercepted each loop (4 launched intercept missiles with pkill 0.25 = 1 per intercept).
The points of impact are dependent on the size of the salvoes and the time difference
between them. The solution is generated using the iteration loop shown in Figure 6.5.
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Figure 6.5: Iteration Loop to find SAM vs. ASM Intercept Positions
In the overload scenario, with all missiles launched simultaneously, it can be seen that
7 missiles are destroyed before the weapons break through the SAM site’s engagement
area (see Figure 6.6). This Figure shows the raid of LRAGM flying towards the SAM
site and the impact points of each engagement between the enemy SAM and a LRAGM.
However, if the time between salvoes is increased to only 1 second, 8 missiles will be
lost to the SAM system. As the enemy SA-15 systems only have 8 missiles each, the
SAM site only has the potential to destroy 8 incoming missiles. Therefore, given that
once 8 of the LRAGM missiles are destroyed the enemy’s stocks will be depleted, there
is no need to group weapons closely together over time as it does not give an advantage.
The reload time of the SA-15 system sets an upper limit on the time between salvoes
used. The LRAGMs should not be spaced apart such that a system could reload
and continue to fire upon incoming missiles. The time interval between salvoes, for
LRAGMs grouped in twos, that would give the enemy SAM site enough time to reload
can be estimated. Given that the first 8 missiles are wasted, if the following 8 missiles
take longer than 10 minutes to hit their targets then these missiles are at risk of being
destroyed. This would only occur if the time between salvoes is more than 70 seconds,
leaving a time of 71x8 = 568s, plus the time it takes to travel through the enemy en-
gagement zone, (12000m− 1500m)/303ms−1 = 34s, giving a total of 10 minutes and 2
seconds.
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Figure 6.6: Estimates of Defending SAMs Intercept of Incoming LRAGM, by Iteration
of Successful Intercept, and Range
6.2 Human Interface Design
The human operator is not just the user of a system designed to perform a particular
job, they are part of the system as a whole. For the operator to be able to carry
out their duties with ease, an interface must present information clearly and allow for
interactions with the interface to be made in an understandable and logical way. To
do this successfully a reasoned list of features and functions needed to be developed to
initiate the design process.
6.2.1 Features and Functions
The interface’s main function is to allow the operator to re-task or abort weapons dur-
ing flight. The system must display information about these weapons and the status
of targets to facilitate the decision making of the operator. Then, there must be a way
of interfacing with the system to invoke the different types of action when required.
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There is a requirement for a large number of weapons to be used against several targets,
and the interactions will occur over time – i.e. the time at which different events will
need to be monitored closely is normally sequential. This means that a large amount
of information will need to be presented to operators.
Given the above set of functions and requirements, the first element of the user inter-
face that is needed is a table that includes a list of weapons and columns that represent
each target. This creates workable space within the interface to place information that
is relevant to a particular weapon to target assignment and sets information out in
a clear manner. It is also an established method of displaying information and has
been used in similar systems for assigning tasks to different objects, from ATC, to
TLAMs [36,101,104].
6.2.2 Task Allocation Table (TAT)
The operator will need both information related to the current weapon-target assign-
ments and information about the ability to re-task a weapon to any other target. An
overview of the layout of the grid (named the TAT) can be seen in Figure 6.7 with no
information presented within the Weapon-Target Status Boxes.
Figure 6.7: Task Allocation Table (TAT) Before Launching Weapons - Each Weapon
to Target Status Box is Empty. Only the First Target Set and First Two Salvoes are
Shown
There will be a potential of 32 LRAGMs and 8 SAM targets, needing up to 256 different
Weapon-Target Status Boxes to be presented on the user interface at the same time.
This raises an issue of salience. Important information needs to be highlighted in a way
that allows the user attention to be focussed when it is necessary [151,165]. There are
specific times at which this is needed. Firstly, when a weapon is approaching the final
20 seconds of flight it will become critical for the operator to monitor it in case the
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weapon is intercepted and a re-task is needed. And secondly, when a re-tasking option
is nearing the point at which it is no longer able to be made.
Further, when weapons are intercepted in flight, or have hit their targets, it is nec-
essary for their salience on the interface to be reduced because the information they
provide to the operator is no longer time dependent. This allows the operator to have
a clearer picture of where attention is needed on the interface.
In practice, the availability of BDA is difficult to achieve in real-time. At best, the
operator can be made aware of a weapon being destroyed in flight, due to the cease of
data link messages received from the in-flight weapon (although this doesn’t account for
any system malfunction). The actual effectiveness that a weapon system has against a
target can only be properly assessed based upon visual verification from a surveillance
asset, which would need to be transmitted to the operator of the system. For the pur-
poses of this trial, an operator was instructed that two missiles on target was sufficient
that the TLAR could be considered destroyed, otherwise the trail would have become
too complex to run in a laboratory condition. Further, the need for real-time BDA is
not strictly necessary as a surveillance asset could begin assessing the damage once the
primary target set were deemed destroyed and report their findings with only a short
delay. The mission commander could then choose whether to re-engage any remaining
TLARs or whether the mission was successful.
The Weapon-Target Status Boxes have four different primary conditions, and hence
different levels of salience, these are:
• In flight towards target (Highest Salience).
• Possibility of re-task (High Salience).
• Hit target (Low Salience).
• Destroyed/intercepted by enemy (Lowest Salience).
Figure 6.8: Elements of the Task Allocation Table and the Weapon-Target Status Boxes
Showing AGM011 Hit Tgt status, and AGM012 Destroyed/Failed
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Figure 6.8 shows the layout of the TAT with the various types of Weapon-Target Status
Boxes shown. The different conditions are clearly distinguishable from one another. In
addition to displaying key information within the TAT, operators must be able to
interact with the different weapons to either abort or re-task them. There were several
options that could be used to allow for this interaction.
• Drop-down list of weapons and a drop-down list of targets, followed by a button.
• Re-task button that creates a new window or panel that allows for re-tasking
orders to be made.
• Placing a button in the TAT for each weapon-target re-tasking option and abort
options.
To analyse these options a Cost-Benefit Analysis was carried out taking into account
the following issues:
• Ease of Use Overall
• Clarity of System
• Feedback to User
• Ease of Multiple Re-tasks
• Speed of Re-task
• Likelihood of Mistake
A table was drawn up and the options given a relative score based upon rank in each
category, 1 being best, 3 being the worst, with no two scores being the same in each
category. As can been seen in Table 6.3 the best option is the individual button for
each potential re-task or abort that might need to be made. It reduces the clarity
of the TAT compared to the other two methods, however, it allows for easy and fast
re-tasking, that only requires the operator to use a single button, rather than have to
scroll through menus or occlude the main window by bringing up a second panel to
carry out a weapon re-task or abort.
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Table 6.3: Rating of Each Element in Cost Benefit Analysis
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Individual Button 1 3 1 1 1 2 9
Figure 6.9 shows the layout of the weapon-target status box based upon TTG and cur-
rent targeting conditions. To minimise the risk of making a mistake, additional safety
features have been implemented into the design. Upon pressing a button to make a re-
task or abort request the operator is prompted to then confirm their command before
any messages are sent to a weapon. This acknowledgement procedure is good practice
in networked systems and was necessary for compliance with VMF type messaging ar-
chitecture outlined in Chapter 3. Figure 6.10 shows the flow diagram of the change in
button state when a command is issued.
If TTG > 20
If 20 >=TTG > 5
If 5 >= TTG
Hit Target
Time Remaining
To Re-Task
(5 Second
Increments)
Re-Task Will Be
Unavailable
Within 10
seconds
Re-Task
Unavailable
AGM Failed
Figure 6.9: Weapon-Target Status Box Display, Left - Weapon Currently Assigned to
This Column, Right - Weapon Not Currently Assigned to This Column
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Confirm Pressed
5s inactivity
5s inactivity
Transmission Delay
Figure 6.10: Re-Task/Abort Button Press Flow Diagram
In addition to the individual re-task and abort buttons for each Weapon-Target Status
Box, an additional feature was developed for the interface. When the first SAM site
has been successfully destroyed, there will be up to 16 LRAGM still in flight towards
the primary target (assuming that 8 are intercepted and 8 hit their targets). To ease
and simply the re-tasking of up to 16 missiles to the secondary SAM site a re-task salvo
button was created. This button re-tasks an entire salvo from their current distribution
against the primary SAM site, to the same distribution against the secondary SAM site.
In scenarios with 4 weapons per salvo, this reduces the number of actions needed to
re-task a salvo from the primary to secondary SAM site by 4 – significantly reducing
the time to effect a decision once it has been made. Figure 6.11 highlights the Re-task
Salvo button, which has the same two stage confirmation protocol as the standard
re-task and abort buttons.
5s inactivity
Confirm Pressed
Transmission Delay
Figure 6.11: Re-Task Salvo Button Press Flow Diagram
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6.2.3 Re-task Acceptability Region (RAR)
The RAR as seen in Chapters 3 & 5 was used in the TAT as a method of displaying
the time available to re-task a weapon to a particular target. However, due to there
being as many as 32 LRAGM in flight simultaneously, using a dynamic graphical over-
lay of the RAR on the map overview would be computationally demanding as well as
overwhelming for operators. Instead a system must be used that provides the operator
the same level of information but in an easily interpretable format. As shown in the
previous chapter, a numerical representation provides a useful way of representing the
data that improves the accuracy of decision makers in time critical situations, whilst
maintaining a comparable reaction time.
In the previous study the numerical data was presented as two numbers – the range
to the target from the zero controls free-fall trajectory of the GBU, and the maximum
possible range that the trajectory could be shifted in the direction of the new target. As
shown this works sufficiently well for free-fall type weapons. However, the LRAGM is a
powered missile, capable of cruising at a constant altitude whilst there is sufficient fuel
to do so. This creates extra complexity in the method used to calculate the weapon’s
ability to be re-tasked to different locations. Chapter 3 contains more detail about how
the RAR is calculated for the LRAGM. The output of the calculations is the route and
time it would take to reach the target, as well as the time spent in straight and level
cruising flight.
This flight phase is important for predicting the time at which it will no longer be
possible to reach a target. Figures 6.12, 6.13 and 6.14 show a number of approaches
to a single target. The different flight phases are shown in different colours. For any
flight, the optimum – minimum distance route to a target will be a combination of one
or two turns, a section of gliding flight, a section of cruising flight, and the terminal
phase. A normal weapon release from high altitude will typically have a glide, with or
without a turn, followed by cruise. Then there will be a final turn towards the target
(given the desired attack heading) followed by the terminal phase of flight to intercept
it.
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Figure 6.12: Approach Paths of Air-to-Surface LRAGM Given Launch and Approach
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Figure 6.14: Approach Paths of Air-to-Surface LRAGM Given Launch and Approach
Headings (West,West)
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The routes to each different target are calculated every time step for each different
weapon, based upon the flight properties calculated from the Monte-Carlo simulations
run in the LRAGM design phase to find the RAR of the weapon. A number of these
flight properties are constant values, such as turn rate and cruise speed, which allows a
simple routing solution to be generated, rather than running a complex, time-consuming
Monte-Carlo analysis of the route for each potential weapon-target assignment. Given
the turn rates and velocities, constant radius curved trajectories can be calculated for
the flight path of the LRAGM during turning flight. This leads to a simplification of
the route, and way-points, that are to be generated for the LRAGM. From each initial
condition of the weapon, there are four possible trajectories to the target. A combina-
tion of two turns, either left - left, left - right, right - left, or right - right, will bring
the LRAGM to the target on the desired attack heading. Of these routes some may
be impossible – i.e. the distance between the target and the missile may not provide
sufficient distance to carry out the required turns – others will be too long, with cruise
distances required that are beyond the range capability of the weapon.
From the four potential routes, the shortest achievable route to each target is found.
This route can then be used to calculate the time until this route is no longer possible.
The amount of TTG remaining in only the cruise phase of flight can be used to estimate
the distance remaining until the LRAGM is too close to the target and needs to ‘Go
Around’. A ‘Go Around’ occurs when the LRAGM can no longer make the necessary
final approach turn to enter terminal guidance and hit the target. The estimation of
the distance remaining can be used, along with the weapon’s velocity, to indicate to a
Remote Operator how much time remains until they can no longer re-task a weapon
to a target.
Preliminary prototyping of the interface found that the display would not be clear
enough if the value presented in the re-task status boxes was a time value similar to
the TTG displayed in the currently assigned status box for each weapon. Moreover, the
operator needs to be able to quickly assess the available weapon-target pairings. For
this reason, the time values were represented by a number of blocks each representing
5 second increments of time remaining until the re-task will no longer be available.
Colour coding was also used to infer the successful outcome of the re-tasking request.
Green indicated that the re-tasking request will be successfully received by the weapon
in time. Orange indicated that the re-tasking request would have a chance to be suc-
cessfully received by the weapon before reaching the last point at which it could turn
to the new target. Red indicates that the re-task request is unavailable and will not
be received by the weapon, and hence will not be sent. The text ‘UNAVAILABLE’ is
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also printed instead of the blocks to indicate this to the Remote Operator. Figure 6.9
shows the different forms of the RAR information as time progresses in a scenario.
6.2.4 Map Overview
In addition to the TAT, a map display was included in the interface (shown in Figure
6.1). This map display is used primarily for displaying positional information to the
operators. The icons used, and the sizing of text and graphical objects, were based
upon the standardised mapping and symbology set out the APP-6A and MIL-STD-
2525D documents used by NATO members for map generation [20, 143]. Further the
formatting, size, colour and additional textual information represented around these
icons is specified in these documents and adhered to in the GUI. The maximum and
minimum ranges of the SA-15 TLAR are also shown on the Map Overview to show the
user where they should expect the LRAGM to be vulnerable to the enemy’s SAMs.
Additional textual information is applied to some of the icons displayed on the screen.
The ASM icons used for the LRAGM have the Salvo and Missile ID number appended
to the icon. The TLAR icons on the map represent a group of SA-15 TLARs due to
the scale of the map, and to prevent unnecessary overlapping of multiple icons. For this
reason the number of sites is appended above the TLAR icon. Further, an estimation
of the number of missiles remaining is included. The maximum load-out is known (8
missiles per launcher) and as weapons are launched from the SAM sites an estimation
of the remaining missiles can be presented to the operator.
6.3 Scenario
A generic SEAD scenario was developed around the strategic deployment of a layered
air defence network. This is when several SAM sites are positioned in concentric circles
around a protected asset of high value – for example a large military base or weapons
store. For the purpose of this trial there are two layers of defence (see Figure 6.1).
For friendly aircraft to be able to prosecute the protected asset they would have to fly
through the first SAM site’s coverage, then through the second, putting the aircraft
and crew at significant risk.
In this fictitious scenario a SEAD mission was drafted to clear a corridor for friendly
aircraft to fly safely through hostile territory. A large number of LRAGMs will be
launched from outside of the range of the defending SAM sites to prosecute the targets.
Due to the ability of the SAM sites to defend against incoming missile attack, weapons
will need to be re-tasked so that they are evenly distributed across the targets at a
SAM site.
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The scenario is configured as follows:
• An aircraft begins launching salvoes of weapons at the primary SAM site, with
equal distribution across the targets.
• Once launched, authority of the weapon is handed over and it appears active on
the Remote Operator Terminal.
• Remote Operator is responsible for managing the distribution of the weapons
across the targets at the first SAM site.
• The Remote Operator must manage the weapon distribution, and re-task weapons
when appropriate, such that each target is hit twice.
• Any remaining weapons are re-tasked to the secondary SAM site, and distributed
evenly across the targets.
• Any surplus weapons, that cannot be safely re-tasked, are aborted such that they
self destruct in flight and do not hit their target.
6.3.1 Summary of Trial
A total of 30 participants were recruited for the trial from Science and Engineering
courses of study at the University of Liverpool. This was to ensure that participants had
a moderate understanding, and were familiar with, computer systems. Test subjects
were asked to participate in a simulated Remote Operator trial. They were informed
that they are responsible for NEC missiles that have been launched from a delivery
aircraft towards an enemy SAM site. The enemy’s anti-air defence network consists of
two SAM batteries/sites in a layered deployment. For an acceptable assumption that
the target has been destroyed before making any BDA, each individual target must be
hit twice. It is also undesirable to waste LRAGM by ‘overkill’ (hitting a target more
times than necessary). The following objectives were given to the participant:
• Primary Objective: Destroy ALL targets at the first SAM site.
• Secondary Objective: Use any remaining weapons to destroy as many targets at
the second SAM site as possible.
• Rules to Observe: Each target must be hit TWICE to be considered destroyed.
• Rules to Observe: Abort any surplus weapons that cannot be safely re-tasked to
prevent ‘overkill’.
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The participants were presented three training scenarios, followed by the main set of
8 randomly ordered scenarios. Performance measures were taken, including the NASA
Task Load Index (TLX) assessment tool [159] and a detailed feedback questionnaire.
This information was then analysed post trial to find the limits of operator performance,
and look for recommendations into improving the display system.
6.4 Study Aims and Methodology
The principal study aim was to establish the limit of operator capacity in managing
multiple remote weapons in a SEAD scenario. Of particular interest was the operators’
ability to complete the task, given a set of objectives, the outcome being that each
target at both SAM sites were hit twice, and thus all targets were neutralised. Analysis
of the data generated by the participants was aimed at finding the limit of operator
performance and sources of error when performing the task, and to make comparisons
between human operators and an automated system for re-tasking.
6.4.1 Independent Variables
Two independent variables were manipulated to generate 8 different scenario conditions
for testing. The Independent Variables were Number of LRAGM in each Salvo, and the
Time Delay Between Salvoes being launched. The Number of LRAGM in each Salvo
was varied between 2 and 4, and the Time Delay Between Salvoes was varied between
5, 10, 15 and 20 seconds. These independent variables were consistent for the duration
of each individual scenario, i.e. within one scenario there will not be a mix of the size
of salvoes or the time delay between salvo launches. Each participant was trained in
how to use the remote operator terminal through a presentation and then provided 3
training scenarios for practice to improve competency using the system. Following the
training, participants were asked to complete 8 different scenarios. Each participant
saw each scenario once, in a random order. This was to reduce the learning and session
effects across the sample size. Table 6.4 shows the different scenario configurations and
their associated difficulty level.
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Table 6.4: Scenario Difficulty Level Configurations
Difficulty Level
Number of Weapons
Per Salvo
Time Interval
Between Salvoes
1 2 20
2 4 20
3 2 15
4 4 15
5 2 10
6 4 10
7 2 5
8 4 5
6.4.2 Performance Measures
Several measures were recorded that relate to performance of participants during the
trial. The main performance indicator was the number of, and which, targets are
destroyed by the participant. In order the get these data, the operator system was
designed to log each event that occurred during the scenarios, such as a missile hitting
its target, or being intercepted. It also logged each user interaction with the interface.
Performance measures include both positive indicators, such as the number of success-
fully hit targets, and error indicators, such as the number of overkills against a target,
or number of re-tasks that occur late into the scenario.
6.4.3 NASA TLX
The NASA TLX procedure was followed to record participants’ perceived workload
throughout the trial [159]. After each scenario was completed (including the training
scenarios) the participant noted their workload rating across six different measures;
Mental Demand, Physical Demand, Temporal Demand, Performance, Effort and Frus-
tration. These were photographed and recorded on a spreadsheet (an online version
is available but was not used so as not to interrupt the interface during the session).
Once all 3 training and 8 trial scenarios were completed, the participant was asked to
complete a NASA TLX ‘Sources of Workload’ task where they were presented fifteen
different cards each with two of the six workload rating measures listed previously. No
combination of measures appeared twice. Participants were asked to circle the more
important contributor to workload for the whole trial from the two measures shown on
each card. Then the number of each measure circled across all 15 cards was used to
weight the score on each NASA TLX Workload Rating Scale completed to find a single
score for each trial completed per participant. Although the order of the trial seen was
randomised, the resulting order was recorded so as to match the workload ratings taken
during the trial to each distinct scenario configuration.
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6.4.4 Additional Measures
A detailed feedback questionnaire was created to record non identifiable participant
data such as age-group, gender, course of study and military experience. Further, a
set of questions was generated to obtain detailed feedback about the interface. The
questions were as follows:
• Please describe, step by step, the thought process you progressed through when
deciding how to allocate the ASMs in flight, and how you chose whether to re-task
or abort a weapon.
• Did you use any type of strategy in completing the scenarios? Did your methods
differ between the scenarios?
• At any point during the scenarios did you miss the opportunity to re-task the
missile?
a) What thoughts did you have that you believe caused you to do this?
b) What feelings did you have that you believe caused you to do this?
• At any point during the scenarios did you make any mistakes?
• Were any elements of the display confusing? Please explain.
• How would you suggest improving the Task Allocation Table?
• How would you suggest improving any other elements of the display?
Within this questionnaire, a shortened ’Need for Closure’ questionnaire was included
[166].
6.4.5 Invoking a Re-task and Scenario Repeatability
The Scenario Outcome Estimation calculations made earlier focus on the kill probabil-
ity of the SAMs against an incoming missile threat, and assume that 1 in four missiles
hits the target. If the actual Hit/Miss event is calculated by using a random number
generator then the outcome of each individual intercept will not be known. This is
problematic for running an operator trial, as scenarios of the same difficulty level must
be repeatable. Further, the number of forced re-tasks affects the difficulty level itself
and must be maintained.
Based on the pkill of 0.25, the SAM sites are guaranteed to hit eight of the incom-
ing missile threats. It would be expected that the missiles lost to the enemy SAMs
would be the first eight as it is expected the enemy doctrine is to shoot the closest
threats first. This means that the second set of 8 missiles are guaranteed to hit, and
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that no re-tasks are actually needed. For this reason, a reference array was built con-
taining true/false values that are used by the SAMs when they reach the intercept event
to decide whether they’ve hit their target or not. These reference arrays are configured
so that there is one partial hit in the first 8 missiles. This creates a situation where
one target is under-assigned in the early salvo, or over-assigned in following salvoes.
This situation invokes a re-task or abort procedure by the operator, as the target ei-
ther needs another assignment in the early part of the scenario, or a re-task away from
the target in the following salvo aimed at the target. The decision that is made by
the participant will then potentially change the way in which the later events occur,
however, the repeatability of the trial as a whole is maintained.
6.4.6 Equipment
The Remote Operator Terminal was displayed on a 1920x1080 pixel computer screen,
and the participant provided a mouse to interact with the display. The NASA TLX
form was laminated so that a dry-wipe marker could be used by participants when
completing the forms for each scenario. This was done, as recommended in the NASA
TLX instructions, to reduce paper usage. A photo was taken of each completed form,
and the answers were transcribed to a master spreadsheet. The feedback questionnaires
were provided on paper.
6.5 Automated Control System Solution
Although the need for a WO in the context of remote weapon re-tasking is extremely
important, there may be benefits to using an automated process to manage the way
in which the weapons are distributed across their target sets. Logic statements can be
written that include the rules set out for operators, and then an Automated Control
System (ACS) can monitor the situation in real time and make re-tasking decisions
based upon the inputs received, much like a human operator. The ACS is a closed
loop system that has been written in MATLAB. The function requires the following
information to generate sets of re-tasking commands that are sent to in-flight missiles:
• Target States
• LRAGM States
• Launch Configuration
Figure 6.15 shows the flow diagram of the ACS. The inputs are passed to functions
that generate vectors including the remaining TTG for each LRAGM, the number of
assignments that each target has, as well as the required number of hits each target
needs to be considered destroyed. Then the ACS calculates the LRAGMs that are
available to be re-tasked, i.e. those weapons that can be re-tasked without removing
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an assignment that is needed. A cost matrix is then generated using the remaining
TTG of each available LRAGM and their ability to be re-tasked to each target within
the target set currently being targeted (primary/secondary). The available LRAGMs
are then distributed if necessary to the targets that need them. This process repeats
each time-step of the simulation as the scenarios evolve to ensure that re-tasking occurs
when necessary.
The performance measurements taken from the ACS will be the same as that gen-
erated for the participant study so that direct comparisons can be made between the
two control methods. These comparisons will be made in the results and discussion
sections later in this chapter.
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Figure 6.15: Automatic Control System Decision Making Flow Diagram
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6.6 Results
Several different sources of data were produced from this study. The primary source of
data is the event and actions log recorded from the operator terminal which monitored
all of the button presses made by participants, including any cancellations of a request.
This data can be used to generate several metrics of performance:
• Overall Performance (Number of Successfully Destroyed/Missed/Overkilled SAM
Sites)
• Primary Objective Performance (Number of Successfully Destroyed/Missed/Overkilled
Primary Targets)
• Secondary Objective Performance (Number of Successfully Destroyed/Missed/Overkilled
Secondary Targets)
• Number of Re-Task Commands (20/20-10/<10 seconds remaining)
• Number of Abort Commands
The secondary source of data is the participants’ self reported workload scores. These
were generated using the NATA TLX method [159]. This data is useful to support
the outcomes achieved by participants from the primary data. Worse outcomes should
correlate with higher workload.
Lastly, the questionnaire responses provide several pieces of useful data:
• Participant Information (Age Range, Gender, Course and Previous Military Ex-
perience)
• Overall Rating of Aspects of Trial (Difficulty, Stress etc.)
• Reduced Need for Closure Scale (Personality Traits)
• Qualitative Written Feedback
Qualitative analysis was carried out on the written feedback to find common positive
and negative themes about the trial and the operator interface used.
Each of these data will be discussed herein:
6.6.1 Operator Terminal Logged Data
The first set of data produced from the data logging is the overall performance of
participants. Successfully hitting all 8 targets twice is considered a perfect score. This
task was achievable if the operator made their decisions quickly and effectively. The
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results for scenario vs. overall performance are presented in Table 6.5 and shown in
Figure 6.16. Note: in the following abbreviations are used in tables – Standard Error
(SErr), Variance (Var), Significance/p-value (sig).
Table 6.5: Participant Average Overall Score, Number of Missed Targets and Number
of Overkills
Difficulty
Overall Miss Overkill
Mean SD SErr Var Mean SD SErr Var Mean SD SErr Var
1 7.500 1.009 0.184 1.017 0.133 0.434 0.194 0.189 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
2 6.900 1.185 0.216 1.403 0.500 1.075 0.295 1.155 0.100 0.403 0.074 0.074
3 7.700 0.837 0.153 0.700 0.100 0.403 0.063 0.162 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
4 7.033 0.964 0.176 0.930 0.400 0.675 0.267 0.455 0.033 0.183 0.033 0.033
5 7.367 0.890 0.162 0.792 0.200 0.610 0.166 0.372 0.067 0.254 0.046 0.046
6 6.400 1.248 0.228 1.559 0.633 1.129 0.313 1.275 0.200 0.407 0.074 0.074
7 5.800 0.997 0.182 0.993 1.100 0.923 0.385 0.852 0.200 0.551 0.101 0.101
8 4.833 1.177 0.215 1.385 1.700 1.442 0.823 2.079 0.400 0.814 0.149 0.149
It is necessary to look individually at primary and secondary objective completion. The
participants were primed to perform the primary objective and do as best they could
at the secondary objective. Tables 6.6 and 6.7, and Figure 6.17, show the results of
scenario vs. primary and secondary objective performance respectively. Due to the
nature of the task given to the operators, it is expected that the primary objective
should always be completed and that the level to which the secondary objective is
completed will indicate the drop in performance.
Table 6.6: Participant Average Primary Objective Score, Number of Missed Targets
and Number of Overkills
Difficulty
Primary Partial Primary Miss Primary Overkill
Mean SD SErr Var Mean SD SErr Var Mean SD SErr Var
1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.300 0.988 0.180 0.976
2 0.100 0.403 0.074 0.162 0.033 0.183 0.033 0.033 0.867 1.306 0.238 1.706
3 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.100 0.305 0.056 0.093
4 0.033 0.183 0.033 0.033 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.733 1.285 0.235 1.651
5 0.067 0.254 0.046 0.064 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.633 0.615 0.112 0.378
6 0.200 0.407 0.074 0.166 0.067 0.254 0.046 0.064 1.233 1.736 0.317 3.013
7 0.200 0.551 0.101 0.303 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 2.567 2.144 0.392 4.599
8 0.400 0.814 0.149 0.662 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 5.100 4.649 0.849 21.610
Table 6.7: Participant Average Secondary Objective Score, Number of Missed Targets
and Number of Overkills
Difficulty
Secondary Partial Secondary Miss Secondary Overkill
Mean SD SErr Var Mean SD SErr Var Mean SD SErr Var
1 0.367 0.718 0.131 0.516 0.133 0.434 0.079 0.189 0.033 0.183 0.033 0.033
2 0.500 0.630 0.115 0.397 0.467 1.008 0.184 1.016 0.267 0.583 0.106 0.340
3 0.200 0.484 0.088 0.234 0.100 0.403 0.074 0.162 0.033 0.183 0.033 0.033
4 0.533 0.629 0.115 0.395 0.400 0.675 0.123 0.455 0.267 0.785 0.143 0.616
5 0.367 0.556 0.102 0.309 0.200 0.610 0.111 0.372 0.367 0.718 0.131 0.516
6 0.767 0.774 0.141 0.599 0.567 1.073 0.196 1.151 0.167 0.379 0.069 0.144
7 0.900 0.712 0.130 0.507 1.100 0.923 0.168 0.852 0.233 0.430 0.079 0.185
8 1.067 0.944 0.172 0.892 1.700 1.442 0.263 2.079 0.233 0.430 0.079 0.185
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Both the number and the frequency of re-task commands are good indicators of work-
load. Tables 6.8 and 6.9, and Figure 6.18 show the relationship between scenario and
the number of re-task commands overall, and based on the TTG remaining on the
LRAGM. The re-tasks based on TTG are grouped into decisions made with more than
20 seconds remaining, between 20 and 10 seconds remaining, and less than 10 seconds
remaining of flight time before impact. Table 6.10, and Figure 6.19 also shows the
average frequency of re-tasks in each scenario and Table 6.11 shows the average NASA
TLX score recorded by participants across the difficulty levels. These workload scores
are included in Figure 6.16.
The NASA TLX score is based upon weighting applied across the six different scores
provided by participants. Table 6.12 shows the average scores for the sources of work-
load. Mental and Temporal demand are the highest rated contributing sources, with
physical having almost no weighting on the overall workload scored.
Table 6.8: Average Total Scenario Re-Tasks (All TTGs)
Difficulty Re-Task Total
Mean SD SErr Var
1 23.867 14.012 2.558 196.326
2 29.567 12.805 2.338 163.978
3 23.400 12.974 2.369 168.317
4 25.767 10.085 1.841 101.702
5 26.267 12.597 2.300 158.685
6 24.300 11.136 2.033 124.010
7 20.633 9.212 1.682 84.861
8 17.433 10.371 1.894 107.564
Table 6.9: Average Scenario Re-Tasks Grouped by TTG
Difficulty
Re-Task TTG>20s Re-Task 20s >TTG >10s Re-Task 10s >TTG
Mean SD SErr Var Mean SD SErr Var Mean SD SErr Var
1 22.833 12.562 2.293 157.799 0.800 1.769 0.323 3.131 0.233 0.774 0.141 0.599
2 26.667 11.926 2.177 142.230 2.400 2.621 0.479 6.869 0.500 0.731 0.133 0.534
3 22.433 11.933 2.179 142.392 0.933 1.701 0.310 2.892 0.033 0.183 0.033 0.033
4 21.833 9.596 1.752 92.075 3.400 3.318 0.606 11.007 0.533 1.196 0.218 1.430
5 24.267 11.543 2.107 133.237 1.567 1.813 0.331 3.289 0.433 0.898 0.164 0.806
6 16.500 11.942 2.180 142.603 6.000 2.704 0.494 7.310 1.800 1.901 0.347 3.614
7 14.233 9.971 1.820 99.426 4.967 3.045 0.556 9.275 1.433 2.285 0.417 5.220
8 12.567 9.926 1.812 98.530 2.667 3.575 0.653 12.782 2.200 2.469 0.451 6.097
171
Table 6.10: Average Frequency of Actions (Num Actions Per Second)
Difficulty Frequency of Actions
Mean SD SErr Var
1 0.148 0.072 0.013 0.005
2 0.253 0.127 0.023 0.016
3 0.212 0.130 0.024 0.017
4 0.249 0.108 0.020 0.012
5 0.238 0.093 0.017 0.009
6 0.288 0.154 0.028 0.024
7 0.345 0.220 0.040 0.049
8 0.361 0.248 0.045 0.061
Table 6.11: Average NASA TLX Workload
Difficulty NASA TLX Workload
Mean SD SErr Var
1 7.011 3.570 0.652 12.743
2 10.146 3.727 0.680 13.888
3 7.980 3.559 0.650 12.663
4 9.811 4.330 0.791 18.749
5 9.383 3.812 0.696 14.528
6 11.179 3.379 0.617 11.419
7 12.609 3.583 0.654 12.840
8 14.202 3.335 0.609 11.125
Table 6.12: NASA TLX Sources of Workload Breakdown
Source Mean SD
Mental Demand 4.07 0.74
Physical Demand 0.47 0.82
Temporal Demand 4.07 1.05
Performance 2.37 1.16
Effort 2.10 1.24
Frustration 1.93 1.46
The difficulty level of the scenarios ranks from 1 (easiest) to 8 (hardest) with the sce-
narios with two missiles per salvo being easier than those with four missiles per salvo
with the same separation between salvoes. A simple Linear Regression analysis was
carried out using SPSS in order to establish whether a linear trend could be found
between the difficulty level and the various metrics collected, the main interest being
in the performance of participants, and the performance indicators.
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There are data that record the actual outcomes, such as number of primary targets
destroyed, that describe the performance of participants and data such as number of
re-tasks, or frequency of button clicks, that instead are latent variables that could be
useful indicators of the causes of different levels of performance. Table 6.13 shows the
Linear Regression output, the relevant significance values and the equation of the linear
function that represents the data.
Table 6.13: Linear Regression Analysis Results (* indicates statistical significance,
green indicates increasing with difficulty, red indicates decreasing with difficulty)
Correlations ANOVA Coefficients Rˆ2
Factor Pearson’s Sig F Sig Const Grad (B) Std Err (Adjusted)
Workload* 0.463 0.000 65.076 0.000 6.443 .855 .106 0.211
Overall* -0.551 0.000 103.497 0.000 8.177 -.330 .032 0.300
Miss* 0.408 0.000 47.421 0.000 -0.227 .183 .027 0.163
Overkill* 0.497 0.000 78.257 0.000 -0.883 .561 .063 0.244
Pri
Partial*
0.250 0.000 15.849 0.000 -0.086 .047 .012 0.058
Pri
Miss
0.008 0.450 0.016 0.900 0.011 .000 .003 -0.004
Pri
Over*
0.485 0.000 73.175 0.000 -0.99 .540 .063 0.232
Sec
Partial*
0.312 0.000 25.733 0.000 0.136 .100 .020 0.094
Sec
Miss*
0.413 0.000 48.898 0.000 -0.238 .183 .026 0.167
Sec
Over
0.093 0.076 2.064 0.125 0 N/A N/A 0.004
Abort
Conf
0.109 0.046 2.854 0.092 0.36 .068 .040 0.008
Re-Task
>20*
-0.339 0.000 30.93 0.000 28.17 -1.779 .320 0.111
Re-Task
20>n>10*
0.341 0.000 31.225 0.000 0.738 .467 .084 0.112
Re-Task
<10*
0.387 0.000 41.891 0.000 -0.37 .281 .043 0.146
Re-Task
Total*
-0.196 0.001 9.480 0.002 28.538 -.037 .012 0.034
Frequency* -0.456 0.000 62.48 0.000 0.146 .026 .004 0.012
Thirteen of the sixteen metrics investigated show a statistically significant correlation
between difficulty and the output value of the metric. Both direct measures of perfor-
mance and latent indicator variables of performance correlate with the difficulty level
of the scenario seen. From these data the following statements can be made: Workload
increases linearly with difficulty, overall performance reduces with increasing difficulty.
The number of missed targets increases with increased difficulty, as does the number
of overkills logged on targets.
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However, the R2 values (which measure goodness of fit to a regression line) are low in
all cases and there is potential to improve the relationships found by applying more
complex curves to the data. An investigation into curve fitting using the SPSS statistical
analysis software found increases in the R2 for the following cases shown in Table 6.14.
The increase in R2 values ranges from small increases of around 2%, to larger increases
of 13%. The average increase amongst these factors is 6%. Whilst the R2 values
achieved through both linear regression and curve fitting are all below 0.5 and average
around 0.21 (21%), it still shows that there is a relevant goodness of fit within the
model.
Table 6.14: Curved Regression Analysis Results (green indicates increasing with diffi-
culty, red indicates decreasing with difficulty
Factor Linear R2 Curve R2 Type sig constant X x2 x3
Workload 0.211 0.235 Cubic .000 5.918 2.101 -0.471 0.043
Overall 0.300 0.401 Cubic .000 7.448 -0.171 0.082 -0.013
Miss 0.163 0.237 Cubic .000 -0.007 0.317 -0.110 0.012
Overkill 0.244 0.364 Cubic .000 -0.519 1.322 -0.434 0.045
Pri
Partial
0.058 0.080 Cubic .000 -0.007 0.044 -0.015 0.002
Pri
Over
0.232 0.363 Cubic .000 -0.460 1.183 -0.415 0.044
Sec
Partial
0.094 0.120 Quad .000 0.496 -0.116 0.024 /
Sec
Miss
0.167 0.247 Cubic .000 -0.040 0.347 -0.119 0.013
Re-Task
>20
0.111 0.135 Cubic .000 19.871 4.551 -1.185 0.062
Re-Task
20>n>10
0.112 0.173 Cubic .000 3.205 -2.649 0.930 -0.075
Re-Task
<10
0.146 0.171 Cubic .000 0.771 -0.567 0.153 -0.007
Re-Task
Total
0.034 0.059 Cubic .000 23.848 1.335 -0.102 -0.021
Frequency 0.124 0.185 Inverse. .000 0.146 0.098 / /
Figure 6.16 show the best fit curved regression lines and the corresponding mean values.
It can be clearly seen that the workload increases continually as task difficulty increases,
with an exponential increase occurring towards the higher levels of difficulty. In tandem
with this, the overall score based upon the number of targets successfully destroyed
across both SAM sites (batteries) reduces in an exponential shape as difficulty level
increases. For the easier levels (1-4) the performance is relatively similar with a visible
inverse exponential drop off in performance occurring in the more difficult scenarios.
Two variables that show the causes of lower performance can be seen increasing in the
opposite trend. These are the number of missed targets, and the number of overkills.
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Overall these remain at similar levels for difficulties 1-4 and then increase exponentially
from levels 5 to 8.
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Figure 6.16: Workload and Overall Hit Targets, Missed Targets and Overkills vs. Dif-
ficulty (Curved Regression Fit)
However, when breaking down misses, partial hits against targets and the number of
overkills between the primary and secondary SAM batteries, there is a clear difference
between the two. Figure 6.17 shows the regression lines/curves for the primary and
secondary partial hits, complete misses and overkills. It can be seen that the number of
complete misses of primary targets is generally zero; this shows that the primary target
set is almost always completely destroyed in all difficulty levels. What is more striking
though is the significant number of overkills on primary targets when the difficulty level
increases. After level 5, the average number of overkills increases from below 1, to more
than 5 at difficulty level 8. This means that, on average, 5 missiles are being wasted.
There is a slight increase in primary partial hits as difficulty level increases, however,
the average at the most difficult level is still below 1. Secondary target overkills remains
low with varying difficulty, however, both partial and complete missed targets increase
with increasing difficulty. This is a latent effect of overkill on the primary targets. As
the number of overkills increases, the available missiles for the second SAM battery is
reduced to a point where there are no longer enough missiles to completely destroy it.
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Figure 6.17: Primary and Secondary Partial Hits, Missed Targets and Overkills vs.
Difficulty
A useful indicator of performance can be found in the number of re-tasks and the time
at which participants make their re-tasking decisions. Figure 6.18 shows that overall,
as the difficulty increases, the number of re-tasks decreases. This data can be grouped
based upon the missile’s TTG at point of re-task, as specified with the colour coding of
the interface. There are three groups; TTG greater than 20 seconds, TTG between 20
and 10 seconds, TTG less than 10 seconds. From Figure 6.18 it can be seen that as the
mean re-tasks when TTG is greater than 20 seconds falls with increasing difficulty, the
number of re-tasks in the 10-20 seconds and below 10 seconds groups increase. These
trends imply that as the difficulty level increases, participants become less able to re-
task the missiles between targets, and have less time to make their decisions. It further
suggests that participants’ ability to correctly predict the behaviour of the weapons in
flight is reduced as the difficulty increases.
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Figure 6.18: Number of Re-Task and Abort Commands vs. Difficulty
Lastly, the frequency of button presses is an interesting performance indicator. It can
be seen in Figure 6.19 that as the difficulty increases, the average number of re-tasks
per second also increases. This correlates well with the decrease in time available
as the scenario difficulty increases. However, the number of re-tasking decisions made
overall also decreases as difficulty increases meaning that the reduction in time available
for re-tasking has a larger effect on the frequency of re-tasks than the decrease in
re-tasks overall. The point of overall performance drop off, and its corresponding
frequency of actions may be a good indicator of the upper threshold to the limit of
human operator capacity as indicated in a Cummings study that highlighted a possible
optimum percentage busy time of 70% [36].
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Figure 6.19: Frequency of Actions vs. Difficulty
6.6.2 Heat Maps
Human Factors studies are often exploratory and contain data that can often best be
understood when presented graphically. The methods of participants when completing
the different scenarios can be analysed by looking at heat maps that depict the concen-
tration of the participants’ activity with relation to the TAT. The heat maps are laid
out as a grid representation of the TAT, with Rows indicating the different weapons
and Columns indicating the targets. Four heat maps were generated for each scenario
showing:
• LRAGMs destroyed by the SAM sites
• Valid LRAGM hits on SAM sites (non-overkill)
• Invalid LRAGM hits on SAM sites (overkills)
• Aborted LRAGMs
The colour intensity of the grid boxes corresponds to the frequency of events occurring
across the population of participants. These heat maps provide a useful insight, par-
ticularly when the method that participants can use to complete the task is unbounded.
178
Figure 6.20 to Figure 6.27 show the heat maps generated (from difficulty level 1 to
8) of the frequency of the four main events that occur during the scenarios. There is
a clear difference between scenarios in the overkill frequency (confirmed statistically
by the regression results) as well as the in the other performance metrics. The heat
maps show where the increase in the overkill frequency occurs in each scenario. As the
scenarios become more difficult, the number of overkills on primary targets increases,
particularly in LRAGMs that immediately follow the successfully hit primary targets.
Another interesting artefact from the data is the distribution of LRAGM to target
assignments aimed at the Secondary SAM battery. In the easier scenarios there is a
more varied distribution of the LRAGM amongst the four secondary targets, however,
when the scenarios become more difficult there is far less variation in the distribution
of LRAGMs. This corresponds well with the regression trends of decreasing re-tasking
as difficulty levels increase. Operators are less likely to manipulate the method of pros-
ecuting the SAM batteries if they are not confident that there is enough time to do so.
Whilst observing participants, an interesting behaviour was witnessed. Instead of re-
tasking missiles in order to recover an even distribution when having lost an in-flight
missile, this participant deliberately re-tasked all missiles evenly across the secondary
set of targets as soon as they were able to do so. Then when the primary SAM site
had expended its ammunition the participant would re-task eight missiles back to the
primary targets in an even distribution, with plenty of time to do so in each difficulty
level. In some cases early salvoes had already passed the primary targets, and in these
cases the participant would re-task the first safe to re-task missiles that had not yet
passed the primary targets. This method allowed the participant to achieve both the
primary and secondary objectives at all difficulty levels.
This method was trialled oﬄine in the development research laboratory with researchers
who were involved in running the trials. Although of no scientific merit, the method
did provide operators the ability to complete the primary and secondary tasks in all
difficulty levels. The method allows for the operator to spend less time dynamically
responding to the loss of own assets, and instead observe the system and the SAM
intercepts and then re-task the appropriate number of missiles to complete the task
with confidence that they will hit their target. Whilst this strategy works for the pri-
mary target, the operator must still be reactive in the prosecution of the secondary
objectives. Interestingly though, from a weapon conservation perspective. If any mis-
siles successfully pass through the engagement zone of the primary targets, their utility
at wasting the enemy’s ammunition is increased and could reduce the overall missiles
needed to complete this type of SEAD scenario.
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Figure 6.20: Participant Scenario 1 Heat Maps of Intercepted (Destroyed) LRAGM,
LRAGM Hits on Target, LRAGM Overkills on Target, LRAGM Abort from Target
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Figure 6.21: Participant Scenario 2 Heat Maps of Intercepted (Destroyed) LRAGM,
LRAGM Hits on Target, LRAGM Overkills on Target, LRAGM Abort from Target
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Figure 6.22: Participant Scenario 3 Heat Maps of Intercepted (Destroyed) LRAGM,
LRAGM Hits on Target, LRAGM Overkills on Target, LRAGM Abort from Target
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Figure 6.23: Participant Scenario 4 Heat Maps of Intercepted (Destroyed) LRAGM,
LRAGM Hits on Target, LRAGM Overkills on Target, LRAGM Abort from Target
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Figure 6.24: Participant Scenario 5 Heat Maps of Intercepted (Destroyed) LRAGM,
LRAGM Hits on Target, LRAGM Overkills on Target, LRAGM Abort from Target
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Figure 6.25: Participant Scenario 6 Heat Maps of Intercepted (Destroyed) LRAGM,
LRAGM Hits on Target, LRAGM Overkills on Target, LRAGM Abort from Target
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Figure 6.26: Participant Scenario 7 Heat Maps of Intercepted (Destroyed) LRAGM,
LRAGM Hits on Target, LRAGM Overkills on Target, LRAGM Abort from Target
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Figure 6.27: Participant Scenario 8 Heat Maps of Intercepted (Destroyed) LRAGM,
LRAGM Hits on Target, LRAGM Overkills on Target, LRAGM Abort from Target
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6.6.3 Automated System Data
Action and event data was logged from the ACS when completing the 8 different scenar-
ios. The benefit of using an ACS that makes clear, logical decisions is that actions and
events that occur in each difficulty level do not differ between independent runs. This
means that the results for each difficulty level are repeatable, and that the decisions
made by the ACS are traceable. The ACS totals in four categories: Hits, Destroyed,
Misses and Overkills can be seen in Figure 6.28. As the difficulty level increases, the
ACS’s performance metrics remain the same. Total hits on targets are the same across
difficulty levels at 16, two hits per target. The number of destroyed targets is also the
same across all levels at 8. Both miss, and overkill numbers are zero across all the
difficulty levels.
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Figure 6.28: ACS Total Hits, Destroyed Targets, Misses and Overkills vs. Difficulty
Figure 6.29 shows the number of actions carried out by the ACS in each scenario. The
mean number of re-tasks is relatively similar with one clear outlier. When looking at
the heat maps it can be seen that for scenario 3 the ACS managed to re-task a missile
on to the secondary target set early. This has the knock on effect of requiring re-tasks
of missiles 17, 18, and 23 back to the primary targets, increasing the number of re-tasks.
It is worth noting that the ACS completed this scenario with one spare missile at the
end that was aborted.
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Figure 6.29: ACS Number of Re-Task, Re-Task Salvo, and Abort Actions vs. Difficulty
Figure 6.30 shows that the frequency of decision making by the ACS follows the same
trend as participant data, with an increase in difficulty increasing the frequency of
decisions made. Direct comparison the participant data frequency graph, Figure 6.19,
shows that the ACS makes more re-tasking commands than the operators. This includes
an adjustment made for the number of re-task salvo confirmations that effectively re-
tasks 2/4 missiles rather than just one. The lower than expected frequency seen in
Figure 6.30 (based on the trend seen in the figure) is a result of fewer re-tasks being
needed to complete the task due to the missiles that are lost through being intercepted
by the enemy’s SAMs.
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Figure 6.30: ACS Frequency of Actions vs. Difficulty
Heat maps were also generated to show the ACS method for completing each difficulty
level. The heat maps are shown in Figure 6.31 (difficulty level 1) to Figure 6.38 (diffi-
culty level 8). The method of completing each difficulty level is the same. The LRAGM
are not re-tasked unless they have to be, allowing for the staggered paired targeting of
the SAM batteries to continue as intended when the weapons are launched. Following
the successful destruction of the primary target, or the acknowledgement that the SAM
battery has been depleted of weapons, all remaining LRAGM are re-tasked across to
the second SAM battery. What is also clear from these Figures is that there are no
overkills made against targets regardless of the difficulty level, and that there are two
scenarios in which aborts occur – to prevent overkill on a target at the second SAM
site after completing all the objectives.
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Figure 6.31: ACS Scenario 1 Heat Maps of Intercepted (Destroyed) LRAGM, LRAGM
Hits on Target, LRAGM Overkills on Target, LRAGM Abort from Target
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Figure 6.32: ACS Scenario 2 Heat Maps of Intercepted (Destroyed) LRAGM, LRAGM
Hits on Target, LRAGM Overkills on Target, LRAGM Abort from Target
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Figure 6.33: ACS Scenario 3 Heat Maps of Intercepted (Destroyed) LRAGM, LRAGM
Hits on Target, LRAGM Overkills on Target, LRAGM Abort from Target
2 4 6 8
5
10
15
20
25
30
 
Scenario
Heatmap Destroyed Scenario: 4
 
AG
M
 O
rd
er
2 4 6 8
5
10
15
20
25
30
 
Scenario
Heatmap Hits Scenario: 4
 
AG
M
 O
rd
er
2 4 6 8
5
10
15
20
25
30
Scenario
AG
M
 O
rd
er
Heatmap Overkills Scenario: 4
 
 
2 4 6 8
5
10
15
20
25
30
Scenario
AG
M
 O
rd
er
Heatmap Abort Scenario: 4
 
 
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Figure 6.34: ACS Scenario 4 Heat Maps of Intercepted (Destroyed) LRAGM, LRAGM
Hits on Target, LRAGM Overkills on Target, LRAGM Abort from Target
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Figure 6.35: ACS Scenario 5 Heat Maps of Intercepted (Destroyed) LRAGM, LRAGM
Hits on Target, LRAGM Overkills on Target, LRAGM Abort from Target
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Figure 6.36: ACS Scenario 6 Heat Maps of Intercepted (Destroyed) LRAGM, LRAGM
Hits on Target, LRAGM Overkills on Target, LRAGM Abort from Target
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Figure 6.37: ACS Scenario 7 Heat Maps of Intercepted (Destroyed) LRAGM, LRAGM
Hits on Target, LRAGM Overkills on Target, LRAGM Abort from Target
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Figure 6.38: ACS Scenario 8 Heat Maps of Intercepted (Destroyed) LRAGM, LRAGM
Hits on Target, LRAGM Overkills on Target, LRAGM Abort from Target
In order to directly compare these heat maps, the information was collated between
both sets and the ratio between ACS to Participant frequency was used to create
a third set of heat maps showing the differences [167]. Figure 6.39 to Figure 6.46
show these relationships (for difficulty level 1 through to difficulty level 8), with no
difference between ACS or Participant data shown at white. A higher occurrence of
Participants shown in red, and a higher occurrence of ACS shown as blue. With the
ACS never overkilling a target, the overkill ratio always shows elements of red where
participants make mistakes. These patches of red are faded for the easy scenarios, but
as the scenarios become more difficult (and in line with the regression trends shown
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previously) the intensity of red and the size of the patches increases. For the highest
difficulty it can be seen that overkills occur not only on the next wave of ASM following
destruction of the first SAM battery, but also on the wave following that. This is
indicative of the participants becoming so overwhelmed that are unable to make any
further useful decisions once the primary SAM battery is destroyed.
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Figure 6.39: Ratio of Difference between ACS and Participants for Scenario 1. Red is
higher frequency of Participants than ACS actions, Blue is higher frequency of ACS
than Participants actions
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Figure 6.40: Ratio of Difference between ACS and Participants for Scenario 2. Red is
higher frequency of Participants than ACS actions, Blue is higher frequency of ACS
than Participants actions
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Figure 6.41: Ratio of Difference between ACS and Participants for Scenario 3. Red is
higher frequency of Participants than ACS actions, Blue is higher frequency of ACS
than Participants actions
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Figure 6.42: Ratio of Difference between ACS and Participants for Scenario 4. Red is
higher frequency of Participants than ACS actions, Blue is higher frequency of ACS
than Participants actions
192
2 4 6 8
5
10
15
20
25
30
 
Scenario
Ratio Destroyed Scenario: 5
 
AG
M
 O
rd
er
2 4 6 8
5
10
15
20
25
30
 
Scenario
Ratio Hits Scenario: 5
 
AG
M
 O
rd
er
2 4 6 8
5
10
15
20
25
30
 
Scenario
Ratio Overkills Scenario: 5
 
AG
M
 O
rd
er
2 4 6 8
5
10
15
20
25
30
 
Scenario
Ratio Abort Scenario: 5
 
AG
M
 O
rd
er
−1
−0.8
−0.6
−0.4
−0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Figure 6.43: Ratio of Difference between ACS and Participants for Scenario 5. Red is
higher frequency of Participants than ACS actions, Blue is higher frequency of ACS
than Participants actions
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Figure 6.44: Ratio of Difference between ACS and Participants for Scenario 6. Red is
higher frequency of Participants than ACS actions, Blue is higher frequency of ACS
than Participants actions
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Figure 6.45: Ratio of Difference between ACS and Participants for Scenario 7. Red is
higher frequency of Participants than ACS actions, Blue is higher frequency of ACS
than Participants actions
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Figure 6.46: Ratio of Difference between ACS and Participants for Scenario 8. Red is
higher frequency of Participants than ACS actions, Blue is higher frequency of ACS
than Participants actions
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6.6.4 Qualitative Analysis
The feedback questionnaires were investigated using thematic analysis techniques and
the OSR NVivo 10 software package. The information gathered was retrospective and
varying in both quality and quantity, with some participants giving the questionnaire
a lot of thought, whilst others writing single sentence or word answers. The qualitative
analysis is useful as it provides context to the raw data collected from the performance
metrics and is supportive of a mixed methods approach – necessary for Human Factors
and Psychology research. Key themes from the written responses to the questionnaire
were identified and were split into four main categories of nodes with various sub-nodes
as follows:
• Cause of Errors
• Cognitive Processes
– Positive Comments
– Negative Comments
• Display
– Positive Comments
– Negative Comments
– Suggestions
∗ Colour Changes
∗ Map Comments
∗ Request for Automation
∗ Size of TAT Elements
• Strategies
The nodes were developed as coding took place to allow for dynamic generation of the
above model. The Cause of Errors node is used to code any feedback that relates to any
indication of a cause of error. This is when a participant volunteers information relat-
ing to either a display element or some method that the participant is using, causing a
perceived error. The Cognitive Processes node is used to code any effect highlighted as
a cognitive process, and these were split between general comments, positive comments
and negative comments. The Display node was used to code any information relating
to the display. As the display is the main interface for users, there was a wealth of
information to code. In the feedback questionnaire there is a section specifically for par-
ticipants to make suggestions for improving elements of the display. Therefore, in this
node, there are the following sub nodes, Positive Comments and Negative Comments
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for general feedback, and a Suggestions node for recommendations. Further, within the
coded information for Suggestions there were three main themes found. These related
to Colour Changes, Map Changes and Size changes for TAT Elements. Lastly, a Strate-
gies node allowed coding of any information related to the strategy used by participants.
Sources and References are useful indicators of the themes model. Table 6.15 shows
the model in more detail, Figure 6.47 shows a tree map of the number of items coded
to each node, and Figure 6.48 shows the number of items coded in from each source.
Table 6.15: Node Coding Model
Nodes Number of coding references Number of items coded % of participants
Nodes Cause of Errors 106 30 100
Nodes Cognitive Processes 15 11 37
Nodes Cognitive Processes Negative Comments 39 22 73
Nodes Cognitive Processes Positive Comments 20 12 40
Nodes Display 1 1 3
Nodes Display Negative Comments 32 20 67
Nodes Display Positive Comments 14 10 33
Nodes Display Suggestions 19 15 50
Nodes Display Suggestions Colour Changes 22 17 57
Nodes Display Suggestions Map Comments 12 8 27
Nodes Display Suggestions Request for Automation 3 1 3
Nodes Display Suggestions Size of TAT Elements 11 8 27
Display
Cause of Errors
Strategies
Cognitive Processes
Suggestions Negative
Comments
Positive
Comments
Colour
Changes
Map
Comments
Size of TAT
Elements
Requested
Automation
Negative
Comments
Positive
Comments
Figure 6.47: Tree Diagram of Number of Items Coded for Each Node - Area Depicts
Number of Coded Items
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Figure 6.48: Tree Diagram of Number of Items Coded from Each Participant - Area
Depicts Number of Coded Items
There was feedback coded from all 30 participants in the Cause of Errors nodes. All
but two participants commented on using some sort of strategy. Under the Display
node the number of Negative Comments nodes is 20, to only 10 Positive Comments.
Further the number of actual coded references shows the same approximate ratio of
2:1 with 32 coding references from all sources for Negative Comments and only 14 for
Positive Comments. The same relationship is present in the Cognitive Processes node
where a ratio of approximately 2:1 exists between negative and positive comments. The
Display<Suggestions nodes provide interesting feedback into where the visual system
needs improvement. Slightly more than half (57%) of participants commented on mak-
ing colour changes to the display – although these are occasionally conflicting between
participants. A smaller percentage of participants suggested changes to Map elements
and the sizing of objects within the TAT (27% in both cases). Interestingly only one
participant requested more automation for overall task allocation between missiles, and
automatic re-tasking. Specifically, the automatic re-tasking of weapons from first SAM
site targets to second SAM site targets when the first SAM site was destroyed. Lastly
Figure 6.48 shows that in all participants provided responses to code from in their
questionnaire responses. The average number of items coded per participant was 16.3,
with a standard deviation of 6.0. The maximum number of coded items was 30, and
the minimum was 6.
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6.7 Discussion
The participant data shows that there are clear correlations between difficulty and re-
ported workload. This is as expected and provides evidence that the difficulty settings
selected are appropriate with even spacing between the difficulty levels during initial
trial coding. Further it provides credibility that the self reported data gathered from
the NASA TLX Workload Scales were being used appropriately by participants and
that it is a valuable tool for measuring workload.
The performance of participants reduces as the scenarios increase in difficulty and the
trend from the NASA TLX workload suggest that the drop off in performance should
be somewhat linear in the lower difficulty scenarios, with an exponential decrease in
performance from scenario 5 onwards. The initial hypothesis was that, as difficulty in-
creases, there will be a clear drop off point in performance. This drop off point can be
clearly seen in the performance data plots, where participant performance is compara-
ble with the automated system (with some small variance) until the operators become
overwhelmed and their ability to complete the task reduces. This point is at difficulty
level 6 – when missiles are launched in salvoes of 4 and at an interval of 10s. This is
an effective rate of 1 missile every 2.5 seconds and a time between salvoes missiles of
6 seconds. The performance drop off is such that on average, at difficulty level 8, the
participants are only able to complete the primary objective.
The source of the errors that occur in re-tasking, and missing targets, is the overkill
on primary targets. This can be seen increasing as difficulty level increases in Figures
6.20 to 6.27. In scenarios 1-4, the overkills and subsequent misses are very low. Then
as difficulty level increases, the number of overkills increases in an exponential shape,
with the number of missed targets also increasing with the same shape but at half the
magnitude (due to the two missiles to one target rule). The significant rise in overkill
occurrences causes there to be insufficient missiles being available to prosecute the sec-
ond SAM battery. As explained in section 6.1.3 the minimum number of LRAGM
needed to prosecute a single SAM battery is 16. If more than 16 of the available 32
missiles are used to complete the primary objective there is a significant chance that
the secondary objective will not be completed.
The behaviour of re-task quantity as difficulty is particularly interesting. As difficulty
increases, it would be expected that decisions are made closer to the point when the
LRAGM can no longer be re-tasked. What is significant however, is that even though
participants are informed explicitly that they should not attempt re-tasks when the
TTG value is below 5 seconds, they still attempt to do so. What was less expected
was the number of re-tasks overall dropping by 30% from the easier to more difficult
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scenarios, and how much the fall in re-tasks where there is greater than 20 seconds
remaining accounts for this. Further it is interesting that the number of abort deci-
sions made is very low across all scenarios even though there was clearly an issue with
overkills, and that participants were specifically instructed to abort rather than allow
overkill events to occur. There is a very small increase in the mean number of aborts
as difficulty increases, but this is negligible compared to the mean number of overkills.
6.8 Chapter Summary
This chapter has detailed the background, development and findings of a human fac-
tors trial on a remote operator station designed with the express purpose of aiding
decision making, using a SEAD mission as the basis for testing. Relevant background
literature relating to previous studies into both re-tasking, and interface design, as well
as the theory and implementation of ecological interface design have been examined.
The development of the overall system, both from the point of view of generating rep-
resentative models of weapon systems, and air defence systems, as well as from the
perspective of developing the operators’ GUI were discussed.
A psychological human factors study was outlined and the results were explained in
detail. The findings of the trial, in which human participants were tasked to re-task
weapons to effectively carry out a successful SEAD mission, were also compared to
an ACS. Human performance when using the DSS was found to be within reasonable
performance levels at the easy and moderate difficulty scenario levels when compared
to the ‘perfect’ ACS. As the scenarios became more difficult, the participants’ perfor-
mance dropped off quickly and only partial completion of the mission was achievable.
There were a number of specific indicators of errors made by participants, and the
source of the error. For example, the error that caused the performance drop off was
overkill events occurring on the primary SAM battery targets, which led to insufficient
missiles being available to successfully prosecute the second SAM battery. After diffi-
culty level 5 (10 seconds between salvoes, 2 missiles per salvo), the number of overkills
against primary targets increases quickly from a mean of 0.63, to mean of 5.10 at level
8 (5 seconds between salvoes, 4 missiles per salvo). The data corresponds well with
NASA TLX workload ratings and qualitative thematic analysis, the latter suggests
that some slight changes in colour and salience of elements of the display could help to
improve the overall SA and increase operator performance.
Overall this chapter has concluded that complex and time-limited decision making
can be achieved at effective levels by human operators from a lay but computer skilled
background. It has found that even when comparing performance against a perfect
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automated process, it may not be necessary to remove the human operator from being
‘in the loop’. Instead it would be prevalent to focus research and development towards
improving the interface and systems that the human is interacting with to improve
performance in ‘worst case’ scenarios.
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Chapter 7
Summary and Conclusions
7.1 Summary
This thesis focused on the area of NEW in a data-linked military as part of NEC and
highlights the need for an in depth understanding of the Human Factors issues pertain-
ing to its use. New capabilities that are developed through application of networking to
the operation of weapon systems will always need human factors research to underpin
systems design. This thesis investigates the process of designing a novel interface for
use in a new domain and presents findings of two participant studies to support its
conclusions. The context of the thesis is introduced in Chapter 1.
In Chapter 2 the research area and technical need for the research was highlighted,
followed by critiques of related psychological research into interface design in related
contexts. Further, the use of remote systems by human operators, the related SA and
decision making theory was also discussed.
Chapter 3 expands on the background literature and describes the tools developed to
allow for the following studies into the applicability of NEC in three different cases that
represent different levels of C2 systems. To support this research, two air-to-surface
weapons were modelled using MATLAB. These were then integrated into a distributed
simulation environment where pilots and remote operators could interface with the
weapons simulations. This chapter also discussed the method of communicating infor-
mation, based upon a number of military standards, and describes the implementation
of the front end operator interface used by participants in the human factors trials
conducted.
Chapter 4 presents an investigation into the real-time application of an automated
task allocation algorithm for a remote operator terminal. The automated task alloca-
tion algorithm allocates mixed aircraft formations amongst mixed and unknown target
types. The system made use of the networking and simulation environment as a proof
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of concept exercise before developing human factors trials. A simulated annealing op-
timisation process was applied to distribute weapon allocations across target set such
that a cost function was minimised. The cost function takes into account the correct
matching of weapon effect to target type, as well as aiming to reduce the time taken to
complete the overall tasks. Further, conditions were included for CAS priority missions.
Solutions generated by the algorithm were incorporated into the operator terminal to
support their decision making.
Chapter 5 then set out to establish a base line standard for remote operator terminals
for the purpose of re-tasking NEW in a real-time distributed simulation environment.
A human factors participant trial was carried out in a single weapon re-tasking scenario
to investigate the advantages and disadvantages associated with two common types of
information representation that had not been previously applied in this context. The
advantages and disadvantages of each type of display are discussed in the literature,
however, in general terms there are still conflicting opinions about which is more suit-
able. The trial found that the RAR of a weapon should be displayed numerically rather
than as a graphical overlay on the map – as operators are more likely to make errors
when using the graphical overlay. This finding differs from the more established prac-
tice of showing the full graphical overlay to weapons operators on-board aircraft.
Chapter 6 takes the findings from the study in Chapter 5 and expands the use of the
remote operator system to handling multiple re-tasking of multiple in-flight weapons
against multiple targets – the highest complexity level at which such a re-tasking sys-
tem may need to be used. The findings from Chapter 5 were adapted into a large scale
operator system that facilitated operator decision making. A human factors partic-
ipant trial was then conducted to investigate the limits of operators ability to make
effective decisions and complete a set of mission objectives. A computer automated re-
tasking process was also developed such that human performance could be compared
to an ideal case solution where the automated system always follows the same, logical
decision making process set out based upon the same mission goals. When compared
directly, it was found that human operators are able to carry out re-tasking duties in
complex scenarios using the DSS developed at moderate levels of difficulty. A threshold
was discovered beyond which human operator performance reduces quickly below the
constant level of the automated system.
Overall this thesis has demonstrated that firstly, the development of distributed sim-
ulation networks and modelling of appropriate network architectures can be used to
conduct very meaningful research into the use of NEWs by remote operators. Sec-
ondly it has provided a novel insight into the way in which re-tasking DSS should be
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developed, using the findings herein to shape the way in which key decision making
information is displayed to operators when carrying out complex tasks in time limited
situations. Further, comparison with idealised decision making has demonstrated that
human operators are capable of carrying out such tasks, even at moderate levels of
pace, and thus should be kept in the loop. The upper frequency limit was found to be
one missile every 2.5 seconds, and that once this limit is passed, performance drops off
exponentially. As technology develops, it is increasingly important that the capabili-
ties that have become technically possible are also sufficiently presented to a human
operator such that they can carry out their duties effectively. The way in which infor-
mation such as the RAR and the pace at which operations are carried out in complex
environments must be done with the knowledge of the way in which their use will affect
operators.
7.2 Limitations
One limitation of the overall system design used for this research was the way in which
the messaging structure was established. Unfortunately, due to the inability to access
and/or disseminate classified information, the MIL-STD-6017 VMF was unable to be
fully implemented. The VMF K-Series document contains the specific format of all
data packets that can be sent using VMF. As access to this document is classified, the
system developed was unable to include a direct reproduction of this message structure.
Instead, a few resources (as discussed in Chapter 3) discussed partial message struc-
tures that allowed for the inclusion of a representative network architecture that would
facilitate the expansion of the K-Series message structure should it be declassified in
the future.
Another limitation involves the use of university students as participants. Initially
the research was intending to use participants from military establishments, with ad-
ditional insight from the military and the defence industry. Unfortunately, access to
military personnel as participants was not achievable. Instead, contact with military
establishments (DSTL) and industry (MBDA) provided useful input to the research
project. As discussed in Chapter 2, useful insight can still be drawn from university
students in the participant trials that were carried out. The operator performance
limits found may well improve when testing military personnel although there is no
guarantee or knowledge of how much performance will improve.
The final limitation that needs referring to is the time allocated to this research, and as
such the number of trials that were conducted. The pace of this type of human factors
research is limited by the time it takes to carry out such studies; several stages are
involved, from initial conception to the generation of final results; development of the
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system, testing and debugging of software, finalising designs, ethics approval process,
recruiting of participants, training, running trials, data collection and processing, data
analysis, and generation of final results. Each section can take anywhere from one to
three or more months.
7.3 Recommendations for Future Work
Moving forward with the research findings in this thesis, one study that would be of
great interest would be to repeat the SEAD trial with the use of military personnel
with specific experience in operating similar remote systems (such as UAVs). Such a
study would be able to provide direct comparisons between lay participants and service
personnel. Whilst it might be expected that service personnel would have better per-
formance overall, and that this would result in a higher difficulty level being achievable
before drop off in performance, they would be equally inexperienced using the specific
DSS and as such may have similar performance levels. The direct input from military
operators would no doubt offer up adaptations to the system that might facilitate the
way in which SME operators would use the system. A study into the differences be-
tween lay and military operators would prove very useful in this research area.
Additional research trials would be useful for establishing the impact of making the
changes set out by participants in feedback. A number of key areas were highlighted
by participants about the display, particularly colour and salience of the current as-
signment of missiles to their targets in the second participant trial. Incremental im-
provements based upon this feedback could be conducted that would help to confirm
whether the feedback provided proved useful. Although results found in the first par-
ticipant trial indicate that participants may be underestimating their performance and
changing the colour and salience of individual elements in the display may not impact
on their performance at all.
Lastly, a full demonstration of the distributed simulation using trained military per-
sonnel would prove to be very useful in highlighting further decision making and C2
issues that may arise in carrying out complex remote weapon re-tasking missions. SA
can be both supplemented or confused when operators have both audio and visual cues
– and it would be of great interest to investigate the change in performance levels when
operators are connected via verbal communication with other elements in the simulated
environment.
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